So, in the way back machine of 2004, I started a debate Success in Iraq. In that debate, I posed the following two questions:

What do you believe the criteria for success in Iraq are (or should be)? What do you believe the criteria for failure in Iraq are (or should be)?

A number of you answered and quite thoughtfully I might add. This debate isn't about those questions in particular; though, if you wish to answer them, then that's fine. What this debate is about is whether or not "success" has been achieved based on what was stated by those folks. More importantly, have we met the criteria for failure as enumerated. I'll quote a few:

On the topic of criteria for failure:



So the question for debate:

Given what you've stated previously on this topic, has the criteria for failure in Iraq been achieved?

Given what you've stated previously on this topic, has the criteria for success been achieved?

I would certainly say that we have neither succeeded nor definitively failed in Iraq.

It is certainly more difficult than I would have expected at this point particularly in regards to basic services and the coverage of Iraqi troops.

Both are largely the fault of a insurgency that very quickly became a terrorists campaign against stability with no bounds.

The fact that the terrorists are willing to blow up mater mains and destroy oil pipelines that service their own country makes the process more difficult on the economic side, but interestingly, easier on the political side where we have seen steady progress.

The insurgency has no pull in mainstream Iraqi politics even the Shia extremists like Sadr are represented slimly.

That is a remarkably good sign.

As long as the vast majority of Iraqis see no reason to join the insurgency, success is with reach.

I didn't post in the previous thread, but I'll add my two cents concerning the successes and failures to date in Iraq.

Failures - concerning the Iraqi military and security forces (ISF), there is still no semblance of national command and control organic to the Iraqi's. The crux of this still lies within the Multi-National forces Command.
There is no organic logistic and maintenance program in place for the ISF. Not that it matters a great deal, the ISF lacks the needed armor, light vehicles and rotary wing aircraft to deal with the insurgency effectively.
The US Army is near broke, not ineffective, but at a loss as how to manage unit rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, rotations of personnel between combat units and supporting (TRADOC) units, all the while standing up new Brigade Units of Action (UA's) and restructuring the existing divisions around the UA's and the units stationing plan. I can speak from personal ongoing experience that the Human Resources Command is lost like a fart in a whirlwind, due in major part to the ongoing operations in Iraq.
The operations tempo (OPTEMPO) that Iraq is causing has forced the Department of Defense to shift away from the previous two major theater of war capability, leaving North Korea and Iran confidant that we could not effectively deal with a crisis involving those two or nearly any other nation.
Our forces are still not being adequately trained in the arab and Kurdish languages and customs to prevent mis-communications that often results in death, injury or loss of property. All of the above, quite obviously, adds to resentment of US forces.
The State Department and USAID are woefully undermanned in theater, forcing military Civil Affairs personnel to become de facto and de jure mayors and civil administrators. They do a wonderful job in most cases, but their primary function is to act as liaison with those agencies and the populace, not in place of them.
Reporters are often isolated in the Green Zone, unable to get first hand information without fear of death or kidnapping. Not only does this hamstring the public relations image of the status of life in Iraq, it keeps them from seeing the successes that are happening first hand.
Signs of US caused war damage are still evident, and necessary infrastructure is still not yet at sufficient capacity.

Successes - Our troops are doing amazing things with little resources and little command guidance. From humanitarian projects, civil-military councils and general security operations, our forces continue to apply lessons learned and are meeting with greater successes in daily operations.
LTG Dave Petreaus, formerly commander of the 101st Airborne Division, has done a monumental job building the ISF. It's ashame he wasn't placed in that position at the outset of post combat operations.
At the current rate, by mid 2006, there will be 10 ISF division headquarters, with approximately 250,000 combat ready troops at Iraq's disposal.
Though the insurgents still cause near daily casualties, they have shown a level of desperation by their ever limited capability to successfully attack coalition forces without annihilation. The targeting of groups of children and teaching hospitals shows that only the softest targets are successfully within reach, and a continuance of this counter productive strategy will only hasten the decline of popular support for the insurgents.

Overall, I call it a draw. As with teetering on a see-saw, it could turn either way. But with the upcoming Iraqi constitution and more Sunni participation in the political process, I am optimistic.

I didn't get the opportunity to respond to the other topic, but I thought that the following might make for an interesting addition to this one. The Bush administration is officially lowering the bar on success in Iraq:

Wow is that a hint of honesty I hear coming through, somewhat anonymously, from the Bush administration?

But wait it gets better...


Things don't look so great for the Iraqis either - "last throes" indeed:


In my opinion we failed quite some time ago, it just takes a while for people to come around and realize that. Now the question remains - when are we going to leave?

You mean just like how they were "officially" changing the name of the "War on Terror"?

When are we going to learn that the U.S. doesn't (indeed can't) officially change anything on the word of "unnamed U.S. officials"?


For a person familiar with the actual situation on the ground, this is just silly.

First the idea of an Islamic Republic is hardly incongruous with democracy. Afghanistan chose to be officially recognized as an Islamic Republic as well, though of course noting that won't score political points because the political process was facilitated through the UN, not the Bush administration.

