1. Does the Supreme Court in fact have the authority to create new law?Yes, but it's important that they use restraint in exercising that authority. Any case that the Supreme Court decides can be used as precedent in other cases throughout the entire country. Any such case law is "new law," in the common law tradition we inherited from Britain, so clearly the Court does have the authority to create new law.
But the Framers never imagined the Court as a super-legislature, inventing new Constitutional rights and abrogating "obsolete" ones. The other branches have checks and balances that the Court lacks. The only check on the Court's power is to pass a Constitutional amendment -- a very difficult undertaking.
2. What do you feel is the "proper" role for the Supreme Court in the "legislative" process?Striking down laws that are unconstitutional. Giving Congress some guidance about how they overstepped their authority.
3. Do contreversial cases, where the Constitution is unclear and provides no easy resolution, reaffirm the need for courts to "legislate" or challenge it?Controversial cases reaffirm the need for courts to
judge, to read the law carefully, and to interpret it in a reasonable way. Justice Marshall wrote in 1824:
QUOTE(Gibbons v. Ogden)
What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the object for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.
Marshall kind of sounds like Scalia there...
QUOTE(Ultimatejoe @ Mar 9 2006, 03:49 PM)
If I'm a judge, and I'm presiding over a case where interpretation is necessary, no matter how I rule I am in effect creating new law. This is what I was hoping to get a bit. In Roe v. Wade for example, some people (Amlord for example) feel that the Court created new law, and in doing so overstepped its authority. However, if they had ruled that the state could restrict abortions on the basis of fetal rights, then they would be creating new law as well, as nowhere in the Constitution or existing legal body were these rights enumerated.
I see your general point, but I disagree about Roe. The states do have the power to regulate medical procedures. That's an example of "police powers" traditionally reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. And Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe that "In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone."
QUOTE(Ultimatejoe @ Mar 9 2006, 03:49 PM)
The court cannot be a force for social stagnation either. The status quo is only as tenable (in this case) as the law allows.
"Stagnation" is an interesting choice of words. Presumably you would like the courts to be "progressive." The Framers saw the Supreme Court as a
moderating force, not creating new rights, but preserving those rights found in the Constitution. In
Federalist 78, Hamilton writes of "ill humors" that "sometimes disseminate among the people themselves" and "occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community." That danger necessitates "the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void," unless and until the Constitution is amended to allow these laws:
QUOTE(Federalist 78)
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.
There were some at the time who warned of the possibility of judicial activism. Hamilton's response:
QUOTE(Federalist 78)
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.
I think Hamilton was right, that a Supreme Court is necessary to preserve our rights under the Constitution. We're better off than we would have been if the Court hadn't existed. But it's important that the courts recognize the need to exercise their JUDGMENT and not their WILL.