Juan Cole, one of the foremost American experts on the Middle East, has just posted a ten-point plan for withdrawing from Iraq. Now, before some of you hit the roof, let me point out that withdrawal from Iraq is undoubtedly our long-term goal; everybody wants us eventually out of Iraq. The arguments these days are about when and how to withdraw. Dr. Cole states flatly that an immediate withdrawal will trigger a civil war, with horrific casualties. Therefore, his plan presents a staged system that he believes will get us out without a civil war. The question for debate is simple:

Is this plan the best available option for our Iraq policy? If not, what would be better?

Is this plan the best available option for our Iraq policy? If not, what would be better?

I like his plan. I only take exception to one part:



I agree they should be withdrawn ASAP. However, if and when things turn ugly, I think we should be available when requested by the Iraqi Government, to support their police / militia's if a situation gets out of control. I doubt the Iraqi Government would call on us for such support unless there were no other options. I believe this to be true because the Iraqi Government needs to prove to Iraq as well as the world that they can stand on their own two feet.

I think the Iraq government would take advantage of the offer of close air support as needed, but the situation would have to be desperate at best for them to ask for support on the ground. So, if it is bad enough for them to ask, I think it should be available, at least for the next year or two. Most US ground troops would still be able to return home, we would just need to take advantage of the various "reactionary force" concepts that already exist in the US military.



This is definitely needed IMHO. So long as the Sunnis feel they are on the outside looking in, there will be violence, and it will likely get worse.



This, is one of the most important things we can do there. So long as we require that the Iraqi Government pay U.S. companies for things that Iraqi companies, or even firms in other countries can do, we will always be seen by some in Iraq as well as the world as if we are motivated solely by money in regards to Iraq. I do not believe this is true, but the perception of impropriety is at least as damaging as actual impropriety.

I definitely recommend parts one, two and three with the caveat, that along with close air support (primarily rotary wing with a rotating fixed wing CAP), we not only keep in theater but reinforce the Special Forces and Civil Affairs assets. The SF A-Teams keep a low signature, are force multipliers when attached to Iraqi units and can call upon satellite imagery, satellite comms and have pre-established intel assets both in Iraq and neighboring countries. The CA teams in country can continue to be the on the ground liaisons between local governments and NGO's, and can continue to spread goodwill and infrastructure technology.
I don't have a problem with conventional ground troops being withdrawn from urban areas, as long as they can be called into a support role if needed, as long as they are in country. There are several assets that the Iraqi forces do not yet have, such as Q-36 counter battery radar, that has drastically reduced the effectiveness and frequency of mortar attacks, leaving car bombing the weapon of choice.

I'm not sure what Cole has in mind exactly with number six. Many civilians lump tanks in with other armored vehicles. Iraq at present doesn't really need an actual armored corps to fight the insurgency. They will be needed for long term stability and national security. They would be better served with a Stryker/Bradley type vehicle, decent easily purchased from South Africa, Germany or Italy.

Number eight should have been in place from soon after the end of the war, it might have sapped some of the support and ranks of the insurgents.

The only problem with number nine is, are there enough of and the appropriate companies in Iraq to handle the work needed done? Bechtel and Halliburton are the constant bane of the left, but we are left with the sound of crickets when the question is posed, can someone do better or as much? I think that current companies should continue on the large scale, with a rapid shift of outsourcing and sub-contracting to Iraqi companies, eventual Iraqi management on the ground, and when feasible, American and international companies pulling out, except where requested by the Iraqi government.

I must say that it's refreshing to see this coming from Juan Cole, whom I've never been particularly impressed with. I think it has a shot of working......provided the insurgent comply.

I'd agree with DTOM's last caveat and say that as interesting as this plan is, it's hardly an Iraq policy in and of itself.

I don't agree with any of it until the Iraqi government and coalition commanders judge the Iraqi forces are able to deal with the extra load.

Making declarations about what they'll "just have to do" works from the sidelines, not on the ground.

The key to a withdrawal is not to withdraw an inch until someone is ready to take our place.

Anything else is simply a retreat.

That is our intent. However, the issue is one of capabilities. If we completely withdraw our military from the cities before the Iraqi police and military are capable of both maintaining civil order and combating the urban insurgents, then we are, in effect, turning over the cities to the bad guys. We are working hard to bring the Iraqis up to speed - we will depart when they are ready. Not before.
See last line above.