If this official is implying Iraq is choosing the way of Iran, he/she's out of the loop.
Iraq constitution will acknowledge in principle Islam's role in forming moral laws. Iraq's are almost 100% agreed upon avoiding any sort of theocracy.

They were yelling "no turbans in government" long ago.

Iraqis, in every poll and every interview with political leaders are going to enshrine freedom of religion into the constitution. An Iraqi who does not wish to conform to Sharia will not be forced to.

Again with the anonymous, conspicuously uninformed, sources.

Secondly, that's just inaccurate.

Iraq parties fight for final deal


I've been watching this situation closely since it's inception, I can say with absolute certainty that this is pure nonsense and anyone of Iraq's political or civic leaders would tell you the exact same thing.

Anyone who is not blinded by partisanship can acknowledge there has been significant progress in Iraq. The politcal situation is proceeding FAR better than many people feared.

Well thanks for that Turnea, but I think you'll find that my opinion on the matter doesn't have anything to do with the person in office and it has everything to do with the careless manner in which lives are being wasted over there due to picking a fight we didn't need to win and then not setting ourselves up strategically to win it. That is simple incompetence and I expect a whole lot more from whoever is in office regardless of what party they belong to. Had Kerry been elected to office I can guarantee you I would by typing the same thing if we weren't well on the way to pulling out of Iraq.

But it would be really nice if you'd answer the questions for debate instead of just sniping my position. When would you say this whole thing has been a success? When would you say it has been a failure? How many lives, billions of dollars and years are your conditions going to cost? Furthermore, by "staying the course" in Iraq how many additional real threats to our security, such as Iran, are we going to be incapable of responding to?

I think there are precious few examples in all of military history where an army has beaten an insurgency - there is a good reason for that. Even Bush's father was smart enough to realize what a mess invading Iraq would be. So don't tell me these views are partisan Turnea.

Sure there has been progress, it would be kind of hard for there not to have been progress given where we started. Has it been the kind of progress the US expected? No, they expected roses to be thrown at their feet on the march into baghdad (I can dig up that gem of a quote again if you'd like me to). Has it been worth the cost to get here? Again I'd say no - we have no business spending hundreds of BILLIONS of dollars when we have serious domestic problems to deal with and the real war on terror to fight.

Those are, or course not the questions for debate, which would explain my negligence in not answering them.

Two of them were question in the original thread, and I did answer them there, so guess I post them here.


Failure and Success are not fluid in my eyes, we will either succeed or fail and we will only know when we reach the end of our involvement. Or conversely when events on the ground become irretrievable.

Neither has happened, as I noted in my response to the questions for debate in my first post here.

The other question you noted as to costs aren't even up for discussion here. Whether or not you consider the possibility of success to be worth the costs is nearly a pure judgement call.

I can certainly understand if you don't and can't blame you for it considering the distance between the stated reasons for war and the actual outcome.

I believe Iraqi democracy is a worthy cause, again a judgment call.


I suspect there is a misunderstanding clusterd around the idea of the strength of insurgency.

Taking a step back, insurgency is almost the inevitable aftermath of every armed conflict. I think you'll find that after every war, there was an unofficial resistance by non-state actors.

Insurgencies have been being crushed for thousands of years.

Bush's father pulled back form invasion because of a lack of a mandate, not because of fear we couldn't accomplish regime change.


25 million Iraqi lives say differently but if that's your judgement, fine.

The fact is things are not so bad as many people feared. The chances of open sectarian civil war are almost 'nil and the political process is proceeding without undue interference.

All I ask is that people don't confuse opposition to starting the war with opposition to completing the post-war goals.

One is entirely legitimate, the other devalues the quality of life for the Iraqi people.

I am unsure that there is a black and white answer to this. Depending on your definition of successful or failing, and yes there are many, there could be thousands of possible variations of either.

I like to imagine that you cannot measure success of failure until the conflict has ceased, so with the war still being fought on more than one front I do not consider it to be an absolute answer either way.

There are different versions of success, one could say that the Iraqi elections are just that.

Failures? One might just cite the failure to capture bin Laden in the War on Terror as a major failure.

What concerns me is how open-ended these statements are. If there is no time scale associated, then either we're engaging in sophistry or just waving our hands futilely towards a nebulous future. Without a schedule containing concrete milestones of definite time period, then we have the equivalent of: "we'll have success when there's success". Tautology may work for Yogi Berra, but it is the antithesis of useful when engaging in a war, suppressing an insurgency while installing a democracy. Similarly, if there are no concrete criteria for assessing failure modes, then, when something goes wrong, we will have little opportunity to learn from our mistakes and to redirect our efforts along a different path.


Bush Sr's 1998 Time magazine article would seem to contra-indicate this statement:

Interestingly, as I recall reading this essay in Time, it apparently has been pulled from Time magazines archive. Good thing there are caches online.


I suppose I must emphatically disagree with the "almost 'nil" chance of sectarian war. Of course, when good ol' fashioned criminality & power grabs are in vogue in Iraq, sectarian violence is still playing catch up.


I find it highly unlike that CJ opposes the post-war goals in Iraq, I think he (as do I) opposes the ways in which those goals are being achieved.

