QUOTE(Amlord)
Victor Davis Hansen is always a good read for me. A historian and a journalist, Hansen always keeps perspective on things.
In this piece: The Plague of Success, he says that our successes have made our expectations greater and greater. He claims that at the outset, we would have scoffed at the successes we have had in Iraq and yet after those successes, we focus on the negatives.
The article was certainly interesting, and the core is indeed about a mismatch between expectations and achievements, but he can't resist getting a few more digs in against the pessimistic opponents of the Iraq War, foreign and domestic, than he can muster against the over-optimistic.
For example, the French and Germans are singled out for criticism because they "often either wire terrorists money, sell them weapons, or let them go". Last I looked, most terrorist insurgents that were shooting at coalition forces in Iraq were using Khalashnikovs, which aren't (to my knowledge) made in Paris or the Ruhr valley. They let usually only let loose the "terrorists" who haven't been charged or convicted of any crime.
And I think that if Hansen was writing in Europe he'd find the accusation of wiring money to terror groups both subject to libel proceedings and countered by reminders that American citizens have wired and continue to wire money to proscribed terror groups - Noraid ring any bells?
But that's by-the-by. While he mentions the expectations of both pro- and anti-war commentators, the only ones he spends much time proving wrong are the doom and gloom merchants.
You yourself said in your preamble that "we would have scoffed at the successes we have had in Iraq", but this is only true if the expectations we ALL had were those of the worst doomsayers.* If we listened to the advocates of invasion, as the majority of Americans (and, just, Britons) did, then it's not the doomsayers who badly let us down by giving us unrealistic and downright wrong-headed expectations, but the advocates who did.
*Which, in this case, do not include the French government, whose prediction that ejecting the Baathist regime would be easy, but installing a replacement would be a long and painful process dogged by insurgency, infighting between Kurd, Sunni & Shia, consitutional uncertainty, and an almost open-ended commitment of money, manpower & materiel by the invading forces - a pretty good summary of what' happened so far, no?
Is there a sense of perspective missing from our evaluation of the war in Iraq?Yes, on all sides. The BIG missing for me in Hansen's article is that the majority expectation (by far in the USA, and by a whisker in the UK) was that our politicians were doing an unpleasant but desperatley necessary thing
for the reasons that they told us they were.
And the biggest let-down in expectations, at least here in the UK, wasn't to do with how hard or bloody the reconstruction of Iraq would be, because (perhaps because of our different historical experience) we didn't expect it to be easy, short or bloodless.
No, the big disparity between expectation and delivery here has been in the honesty, probity (and if they are still intact, stupidity) of our political leaders. If a genuine military threat is levelled at the UK while Tony Blair is still Prime Minister, the British parliament and people will simply not believe him when he tells us about it until the bombs start falling.
Should we expect more? If so, on what basis?Yes. We should expect our politicians not to lie to us, even if it's to make us feel better. They might believe that something is the right thing to do, but if they can't justify why without resorting to "because it was the right thing to do" (for which read "because I say so") - which is all Blair is left with now WMD have not only not been found but been shown to have been either rusted relics of the Iran-Iraq war or just plain not there to begin with - then they shouldn't expect anyone to support them.
Should we be content with our successes?Like
nighttimer said, contentment is for cows. Nobody ever learns anything from success, except to the same thing again next time. The trouble is, next time is never quite the same, so what worked once may not work again. (Anc
vice versa)
But there's a wider problme here, I think, going beyond even security policy to the very core of Western electoral politics, especially in the Anglophone world.
We like conviction politics, we think, because they seem so certain, and certainty of purpose is atttractive in anyone. Periodically, we like them so much that we elect so many of them with particular convictions that such checks and balances as we have in our various political set-ups become weakened or (sometimes) completely suppressed.
The trouble is,
nobody is
always right about
everything. Not in this world.
We
have to continue to challenge and question our politicians, and we have to continue to expect
them to do it of their leaders and opponents.
And we have to be deeply suspicious of ANYONE who says we have to do something (be it a war or a tax change or anything else) because "it's the right thing to do". If they can't justify based on concrete evidence (either to the electorate directly, or to state legislatures where national security is an issue), we shouldn't do it.
It's an extension of the old Socratic idea that "the unexamined life is not worth living" - the unexamined policy is not worth implementing.
I say this as someone who doesn't consider himself conservative at all, rather something of a radical. We
should question even those things that seem to be working well, to check that they are responding to change and that they can't be improved in some way.
But, for me, the worst aspect of failed expectations in Iraq has been, and continues to be, that we haven't expected ourselves, and our politicians, to be able to justify our (and their) without being overly selective (which is natural enough, and probably tolerable if we have a vigorous enough debate), evasive and downright untruthful (which are also natural, but should no longer be tolerable IMO).