Appropriate, when we do withdraw ground troops. Although we are training and equipping an Iraqi Air Force, it will take longer to get them up to speed on effective CAS than it will take to put effective Iraqi forces on the ground.

"Set-piece battles" isn't the issue. We are talking about an insurgency spotted with flashes of extremely brutal terrorism, not a conventional territorial battle. The bad guys aren't going to "march" from Anbar to Baghdad. They can infil numbers into any city easily - if we leave the Iraqis to fend for themselves in the cities before they are prepared to deal with such a threat. Hell, they manage to get around that problem too often as it stands now. A withdrawal from the cities and putting more US/Coalition troop emphasis on the borders and LOCs will mitigate some of the threat - but it won't stop it.

That's essentially what we are trying to do now, as we simultaneously battle the insurgency and attempt to roll up terrorist cells. We're spread too thin, but we're doing the best we can. A general withdrawal from the cities, leaving behind elements only to guard key figures and facilities while Iraqi civilians fending for themselves continue to be murdered in droves will only serve to discredit us in the eyes of the general populace.

An "armored corps" isn't what the Iraqis need to battle the insurgents. We recognize that, and MNSTC-I is focused on the mission at hand. There is a bit of a "trust" issue, but that ain't the reason we're not setting up Iraqi armored divisions.

I disagree about the "quid pro quo", but it is vital that the Sunni Arabs be brought into the government. This is a complex issue that deserves its own thread.

Some lower-level members of the former regime have been put back to work. At this time, there is no ban on every former party member - people are being vetted for certain positions, but for many others there is no vetting at all. Its not so much a Ba'athist as it is a sectarian issue. Many of the new Shi'a in leadership roles at various Iraqi institutions simply avoid hiring Sunnis.

Where an amnesty program will be of use is in targeting the insurgents. A limited amnesty has been in place for a bit - but a more nuanced program is necessary- along the lines of the Chieu Hoi and Dai Doan Ket programs in Vietnam.

I strongly agree with this one.

I agree, in principle, that we should be engaged in regular multilateral working-group meetings at the ministerial level with Iraq's neighbors. It would go a long way towards defusing several issues - including intereference in Iraq by our so-called "allies" Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

I think it is progress- but a person making progress on a plan is not taking strides to ending the conflict. Hmm, an odd predicament.

I think turnea captures the essence of this debate best: plans will not lead to what must be done. His plan is a fair outline of the times and circumstances, but it does not offer wisdom or the funds that would be ideal in the reality of this plan. We ought to simply do what we have to do, turn the land over to the Iraqis and offer them our support as we do with Israel.

Iraq is a many-leveled and complex problem that can be solved with an easy plan that doesn't get bogged down in the finer details like Mr. Cole's plan: aim to end the conflict, turn government and military operations over to Iraq and then watch from the sidelines unless asked and/or directly threatened.

The war is lost. It has been lost for some time.

[I repeat some words, highly relevant here, that I used recently elsewhere on this site.] Civil war in Iraq has been in progress for two years. The units of the "Iraqi" army and police consist mostly of either Kurdish or Shiite militia. The is no civil society in Iraq in the Western sense. There is a tangle of ethnic, religious and tribal forces and, of course, the Ba'ath movement, which remains powerful in spite of its military defeat. There is no Iraqi government, but a Shiite-Kurdish debating society and a set of "ministries" whose entire actual province is the Green Zone. There is no transportation system. There is no electric power. There is no oil production. U.S. troops have nothing to do in Iraq but be shot at. Their presence there is a magnet to jihadis all over the world.

[I repeat further.] Nobody in this country actually believes the rhetoric about the necessity to democratize Iraq, or that suppression of the Iraqi insurgency will do anything to prevent attacks on the homeland. That's why no one is volunteering. It is possible for the administration to wage this war only on the condition that nobody important, no one rich, in other words, will have to sacrifice in the slightest for it. On the contrary, the business elite's support for the war has much to do with the vast sums of money that the Pentagon has been shoveling at private contractors. Really serious levels of U.S. casualties; large troop increases; or tax increases to pay for the war; each would separately produce a major domestic political crisis. But the continued letting of U.S. blood (nobody in this country really cares about Iraqi blood) and deficit expenditure to pay for the war will produce an eventual crisis, anyway.