It's usually the anti-war side that gets to decry the "black and white" state of their opponent's view point, but it looks like I get my turn now.

Artificial timetables and milestones are an attempt to bring order to the essentially disorderly.

Dismissing the "timetable" approach is simply acknowledging the complex nature of reality.

This is not a game and there is no shot clock. In Iraq millions of lives are in the balance and they cannot afford to be crammed into some schedule.

Taking a step back for a moment, where are the people claiming the "Israeli-Palestinian" crisis is "a failure"?

Must we invent a mythical timetable for that too?

In life, some things are beyond our control, but we must keep working anyway because they are important.


I disagree that this contradicts anything I said, it is essentially what I was talking about.

Cube Jockey, had implied Bush Sr. hung back for fear on insurgency. You'll note he didn't mention that at all. he mentioned the collapse of the coalition and international cooperation, that's is what I meant by fear a lack of a mandate.


Your call. I'm entirely secure concerning my position. It's not going to be an ethnic war.

Despite your attempt at calling my position unrealistic, I am neither calling for a timetable or "black and white" artifice. I am simply calling for concrete milestones with some timescale associated with them (if you've noticed my position in these debates, I am not calling for a pullout). Milestones, if not met within the time initially allotted, indicate either that the plan needs to be adjusted either for optimism or for goals. If there are no concrete benchmarks, then how does one know one is making progress? I don't think I'm asking for anything particularly egregious or far-fetched; this is simply how projects get done. Hand-waving has been and will always continue to be poor strategy.


Correct, this is not a game. Unlike a game where you get multiple "do overs", this situation requires a level of planning a game does not need.


Apart from this statement being off topic, I will say that, yes, scheduling does help if they are not arbitrary or "mythical". Certainly, the Gaza pullout seems to have schedule associated with it.


Agreed. However, the things within our control are planning, scheduling and setting up precisely criteria for determining (and measuring) both success modes and failure modes. There is no "black and white" here and there never will be.


Yes, I suppose you're right. Bush Sr's statements could be interpreted in the way you've interpreted them.


Well, first, you're saying that sectarian war is almost nil and now you're saying that secular war is almost nil. Which is it? Both? Note that traditionally religious=sectarian whereas ethnic=secular.

Could you elaborate?

It seems to me that a timescale has already been introduce where proceedings are not inherently chaotic, such as the target date for the Iraqi constitution which will likely be met.

Asking for timescales in the area of security, targeted reduction in attacks and the like is simply asking to be disappointed.

One such a goal is announced it will simply allow a more focused resistance to that goal to be formed.


Realistic planning. Planning a situation does not entail knowing how long it will last.

I suspect I am unclear as to what it is you intend to plan, so I'll wait for clarity.


That is a view of the terms I do not share. When I said sectarian I meant any kind of sect which can also refer to non-religious divsions.

So in short, both.

To elaborate, we will not see the Shia declare war on the Kurds or the Sunni. We will not see any variation of that act among the other sects.

The violence will remain action driven by a tiny minority against the will of the majority of Iraqis.

The tactics of the insurgents have pretty much hobbled them in this respect.

I have to regret to say that your interpretation of the term sect / sectarian is wrong. In the Cambridge Dictionary the term sect is defined as ..



But besides that, your statement that the threat of a civil war between the three ethnic / religious groups in Iraq is almost nil is pretty optimistic. There is a real possibility that there will be some sort of break up of Iraq, as a result of internal disturbances or even civil war.

It is not for nothing that the Turkish government is highly worried about the possibility that the Kurds in Northern-Iraq will proclaim their independence. The Turks have been dealing with Kurdisch seperatists for a long time.

Besides that the fact that Kurds were given a limited veto over constitutional changes in the subsequent interim Iraqi constitution, was for many Iraqi Shiites unacceptable.

(Main source: http://www.bartleby.com/65/ku/Kurds.html)

It is a dream to view Iraq as an uniform state. During Saddams brutal reign all the different etnic and religious groups were forced to live together. Now, with the dethronement of Saddam, Iraq is changed into a democratic federation. The chance that at least the Kurds will try to seperate themselves is something we should take into account.

You will find that in debates I never step out on a limb without first building a scaffold.


My definition fits with two of the three definitions.


You, on the other hand might want to take notice of the sickening crunch coming from foot level.

This is a common distortion of the history of Iraq. Iraqis have been living together in roughly their present configuration since the Ottoman Empire.

There have always been ethnic tensions but calls for independence have been decidedly non-violent as of late and the constitution that Iraq will vote on tomorrow will not be broken into three sectarian areas.

The absence of Civil War is not some figment of an over-optimistic imagination.

The fact is Iraq's sectarian leaders aren't really interested in fighting one another.

Sure. Here's a link from the previous debate on the subject. In a nutshell, have specific ranges of time in which specific goals are set to be achieved. Moreover, clearly, define how these goals will be measured and what happens when those goals are not met by the criteria that you've set up for yourself. Define a set of protocols to re-evaluate those goals. Most importantly, follow the guidelines/schedule you've established.


