QUOTE(Mrs. Pigpen @ Dec 3 2005, 09:22 AM)
First things first. Kwiatkowski was not an insider. She never worked on the iraq issue and had no direct knowledge of any attempts to pressure or coerce intelligence analysts. She had not one iota of proof to offer the bipartisan
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence(pdf file, see page 283) aside from hearsay which was not subsequently backed up by her supposed sources.
QUOTE
The desk officer told committee staff that she never worked the iraq issue and had no direct knowledge of any attempts to pressure or coerce intelligence analysts. She obtained the information that she provided to Committee staff based on looking at the secret level intranet in the Pentagon and through discussions with colleagues.
The desk officer told Committee staff that a DIA senior intelligence analyst had told her that he had been pressured by the Deputy Under Secretary to change a briefing he was giving on Iraq and that he refused to change the briefing because the intelligence did not support the Deputy Under Secretary’s conclusion. She said that after this incident the senior analyst was excluded from bilateral exchange visits. Committee staff interviewed the DIA senior intelligence analyst (pg 280) who said that he had not been asked to change any briefings on Iraq, but said he was asked not to use the work “assassinations” when giving a brief on the Israeli Defense Force. He provided no information to show that he had been excluded from the bilateral visits because of his analysis.
**snipped out portion…indicating she could not provide any examples of hostile climate (other than the senior analyst mentioned previously) or of instances where points differed from analysis to back up her charges**
When asked whether she had any evidence of the Office of Special Plans attempting to pressure CIA analysts she said that she had heard the Deputy Under Secretary make negative comments about the CIA’s analysis but said she could not say that the office pressured CIA. The desk officer also made several accusations that Administration policy speeches included information that was not supported by intelligence, specifically on issues such as the threat of Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicles, alleged attempts to acquire uranium from Niger, and attempts to acquire aluminum tubes for use in a centrifuge enrichment program, but she was unaware that publicly released intelligence showed that the IC had in fact published finished intelligence products making each one of these assessments. She had no direct knowledge to support any claims that intelligence analysts were pressured and much of what she said is contradicted by information from other interviews and intelligence reporting.
I think if her sources were still in government or wanted to maintain a favorable relationship with government I hardly think they would back her up. I also don't think that talking to government workers who were "in the loop" would qualify as merely hearsay. Furthermore she was working in NESA, a related group, and directly was able to observe the changes there which apparently mirrored what was happening with OSP according to her. Then again she could be lying or simply deluding herself. I am however impressed by the level of detail she offers.
Here she gives you a direct sense of how policy was being agendaized in NESA (Near East South Asia directorate)
QUOTE
I learned that there was indeed a preferred ideology for NESA. My first day in the office, a GS-15 career civil servant rather unhappily advised me that if I wanted to be successful here, I'd better remember not to say anything positive about the Palestinians. This belied official U.S. policy of serving as an honest broker for resolution of Israeli and Palestinian security concerns. At that time, there was a great deal of talk about Bush's possible support for a Palestinian state. That the Pentagon could have implemented and, worse, was implementing its own foreign policy had not yet occurred to me.
And here she is informed of the Chalabi connection.
QUOTE
A politically savvy civilian-clothes-wearing lieutenant colonel named Bill Bruner served as the Iraq desk officer, and he had apparently joined NESA about the time Bill Luti did. I discovered that Bruner, like Luti, had served as a military aide to Speaker Gingrich. Gingrich himself was now conveniently an active member of Bush's Defense Policy Board, which had space immediately below ours on the third floor.
I asked why Bruner wore civilian attire, and was told by others, "He's Chalabi's handler." Chalabi, of course, was Ahmad Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress, who was the favored exile of the neoconservatives and the source of much of their "intelligence."
If Kwiatkowski were alone in offering testimony of agenda based evidence development it would be easier to dismiss her but there are so many other examples where, for instance, evidence that had been more or less discredited was resurrected later in, for example, Powell's prewar UN speech. Sources like "Curveball", al Libi and Al-Haideri who were no longer considered credible were maintained as legitimate purveyors of evidence by the Bush folks. The same with the aluminum tubing and the nuclear Niger connection. Here's a link to some of these matters.
Did the BA manipulate intelligence?This link deals with evidence being kept from Congress by the president's people and also includes some background that directly dovetails with Karen Kwiatsowski's observations about agenda based intelligence development.
Misleading the Hill and alternative "intelligence" development.QUOTE
One reason that Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld made statements that contradicted what they were told in CIA briefings might have been that they were receiving information from another source that purported to have evidence of Al Qaeda-Iraq ties. The information came from a covert intelligence unit set up shortly after the September 11 attacks by then-Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith.
Feith was a protégé of, and intensely loyal to, Cheney, Rumsfeld, then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, and Cheney's then-chief of staff and national security adviser, I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby. The secretive unit was set up because Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Libby did not believe the CIA would be able to get to the bottom of the matter of Iraq-Al Qaeda ties. The four men shared a long-standing distrust of the CIA from their earlier positions in government, and felt that the agency had failed massively by not predicting the September 11 attacks.
At first, the Feith-directed unit primarily consisted of two men, former journalist Michael Maloof and David Wurmser, a veteran of neoconservative think tanks. They liked to refer to themselves as the "Iraqi intelligence cell" of the Pentagon. And they took pride in the fact that their office was in an out-of-the-way cipher-locked room, with "charts that rung the room from one end to the other" showing the "interconnections of various terrorist groups" with one another and, most important, with Iraq, Maloof recalled in an interview.
They also had the heady experience of briefing Rumsfeld twice, and Feith more frequently, Maloof said. The vice president's office also showed great interest in their work. On at least three occasions, Maloof said, Samantha Ravich, then-national security adviser for terrorism to Cheney, visited their windowless offices for a briefing.
But neither Maloof nor Wurmser had any experience or formal training in intelligence analysis. Maloof later lost his security clearance, for allegedly failing to disclose a relationship with a woman who is a foreigner, and after allegations that he leaked classified information to the press. Maloof said in the interview that he has done nothing wrong and was simply being punished for his controversial theories. Wurmser has since been named as Cheney's Middle East adviser.
QUOTE
MPP. Do you feel Karen Kwiatkowski is credible?
Well, she obviously isn't being exactly forthecoming when she says she "witnessed these things firsthand" is she? I'm sure she believes what she is saying. I think I know who Hersh's “unnamed Pentagon source" might be now.
Do you think the Bush administration manipulated intelligence to suit an invasion agenda?
I think he used the evidence to fit his case for an invasion (like other presidents, I might add), because he thought it was in the security interest of the United States. Intelligence is never perfect, particularly in a case such as this where we had few sources within a very secret, closed society (as Iraq was under sanction) other than insiders who were likely feeding us information to suite their own agendas. The sources, however, included even prior head scientists who worked under Saddam. I don't believe Bush "falsified" it, or "created" it, no.
I'm inclined to agree that the president truly believed that there was a threat from Iraq as he described. But I don't think he or his people were beyond "fixing" the evidence to an extent to make a more compelling case for their beliefs and the necessity of invading.