[I repeat still further.] The civil war in Iraq will intensify after the inevitable departure of U.S. forces. But that can only be postponed, not avoided.

Cole's withdrawal plan depends on the fantastic notion that U.S. air power, absent significant ground forces, could prevent the destruction of the Baghdad puppet regime. Air power is an excellent tool for destroying conventional forces; it is of very limited utility in a guerilla war, particularly an urban one. Remember Mogadishu?

An attempt to rely on air power exclusively to control the situation in Iraq would produce substantial civilian casualties (trust us, there was a terrorist cell in that apartment block we just obliterated!). Most Americans, to our great discredit, would be entirely happy with that. We are a soft, cowardly people, willing to inflict enormous harm on others, but unwilling to accept even a little pain in return. We proved that in Serbia; rather than fight one little Yugoslav division in Kosovo, we bombed the blazes out of Serbia's infrastructure. We proved it with decades of economic sanctions against Iraq. But as a practical matter an air war, while more sanitary from a domestic political point of view, wouldn't serve to influence the outcome on the ground. It would also bring even futher international discredit on the United States.

Cole's plan has a fig-leaf quality, similar to hollow U.S. promises to defend the Saigon regime after the U.S. withdrew its forces from Vietnam.

Here is my 2-point plan for U.S. withdrawal, considerably more humane than Cole's:

1. All U.S. ground, air and naval forces to vacate Iraqi territory forthwith; U.S. air forces to stay out of Iraqi air space; U.S. naval forces to stay out of Iraqi waters.

2. U.S. to pay reparations, commensurate with the enormous damage done by "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (what a preposterous name), to whatever government eventually emerges in Baghdad. But not until hostilities among Iraqis have effectively ceased. This will at least provide an incentive for the warring factions to compromise.

How different is this recommendation from the idea of not going in with an exit plan? Yes, it always seems wisest to just go with the flow and make decisions in response to events, but then events control you. Our problem is that, if we just meander along doing our best to make things right, we could end up there forever. There will always be a good reason to remain in Iraq. What about the threat from Iran? What if the Sunnis threaten civil war? What if the Iraqi military never comes up to our standards?

I am certainly not advocating the initiation of this plan anytime soon, but in the absence of some plan, we'll be overtaken by events. We learned this the hard way with Vietnam. The administration kept asking for patience, and after 55,000 deaths the American people lost patience and demanded that we simply cut our losses and run. The same thing could happen in Iraq; in the presence of so much uncertainty, there's a point where the American people will become fed up and simply demand a departure, making it impossible to effect the kind of staged operation that Dr. Cole recommends. I think that political reality demands that we declare a reasonable date for the first stage of the operation -- withdrawal from the cities -- and then make that a deadline that everybody keeps in mind. This kind of planning forces people to face facts and get on with life.

I remember Mogadishu, do you? Prior to 3 Oct, air power combined with Task Force Ranger was the determining factor in the stunning successes that the US Army had against what would be agreed on by most, were guerrilla forces. I think that you underestimate the capabilities and roles of air power in low and mid level insurgency's.
This is one part of Cole's plan that I agree with when he states: I concede that this tactic will get some US Blackhawks shot down from time to time, and won't be painless. But it could prevent the outbreak of fullscale war. This way of proceeding, which was opened up by the Afghanistan War of 2001-2002, and which depends on smart weapons and having allies on the ground, is the major difference between today and the Vietnam era, when dumb bombs (and even carpet bombing) couldn't have been deployed effectively to ensure the enemy did not take or hold substantial territory.

Close air support by fixed and rotary wing aircraft, Predators and Kiowa's with FLIR and target acquisition capabilities coupled with SF, Air Force TACP's and Combat Controllers on the ground, is the only feasible way the ISF are going target and destroy insurgents coinciding with a pull out of US conventional forces.
I think the time has come for informed observers as ourselves to discard the rhetoric from both sides and concentrate on realistic options for withdrawing from Iraq. If I read into Erasmussimo's question premise, I think he is addressing what the administration could reasonably be expected to look at. Being no cheerleader of Juan Cole, I surprisingly think his plan has a solid foundation to start from.