Fair enough. However, timescales, as named, could be scaled according to when certain specific milestones are met. In other words, in order to meet milestone B, we need to first meet milestone A. We expect milestone B to be achieved within a range of time T after milestone A has been met.


I'm sorry I don't buy this line of logic. If, by announcing our goals, we will fail to achieve our goals, then we have made a very poor plan by definition.


All right. I'll keep that in mind in our future debates. However, I would caution that it is hard to keep track of everyone's pet definitions of words. It always leads to a semantic debate. Rather, I would propose that you use the more traditional definitions so poor me doesn't get confused .


I hope you are right, turnea. Yet, I fear you are wrong.

To throw some meat into the lion's den, I found an article that may lend some credence to what Turnea had to say. Though it's too early to tell from one article, it may bode well for the situation in Iraq.


WAPO

Quite possibly this is a sign that ordinary Iraqi's are starting to take their country back from the foreign fighters and Ba'athists who are wreaking so much havoc and death.

I remember now...

..and I still don't see how what you proposed is a possible option from the strategies already in place.

Let's take a look.

All very good questions...

Now, what's the answer?

I don't see the validity in setting a hard range for the "number of attacks" or their severity. Such a thing seems unacceptably artificial.

I would rather simply let's Iraqi leaders give their call on stability. When they believe the situation is stable then (barring any obvious contradictions posed by facts on the ground) so do we.

I don't see the danger in allowing a judgement call, rather than a stratified formula decide this.

Democracy is much more cut and dry and I think that an elected parliamentary system without interference on the part of clerics is well on course in Iraq.

In any case I would definitely avoid setting timescales for this, as it would only look like interference in Iraq's political affairs.

Stay as far out of it as possible as I see it.

Safety I see as the same as stability.

I've always though that it would be best simply to wait for the Iraqis or American generals to make the "all clear" call than to look for a checklist.

I have a long term view of the situation which is not so much focused on withdrawal as the benefit to the Iraqis.

I think "when can we get out?" is basically the wrong question.

Well, I could give my answers to these questions, however I don't believe I'm the most qualified to do so. What is sad is that these questions are not already answered. They should be; they must be for stability to be assessed or achieved in Iraq. There is no plan without establishing goals, milestones and means of measurement.


Why? Why can't number, strength and deadliness of attacks be used? How is this artificial? I contend that excluding such statistics is artificial.


The "danger" (if you will) is that ideology tends to get in the way of cold, hard numbers. Use the numbers to evaluate the strategy; don't use the strategy to evaluate the numbers. Also, I don't know where this "stratified formula" thing is coming from. I certainly never advocated it.


Hey, you've just enumerated one criterion. Good start.


"Stay as far out of it as possible". Umm... okay, are you advocating a pullout? What do you mean by "as possible"?


If US troops and dollars weren't involved, then I'd agree with you. However, it's our money being spent and our soldiers being killed.


I agree. "When can we get out" is the wrong question. If you think this is what I've been advocating, then re-reading what I've written without this in mind may be in order. There are so many other questions to be answered though: questions which I'm surprised you're so willing to not have answered.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Yes, regular Iraqis fighting back against Zarqawi could be a good sign. Or, it could be a bad sign. It could be that this incident meets the definition of civil war.

In a broad sense they certainly are. Even if we win, if it is at too great of a cost then we have failed whether that cost is in lives or money. Regardless of the "progress" we are making if we are unable to deal with real threats such as Iran because we have committed our forces to Iraq then we have failed.


This is absolutely preposterous, of course these things have to be taken into account in determining whether we are successful. It is not a judgement call, it is reality. According to your standards we could be in Iraq 10 years from now and you'd still consider that acceptable. Meanwhile thousands of American soldiers could be dead, we'd be billions of dollars in debt (money our children and grandchildren will be paying back) and real problems facing our country couldn't be solved due to simple opportunity cost.


Well first of all, and this shouldn't be news to you, we didn't have a mandate for Iraq this time either. Bush Jr. did not have approval from the UN for the action he took and he built an even smaller coalition with fewer active members than his father did.

That being said, Bush Sr. made this statement in his book from 1998:


Gee, all of that seems to have happened. Funny how that works. Bush Sr is either extremely smart or clairvoyant. As you can see his reasons were more extensive than a mandate (which as I'll again remind you Bush Jr. did not have).


I'm not in opposition of the post-war goals I'm saying that they are poorly defined and we are not setup for success and I'm sorry but your answer of we need to stay the course until we get lucky simply isn't acceptable. This all comes back to exit strategy, which the Bush administration has admitted time and time again they don't have. Unless you have some sort of information I don't then they still don't have one.

An exit strategy doesn't mean we have to pull out tomorrow, what it does mean is that we set realistic and achievable goals and we march toward them checking progress along the way. It should end with a pullout of all or most of the troops. It is how big projects are achieved in every facet of life Turnea from the battlefield to the boardroom to construction sites.

If you were the CEO of a Fortune 500 company and you defined "success as when we are successful" - how long do you think you'd have a job?

I am sorry to say, but it is you who has a distorded view toward the history of Iraq.

