QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
Yes I read that. So the UN, according to you[r] logic, knew more about the WMD in Iraq then our CIA did.
In a word, yes, I think the IAEA was more versed in Iraq’s capabilities than our intelligence agencies. Our intelligence agencies don’t have a biological/chemical/nuclear inspections team that I’m aware of. Our intelligence agencies rely on the accounts of people with agendas like
Ahmed Chalabi. If the intelligence supporting or opposing the invasion isn’t vetted before it reaches top brass and civilian leadership, the chance of them making the wrong decision increases.
QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
Then if you read the UN statements by Blix to the UN you will have to agree that Iraq had very significant stockpiles of WMD – such as TONS of VX nerve gas and thousands of liters of Anthrax.
I will agree that Blix would not have allowed an invasion until he was satisfied with inspections if it was within his power. The U.S. was not interested in granting Blix “
a few more months.” In a few months the mushroom cloud scenario would fade from the American public’s memory.
QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
UN 1441 said Iraq must actively bring out the WMD or show proof they had (illegally) destroyed them. Instead they stonewalled the UN and shot at our aircraft. Illegally?
As far as showing proof, we had intelligence prior to the invasion
indicating Saddam had destroyed his stockpiles and capabilities. The administration decided Chalabi’s account was more accurate than former US Marine Intel officer and former UNSCOM Chief Weapons Inspector, Scott Ritter’s.
Saddam’s reticence with UNSCOM inspectors probably had something to do with some UNSCOM
team members spying for the U.S. and providing our country with valuable targets in our retaliatory strikes a few years later. While I’m not opposed to taking out locations that potentially presented WMD threats ourselves (although conventional wisdom says that doing so would decrease Saddam’s capabilities), there is nothing in 1441 authorizing U.S. intelligence agencies to embed agents in the disarmament team.
QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
Bush decided we could not wait forever. IMO he was correct. France and Russia were paid off and the inspectors had little chance of getting Iraq to bring forward the WMD.
It is your prerogative to believe this is the case, but how does this counter my argument that the WHIG stovepipped intelligence?
QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
No most of the Intel during the Clinton years was from the inspectors that identified Iraq’s WMD facilities, and the intel on WMD produced. This is where Blix started and we can see what he said as well as Butler. ALL of them said Iraq produced stockpiles of WMD and Iraq admitted they did so.
And since the inspectors were booted in 1998 after Bill and most Dems said Iraq had massive WMD I fail to see the plan.
Well,
Ted, no one denies that Iraq was capable of WMD production, if not delivery systems, at some point. We may not have sold Saddam the whole chemistry kit, but we sold him
some of the flasks and components to get things going.
Certainly I can read that Blix
wanted more time for thorough inspections and Butler, contrary to repeating a popular myth, was not kicked out of Iraq by Saddam—he was basically ordered out by the U.S. for his own safety before we answered Saddam’s reticence with bombs:
QUOTE(Center for Cooperative Research)
UNSCOM executive chairman Richard Butler orders the withdrawal of weapons inspectors from Iraq accusing the Iraqis of not cooperating. His actions follow a phone conversation with Peter Burleigh, the American representative to the United Nations [New York Times, 12/18/1998] , basically warning Butler that the US intends to strike Iraq. In his book, Saddam Defiant, Butler will recall: “I received a telephone call from US Ambassador Peter Burleigh inviting me for a private conversation at the US mission... Burleigh informed me that on instructions from Washington it would be ‘prudent to take measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq.’... I told him that I would act on this advice and remove my staff from Iraq.” Butler's order to withdraw is made without the permission of the UN Security Council. [Butler, 2000, pp 224; Znet, 7/6/2004]
Years later, the American press and government will say that on this day Saddam Hussein “kicked out” inspectors. [Extra!, 10/2002]
-
Context of 'December 16, 1998'QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
The ONLY reason we got inspectors back into Iraq, if you remember, is because GWB put 50,000 men on his border.
Actually, after
UNSCOM was shut down in 1999 due to the spying scandal Blix organized the
UNMOVIC team in 2002, when the U.S. began its saber-rattling. That February the UN said “Iraq’s level of cooperation is improving.” (
Link) There may be a one year window between cooperation and troop buildup outside Iraq’s northern and southern borders.
QUOTE(Ted @ Dec 19 2005, 04:14 PM)
And as for the CIA please be aware that the real problem in Iraq going back 2 decades is we had not one agent inside Iraq. This is due to the stupid idea that with great satellites we didn’t need people. Also the Clinton Administration and those before him cut back on “field agents.” In particular Clinton folks ignored the special terrorism commission which recommended increases in these areas.
I agree this is a pivotal mistake Clinton make. Our greater reliance on technology removed emphasis on human intelligence. Hopefully we don’t repeat this mistake. However, this doesn’t excuse the WHIG’s intelligence machination.