This is one I have struggled with for more than a year and a half. I vehemently opposed the invasion of Iraq because I distrusted the administrations motives and because I feared just the kind of situation we now face. (I referred to it as "a gigantic West Bank." Since then, I have been advocating turning the stabilization over to others with U.S. financial underwriting. See (What could Bush do?). Things have deteriorated so much that this may not be possible. I would regard Juan Cole's proposal as a possible alternative if we could trust the Bush Administration. However, there is no clear evidence that it has given up on exerting long term control of Iraq; consequently, following Cole's policy would run the great risk of continued American meddling in Iraqi politics to the detriment of both the Iraqis and ourselves. I would, however, regard policy changes in the direction of Cole's proposal as substantially better than Bush's "stay the course" rhetoric.

Though not 100% in accordance with Juan Cole's 10 point plan; that Army did announce today that near term withdrawl is starting to look like Army policy.


FT News

Though I still expect to make to trip to Iraq sometime within the next year, I am heartened by this news, hopefully, troop levels will be drastically reduced, and tour lengths will be shortened.

Kiowas, FLIR, SF, TACP -- yawn! This is more tedious than a Tom Clancy novel. These omnipotent technologies were going to win the war, remember? Having singularly failed to do that, they will now -- presto, chango! -- defend the Iraqi government from its determined foes on the ground.

The "Iraqi government" is not coherent but a loose alliance of Shiites and Kurds that will very likely disintegrate with our departure. Some of the "Iraqi" security forces will continue to exist, because they are in fact Kurdish or Shiite security forces. In any case, there will be a confused tripartite struggle among irregular forces, not set-piece battles where these science fiction devices might possibly accomplish something.

As if America hadn't already overdosed on fantasies of solving the world's problems with whizbang military marvels, we now have this Michgan history professor proposing to accomplish the essential aims of the war exclusively with air power.

I'm sorry....... next time I'll leave the realistic, factual information at the door, and just stick to class warfare rhetoric, with a sprinkling of chicken little-esque the sky is falling, the war is lost chants.
A plan is usually better than NO plan. Your plan seems to be leave and pay vast sums of money while apologizing profusely. I remember disagreeing with it, but I don't remember ridiculing it..........Maybe that's just a subtle difference in debate styles......
You can deride technology all you want, but I'm having doubts as to whether or not you understand what they are, or their effectiveness. I brought up a critique of Cole's plan, with some ideas of my own, and all you can do interject quotation marks and phrases like presto chango?

If, as you claim, the war has been lost for some time, then why is there a government and why is there a draft constitution, and why is there an ISF?
If the war has been lost for some time, Baghdad should have been brunt to the ground by now.
The goal is to eventually withdraw from Iraq and leave it as stable as possible. We cab do it smart or we can do it stupid. I vote for smart. At least Cole has tried to be moderate and sensible and offer a plan, which we are now debating. It's more than the administration or the opposition has provided.

I believe the problem is more likely to be this: The Iraqi government may request more troops longer, in a Germany/Korea style of occupation. No matter Democrat or Republican, the next administration is likely to be too tempted to say no.
The biggest problem in the short term is how to more effectively deal with the insurgency. Most insurgency's of past conflicts have followed a maoist model, and western democratic governments have evolved methods to combat them. This insurgency is composed of disparate groups vying for goals ranging from simple chaos to regional instability to the return of the Ba'athist/fascist regime, and these groups don't even like each other.
Because of this dilemma, even the best plan for stability and withdrawl, will be marred by factional violence. I'm still optimistic, but reaching our goal will not be bloodless.

Mods, I hope you don't mind if I just throw this link in here - I said all I need to say in my first post on this thread. However, I believe that this paper by Anthony Cordesman at CSIS bears a read by anyone reading or discussing this topic.

Iraqi Force Development: Can the Iraqis Do the Job?, date 8 August 2005.

A 76-page study, its probably the best you'll find open-source. Its also a living document, and you can expect an updated version sometime next month.

This MOD for one thanks you for the link. Withdrawing US forces successfully from Iraq is clearly linked to the effectiveness of the ISF.
I've seen an excerpt from this document, but haven't had time to read the whole thing. CSIS always puts forth a good analysis; nothing cuts through the spin like statistics and context.
Not to take away from Cole's 10 point proposal, but it is simplistic and 'big picture'. CSIS's study contains 30 recommendations that deal with the training, funding and regulations of the ISF and police forces. It may read like Aramaic to some but really gets into the sordid details.