First you state that the chance of civil war is relatively smal, because Iraqis have lived roughly in the present configuration since the Ottoman Empire. This is argument is misleading.

Although it is a fact that the three main ethnic and religious groups in Iraq have have lived together for a long period, that doesn't mean that they did this willingly. In fact since the fall of the Ottoman Empire Iraq has been governed by different parties who held a brutal grip on the Iraqi people and forced the different ethnic and religious groups to live together. They never had a choice!

(British Occupation and mandatory regime (1918 - 1932), The Hashemite Monarchy (1920 - 1958), the military Republic under Qasim (1958 - 1963), the coup of the Ba'th party, and the steady infiltration of this party in all aspects of the Iraqi society (1963 - 1979) and at last the brutal dictorial regime of Saddam.) http://www.angelfire.com/nt/Gilgamesh/history.html

Secondly, your state that although there always have been ethnic tensions, the calls for independence have been decidedly non-violent. This statement is also not correct. (Main source: http://www.bartleby.com/65/ku/Kurds.html )









As you can see, Kurds in Turkey, Northern Iraq and Iran, have a long and violent history. Even during periods of repression the Kurds have always fought for their independence. What would discourage them from doing this again?

If we look at the recent situation, it will be clear that there are still big tensions between the Kurds and for example the Shiites:

Why must we eternally labor under this perception that helping to create a secure Iraqi democracy is anything like the measly business dealing of some cooperation.

I swear I have been asked a variant of the question at least fifteen times.

You think the goals are unreachable and you blame the Bush administration, I get it.

This is not the impression I get and I've been watching the situation very closely like al doom and gloom prediction I think that a wait and see approach is likely the best option.


I'm very confident the situation will be worked out, I have no fear that when this subject is revisited I will be found in the wrong.

No, that isn't what I'm saying Turnea. I want this to work just as much as you do, but the only problem is there is absolutely no way that it will if we don't change our strategy and get serious about setting some realistic goals. You are trying to minimize it by classifying it as anti-bush rhetoric and it isn't.


Then why don't you answer it? There is a reason you are being asked that question. No matter what you do in life, you will not succeed with a big project if you have no plan. You can say that there is absolutely no parallel to business all that you want but the fact is that there is.

Your optimism is great Turnea but unfortunately it doesn't get the job done in Iraq nor would it get it done anywhere else. If you aren't going to back off from your "hear no evil, speak no evil, see no evil" stance on Iraq then it really isn't possible to discuss the matter with you.

Interestingly, wait and see has been the approach of those most immediately affected by the outcome...those being the Iraqis and the rest of the Middle East. With all the predispositions these groups supposedly have to mistrust the US...they seem to be the one block of people who actually are giving the US the benefit of the doubt, and adopting a wait and see approach. As the group most immediately affected by the situation, I would think that this fact would get more publicity and carry more weight in discussions regarding Iraq than it does...especially since these opinions have a direct impact on the liklihood of success in both Iraq and the greater Middle East.



What, other than democracy, offers any hope of a peaceful resolution to this problem? Don't you find it a bit ironic that following this line of reasoning is using a pro war and violence argument to support an antiwar position? The reality of the situation is that setting up a democracy in Iraq represents the only chance of changing the situation you have described...essentially stating that war was needed to break the cycle of violence. Stating, then, that you are against the war indicates that you are FOR the cycle of violence, as war was the only method available to induce the changes necessary to break that cycle.



The implied statement here is that Iraq was not a real threat, an implication I reject. Iraq was athreat in multiple ways. First, look at the oft stated reasons given by UBL for his jihad against the United States...the presence of US troops in the Muslim holy land. Why were these troops there? Because of the regime of Saddam Hussein. These troops were going to be necessary as long as that regime remained in power, and the only way to remove it from power was by force. The usual rebuttal to this argument is that we are putting even more troops into that area. This is true, but there are two arguments against this rebuttal. First, the troops are not in Saudi Arabia, they are in Iraq, which is not the Muslim Holy Land. Second, regardless of the current number of troops, the invasion offered a path in which troops could eventually be removed. Leaving Saddam's regime in power offered no such path...the troops would have been there indefinitely, thereby leaving no means through which to address this fundamental issue with UBL and therefore with Al Queda. Also, Saddam's seeming ability to continue to thwart the United States created the 'paper tiger' scenario...allowing terrorists to assume that acting against the United States, even with military force, brought with it no real threat of response in kind. Not only had Saddam survived the first Gulf War, where large force was applied directly against him, but he had continued to survive in the decade after...despite continually thwarting the aims of the United States. He was an ideal terrorists could look to to support their cause and create hope of its eventual success...an ideal that needed to be removed in order to succeed against terrorism.

I would end by saying that it is always quite easy to find arguments against war. War is a dirty nasty endeavour that leaves many avenues for criticism. However, it is sometimes quite difficult to follow this up with feasible alternatives to resolve the problem. The problem in Iraq was Saddam's regime. Nothing short of invasion offered any mechanism that was going to change that. Further, the problem of terrorism was rooted in the fundamental social/political structure of the Middle East. Nothing short of invasion was likely to change that, either. So, the only viable solution to either the immediate Iraqi threat or the broader terrorist threat was invasion. Despite all the criticism I have heard over the invasion of Iraq, I have yet to hear of any viable alternatives. The status quo was what led to 9-11...continuing in that fashion was not an option. So, something had to be done. Anybody who was in office at that time would have been faced with this dilemma. I think the same solution would eventually have been arrived at regardless of who was President...there simply isn't any other alternative that addresses these two problems. Basically, war offered the best path to peace. Given that....

Given what you've stated previously on this topic, has the criteria for success been achieved?

No, it hasn't. However, neither has it been abondoned. I expected all along that it would be several years before determination of success or failure could be carried out. We are still well within that time frame. All the arguments against its eventual success are equally powerful arguments for the imperative of it succeeding, so I still don't see any other path. Further, I remain convinced that the only way for failure to be achieved is if we give up. Given those two alternatives, success or failure, and further given that failure seems to be a choice and not an outcome...why would we choose failure? I hear much about the potential costs of success, and they are indeed high. But what of the costs of failure? It seems to me that they would be much, much higher. Further, failure would likely mean that we would find ourselves facing similar choices in the near future, leading to a repeat of the cycle we find ourselves in currently. So, the costs of success would still apply, but with the costs of failure added to them. There really isn't any choice but to succeed.

Further, while I hear much about the costs of success and an equal amount of the potential costs of failure, I hear very little of the benefits of success. One can argue against the liklihood of success, but I don't think there are any arguments against the huge benefits if it is achieved. These benefits should be considered when discussing the costs...yet they seem markedly absent from the discussion (perhaps because it doesn't suit the aims of those criticizing the effort?). Despite one's feelings about the war, the liklihood of success, or the current state in Iraq, I find it difficult to see where a successful outcome can be categorically denied. Therefore, the benefits of that success cannot be removed from the discussion. This is especially bothersome because those benefits would, I think, be the very situation those against the war would find most appealing. Criticize the means if you must, but don't discount the end...particularly if the means employed were the only means through which that end could be achieved.

CJ, what I am not understanding is what realistic goals you are referring to. Are we discussing the realistic goals of the Iraqi government or the US military or both?

The goals of the Iraqi government are this:
Iraqi Government


This makes the next few months crucial to the success of the Iraqi government. The constitution is going to be presented to the National Assembly shortly and they will vote on it. If it passes, it is another step on the road to democracy. These look like specific goals to me.

The Iraqi Security Forces and Police Units equal upwards of 170,000. Granted, a smaller percentage of this number are battle-hardened and faced combat and other situations. However, the thing is that while the United States has played a reduced role in operations in recent months, they have still been in strong support of the Iraqis. After the buildup of US forces in the next few months for the election on the Iraqi Constitution and finally the election for the new Iraqi Government...the US troop levels in Iraq should go down considerably. Obviously because by the end of the year, the hope is that enough Iraqi troops will be trained and tested that they could committ to operations by themselves with minimal US support. That is the only way that the Iraqi troops will be learn to defend their country.

If we are talking about the US military...then obviously the goal is to have more troops in the next few months to protect civilians during the elections and then decrease the number immediately. And gradually you decrease the troop levels next year so that the Iraqi Forces can carry more of the burden. That is what is most likely going to happen.

My views on Iraq remain fundamentally unchanged from a year ago. Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator, which nobody denies, who brutalized and murdered about 1.3 million people. The Iraqi people have lived under an iron fist of his leadership for decades and it was time that they were finally free of his terror. So the United States took the initiative and said that this must end. Now the Iraqi people have the best chance at democracy than anyone has ever given them.

Whether you believe the Iraqi war was fought for oil, or imperialistic power, or for Bush sr., or for the 'neocons'...it doesnt matter at this point. What is important is the Iraqi people. What is important is getting the job done and bringing our troops home. Nothing worth doing is easy. That statement never makes more sense than our current situation in Iraq. These people WANT democracy. It may not be our democracy, but its a vital first step towards that.

You know when i have discussions with some of my friends on the subject, i always end up asking the same questions. Wasn't Saddam a brutal dictator? Isn't it better that he is out of power in Iraq? Is Iraq better off now than under Saddam? And you know, i always get the same response...because any rational person would respond all three questions with a yes. Because the truth is that while things may not be going the way we want exactly...things never do. And things are progressing better than most thought. No civil war, Sunnis participating in the democratic process, and more and more forces trained every day.

In the grand scheme of things, i think that if the Iraq adventure is a success that some of s will look back on these years and think that providing Iraq with democracy and deposing of Saddam Hussein is one of the decent things this nation has ever done. Many dislike our methods. They prefer a 'peaceful' approach to taking out dictators like Saddam. But i think what is important is your definition of peace. Is peace simply the absence of war? The Iraqis have been fighting a war for their lives for decades. They know no peace. But perhaps after successful elections and a successful constitution...the Middle East and the World as a whole will look upon Iraq and say that they deserve our admiration and support. Then they may no the American definition of 'peace'.