I am unaware of having used any "class warfare rhetoric."



Well, to say that this is an absurd, science fiction scenario, these figures of speech seem entirely appropriate. I did observe that these technologies have been singularly incapable of suppressing the insurgency with U.S. forces on the ground, and hence, with what likelihood will they suppress it without?

To withdraw, apologize and pay reparations is not no plan, and it is one that no one doubts is feasible. This is in contrast to Cole's, by which all the orginal objectives of invading Iraq are supposed to be achieved without ground forces.



I am hardly alone in my belief that the war is lost. The enemy's objective is not, of course, to burn Baghdad to the ground. The occupation proceeds in a kind of zombie existence because not only the Administration, but significant other elements of the U.S. power structure (sorry for the "class warfare rhetoric") haven't been able to accept its failure. They will have to soon enough.

It would be possible to win this kind of war with a vastly greater commitment of time, manpower and resouces than the American people would accept, and also with signifantly greater brutality than world and Middle Eastern opinion would accept. Recognizing these two constraints, the war is lost.

There are no multiple-rotor, lazer-guided solutions to that.



The actual goal is to control the future of Iraq. The Administration is entirely correct that this can't be done without a substantial commitment of ground forces. Indeed, even more ground forces are needed than they admit. It is hardly smart to pretend that this goal can be achieved without any ground presence. Fish, or cut bait. Those are the realistic options.

The "opposition" is not the Congressional Democrats, than which a sorrier bunch of unprincipled, compromising, wishful-thinking do-gooders never existed, but the real war opposition, which has been calling for immediate withdrawal for some time.

Is this plan the best available option for our Iraq policy? If not, what would be better?

It seems to me the current plan is sufficient. I don't know if it's the best, but it seems to be working. President Bush laid out his plan for withdrawl from Iraq in these words, "Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down."

So I understand this to mean that as Iraqis assume the roles of governance, coalition forces will begin to leave Iraq. I've heard a couple of different sources, both liberal and conservative say that a realistic time frame for troop withdrawl to be more like next summer.

Liberal Source
Conservative Source

Assuming that this is the case, the war would have lasted over three years, and would have come with a cost of about 3,000 coalition lives. Surely this would be unprecedented for a war of this magnitude.

Excuse me? Brutality is almost synonymous with Mid-East politics. They're practically used to enduring harsh treatment by government. They sure as hell respond to it.

I must admit that Bud's comment is not out of context, but still.

The most important thing to do, is of course, to make sure the country manage to build itself up again. The American army literally destroyed the infrastructures and ancient (none replacable) areas in Iraq, and i know that the U.S does not have any real history to talk about, but that does not make it right for them to destroy other cultures whom has. However much you dont like them.


Personally, as long as the U.S rebuilds and pays for all the destruction and killing they commited in Iraq, i am alright. But i have my suspicion that they wont, nor that they even would admit the massive amount of destruction they caused. But now its done, to late now, i just hope they are prepaired to face the truth and challenges to pay up for what they have done.

-Eric

The U.S. isn't obligated to to own up to anything. Wars result in casualities on both sides and, from time to time, civilians and the infrastructure to sustain them get in the way. That's the nature of war. However, the U.S. has a particular interest in rebuilding the national infrastructure, so I wouldn't expect us to rescind on what we have committed to the country so far.

In order to nurture the present climat to make it conducive to large-scale re-development, we need to purge the country of that terrorist element. So far, the Bush administration has failed to confront the insurgents as aggressively as he should. Until that time comes, Iraq will remain in the current state indefinately.

Juan Cole has issued another statement on the urgency of withdrawing ground troops from Iraq now. Source. This pice is also a good review of the errors committed that have allowed the situation in Iraq to spiral into chaos. A few excerpts:






Professor Cole should have added that the British versus Basra police shootout demonstrates that the situation in Shi'ia Iraq has also obviously deteriorated to an untenable level. In addition, the American people have now began to recognize the inability of American forces to accomplish anything of lasting value in Iraq. See this USA Today Gallup Poll. (This question is near the bottom). 63% now want to withdraw some or all of American ground forces.