I think your missing my point here. The fact that I made these statements was to correct Turnea's view about ethnic tensions in Iraq. (post #14). There are tensions between Iraqi groups, and there have been numerous attempts by Kurds to try to obtain complete autonomity and their own Kurdistan. What I am trying to say is that these aspects of Iraqi society should be monitored closely and guided in the right right way, if we want Iraq to succeed in becoming a stable and democratic society.

Yes, turnea, we must labor under this perception. The methodology for planning holds true no matter the subject matter. The amount of planning required is directly proportional to the size of the project. Clearly, establishing peace and democracy in Iraq is a project of "non-trivial" proportions. The business world uses this type of planning because it works efficiently and effectively and not because it is exclusively within the business domain.

I wouldn't be surprised if the military uses this type of planning (in Iraq to boot). Yet, Iraq is far larger in scope than the military exercise. I have complete confidence that within the narrow purview of military strategy, the brass does an exemplary job. It is the larger issues of nation building that I find to be less than "thought out". You don't build Rome in a day.


I'll speak for myself here (and possibly CJ as well). I don't believe the goals are unreachable. Or rather, I believe some goals are reachable if and only if there is sufficient and clear planning associated with them. I may be against the war in Iraq but this doesn't mean I'm against reconstruction and nation building now that we're there.


I agree that only time will tell, however let me state why I revisited this debate topic. Some folks looked one year ahead from the last debate to give Iraq time to "settle down". One year later, Iraq has not settled down; the violence has gotten worse. At what point, does one assess what is going on there and say: "hmm....maybe, the current strategy isn't working"? The whole "wait-and-see" argument doesn't work if there are no concrete criteria by which to evaluate whether or not "wait and see" is working.

Standards are the benchmark by which we judge success or failure. They are how we determine if the strategy is correct, must be adjusted or completely changed. They are essential for any large project.

No, it doesn't.

That I think is part of the problem in this debate, we keep trying to treat this like it is something mundane.

International politics and military strategy are not at all like a business.

We are dealing with a sovereign Iraqi government which must make it's own decision as well as with a insurgency fully aware that the perception of their attacks matter far mor than their actual material costs.


That merely reflects a lack of perspective, if anyone thinks the US "settled down" in two years after the Revolutionary War they have another thing coming.

The fact is the opponents of stability in Iraq are far outnumbered and outresourced.

Of course it will take time for an entirely new government to organize it's efforts against them.

I don't see how drawing them up a chart will help any, they can do that themselves.

Renger, I didn't miss your point...I was just using your quote to address a larger issue. Sorry for the confusion. The point I am trying to make is that arguments against democracy working in Iraq frequently point to the long history of violence employed to obtain power, and also to the very different ethnic groups in Iraq and the long history of conflict between them. While these do indeed point to difficulties in implementing democracy, I think they also point to democracy being the only workable peaceful long-term solution. In short, I think working towards democracy is guiding them the right way. I think we're probably in agreement on this...would that be correct?

Further, in listening to the various discussions being carried on regarding the new Iraqi constitution, it sounds very much like the parties involved 'get it'. This, to me, was really the major impediment to eventual success of democracy...if the various groups in Iraq didn't grasp that democracy could work for them and offer a desired alternative to other methods...then it would never work. But, it seems like they do see that democracy can be the solution to their problems. Further, it seems like the majority of the people of Iraq think so too (how many Americans would risk their lives to vote?--heck, too many of us don't bother as it is).

Whoever said that planning is "mundane"? Only you I think. If we can't agree that planning and well-tested methods used in planning are essential for any large endeavor, then I agree with you there is no point in further debate. However, I will ask you this. What do you believe are the salient differences for international politics and military strategy that makes planning unnecessary?


Okay, so if it takes, say, 100 years for Iraq to get itself together, then that's equivalent to Iraq taking 10 years or 5 years or 1 year, right? If it takes 100,000 deaths, then that's equivalent to 10,000, 1000 or 100 deaths, right? You tell me. Do you have no criteria by which to judge Iraq? Or do you just wait and see?

..and who ever said planing was "unnecessary"?

I'm saying that the nature of the planning does not at all lend itself to timescales.

Dealing with politics requires a lot more flexibility than any business model. You don't know when to expect a "shipment" of compromise, there is no warehouse of goodwill.

Iraqi politics must be allowed to run their course and that will take time which no one can specify.

The same goes of military planning. This one lends itself a little most to target and dates, but we will never be able to predict the action of the insurgents. There strategy is itself inherently political, the attacks seek a reaction more than a death toll.

It would be impossible to proclaim the timescale is off track simply because we see a single spectacular attacks live the one that killed several marines last week.

That's simply not something we can guarantee prevention of.

The trends of Iraqi political coalescence and the strengthening of the iraqi security force, as well as Iraqi public opinion are all boding well for the future of Iraqi democracy.

Pretending we know when that will finally settle down is of no value.

In addition to my ealier post, i think this is an important article to weigh the success of our military and influence in Iraq versus that of the insurgency:

Iraqi Sunnis Battle To Defend Shiites



Sunnies protecting Shiites. Iraqis fighting insurgents. Does this look like the Iraqi people want democracy? Does it not show the resolve of these brave people to protect their homeland from the TRUE invaders? Those who want to instill fear and oppression as opposed to those who want Iraqis to have democracy and govern themselves?

Yes I do think that democratic process in Iraq is the only workable and most peaceful long-term solution. And you are right that the history between the different ethnic groups doesn't have to mean that democracy in Iraq is a mission impossible.

But I also think the democratization of Iraq is going to be a delicate and slow process. Elections and a constitution are only starting points in this process. The Iraqi people have yet to learn from experience how to put these new democratic rights into good practise. Their mentality has to have time to adapt to the new situation. Longtime commitment is essential if the U.S. want to make Iraq a succes.

The biggest problem at this moment is the fact that in Iraq the peace still isn't secured. Violence is still omnipresent. Without internal peace and stability the democratization process is doomed to fail.

American troops are doing there best to get the situation under control, but fighting a enemy that uses guerilla tactics and is willing to make extreme sacrifices is a extremely difficult task. The continuation of violence doesn't only slow down the long and difficult process of democratization, but also has a negative impact on the public opinion in the U.S.

Bush is in a predicament. On the one hand it is essential for the stability of the Middle East that the democratization process is a succes. But this process will take a long term U.S. commitment if it wants to succeed. On the other hand the cry for withdrawl of the troops is becoming stronger and louder. Troop reduction can only normally be done if the situation in a country is fully under control. Forced troopreduction will be seen as a weakness in the eyes of enemy groups. Increasing the chance that the situation in Iraq will escalade, possibly destroying the chance for democracy at all.

Because of the chilled relations with Europe and the U.N., I don't think the U.S. can expect a lot of international help with solving the problems in Iraq. It is up to the Bush administration to find a workable solution.

Given what you've stated previously on this topic, has the criteria for failure in Iraq been achieved? Given what you've stated previously on this topic, has the criteria for success been achieved?

I'd say no to both at this point. I don't think a year is enough time to come to any conclusions that Iraq will be either a failure or success...though the situation isn't exactly good. I think it should be placed in perspective and compared with other nationbuilding endeavors. We (the western world that is) have gone into countries in the midst of civil war in the past, and stopped the violence with some success. Remember as many as 10,000 civilian Serbs died after the ceasefire when vengeful Kosovars returned to their homes. Iraq isn't even in that type of chaos (yet), and there is a basic foundation for a (relatively) strong, reasonable government.



I agree. This is a major problem which ideally should be taken care of by Iraqi forces. Unfortunately, from what I've heard they won't be up to the task for a while. Our forces, on the other hand, offer targets for attack and perhaps provide incentives to attack by their presence. My husband went to a conference recently and spoke with an Army man who had just come from Iraq. He told him that the sides of the streets are covered with garbage and IEDs are planted in the garbage. It's an extremely dangerous situation for everyone, and explains why a lot of children are injured and die as well. It's also the type of situation which is very hard to combat with conventional forces.

I'm starting to think the Iraqi government should hire private security forces for a short time to police their streets. Companies within Iraq are doing this individually, and officials are using them as bodyguards so I see no reason why an independent government should not as long as they use them exclusively domestically.

I was trying to think of the best way of showing this isn't just my imagination when as usual the obvious solution presented itself.

You first post in this thread ended on this note.


Now that we have stripped away the facade on this one let's speak honestly.

Yes, the situation in Iraq is difficult and no there is nothing wrong with suggested ways the strategy can be improved.

But one cannot help but to suspect a partisan motive when debaters insist upon sending contradictory messages.

Yes let's do speak honestly Turnea and we can start by not throwing around the word partisan all the time in regards to the Iraq war. I think it is pretty safe to say that people across the political spectrum disapprove of the way it is being handled. That is a fact. There are public opinion polls to back it up and in fact some people who post here at AD disagree with it and are declared Republicans.

That being said, any strategy that does not terminate with a full pullout of our troops in Iraq is not going to satisfy me as being sufficient. Now that being said that doesn't mean the order has to be given tomorrow to do that, but it has to be clear that is the goal. The administration should clearly state that is the goal and not dance around it or allude to it.

At the moment I don't believe that is the goal at all, every indication suggests we plan to be there for quite some time with no intentions of leaving. It certainly would fit in with PNAC plans to have a base of operations there to conduct future wars and ops. I think DTOM or someone said that there will be 250K troops there by next year. You do realize that is similar or more than we have had in most major wars.

Furthermore I think we need to realistically sit down and determine what it is we want to accomplish in Iraq and I don't think that has been done either. The "wait and see" attitude has been in place too long.

Some of those things might be the need for an Iraqi constitution, a police force of a certain size, a permanent government, a certain percentage of basic services restored, etc. You don't need to put dates to those things but they need to be on a checklist, progress needs to be tracked and we need to shift strategies to make sure we can achieve them. The troops in country need to correspond to the needs at that time, so over time we should see a gradual withdrawl and at the end of it all troops should be gone except those necessary for an embassy.

I am not going to accept having our troops there for the next 10 years or longer as a police force, constantly getting sniped by insurgents. At the same time ensuring that if another threat comes along we can't adequate