Full Version: Defining Chief Justice Roberts
When Roberts was confirmed as the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, many of us were pleased. Strict constructionists rejoiced.
Now on the Court for a while, looking at some of his opinions leaves me to wonder why I was so pleased. Definition of Strict Constructionism
Georgia vs Randolph – he sides against privacy(although his reasoning is at least backed up) rights.
Gonzalez vs Oregon- he sides against state’s rights(all powers not given the feds are enumerated to the states).
Both of his decisions were dissenting views that while pleasing to the Republican base, are questionable in their constitutional backing IMO.
Questions for Debate: Do the Chief Justice’s Opinions on the Court thus far indicate that he is a strict constructionist? Why or why not? Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
Now on the Court for a while, looking at some of his opinions leaves me to wonder why I was so pleased. Definition of Strict Constructionism
QUOTE(wikipedia 3/30/06)
Strict constructionism is a philosophy of judicial interpretation and legal philosophy that limits judicial interpretation to the meanings of the actual words and phrases used in law, and not on other sources or inferences. Adherents look strictly at the text in question rather than relying either on legislative intent (as gleaned from contemporaneous commentaries or legislative debate) or on metaphysical ideas such as natural law.
Georgia vs Randolph – he sides against privacy(although his reasoning is at least backed up) rights.
Gonzalez vs Oregon- he sides against state’s rights(all powers not given the feds are enumerated to the states).
Both of his decisions were dissenting views that while pleasing to the Republican base, are questionable in their constitutional backing IMO.
Questions for Debate: Do the Chief Justice’s Opinions on the Court thus far indicate that he is a strict constructionist? Why or why not? Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
Do the Chief Justice’s Opinions on the Court thus far indicate that he is a strict constructionist? Why or why not?
From what I can tell from these two opinions (Georgia v. Randolph and Gonzalez v. Oregon), it seems he is lining up as a strict constructionist.
In Georgia v. Randolph he reads the 4th Amendment in a fairly narrow fashion that would be consistent with a textualist approach. The majority adopts a very broad reading to encompass an individual's expectation of privacy. Roberts' reading of the 4th amendment assumes that a property owner's privacy expectation might be different where that property is jointly owned with an individual.
His dissent in Gonzalez v. Oregon is entirely consistent with a textualist approach. Textualism gives much weight to precedent and precedent dictates that great weight is given to an attorney general's interpretation of a federal regulation.
JLMA wrote
I can't agree with this at all. Frankly, I don't see how you could begin to argue that Roberts' decisions in these two cases lack constitutional backing.
Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
I am not sure we can answer this question by looking at these two decisions. In both cases Scalia and Roberts signed on to the same dissent.
From what I can tell from these two opinions (Georgia v. Randolph and Gonzalez v. Oregon), it seems he is lining up as a strict constructionist.
In Georgia v. Randolph he reads the 4th Amendment in a fairly narrow fashion that would be consistent with a textualist approach. The majority adopts a very broad reading to encompass an individual's expectation of privacy. Roberts' reading of the 4th amendment assumes that a property owner's privacy expectation might be different where that property is jointly owned with an individual.
His dissent in Gonzalez v. Oregon is entirely consistent with a textualist approach. Textualism gives much weight to precedent and precedent dictates that great weight is given to an attorney general's interpretation of a federal regulation.
JLMA wrote
QUOTE
Both of his decisions were dissenting views that while pleasing to the Republican base, are questionable in their constitutional backing IMO.
I can't agree with this at all. Frankly, I don't see how you could begin to argue that Roberts' decisions in these two cases lack constitutional backing.
Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
I am not sure we can answer this question by looking at these two decisions. In both cases Scalia and Roberts signed on to the same dissent.
QUOTE(hayleyanne @ Mar 30 2006, 03:12 PM)
In Georgia v. Randolph he reads the 4th Amendment in a fairly narrow fashion that would be consistent with a textualist approach. The majority adopts a very broad reading to encompass an individual's expectation of privacy. Roberts' reading of the 4th amendment assumes that a property owner's privacy expectation might be different where that property is jointly owned with an individual.
I had a feeling that the opening post was going to cause problems with respect to understanding what Georgia v. Randolph was really about, since it isn't really about privacy if you actually read the case. It is about a bad police search, period. Lets just take a look at the facts of the case shall we?
QUOTE
Respondent Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, separated in late May 2001, when she left the marital residence in Americus, Georgia, and went to stay with her parents in Canada, taking their son and some belongings. In July, she returned to the Americus house with the child, though the record does not reveal whether her object was reconciliation or retrieval of remaining possessions.
On the morning of July 6, she complained to the policethat after a domestic dispute her husband took their son away, and when officers reached the house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user whose habit had caused financial troubles.
She mentioned the marital problems and said that she and their son had only recently returned after a stay of several weeks with her parents. Shortly after the police arrived, Scott Randolph returnedand explained that he had removed the child to a neighbor’s house out of concern that his wife might takethe boy out of the country again; he denied cocaine use, and countered that it was in fact his wife who abused drugs and alcohol.
One of the officers, Sergeant Murray, went with Janet Randolph to reclaim the child, and when they returned she not only renewed her complaints about her husband’s drug use, but also volunteered that there were “ ‘items of drug evidence’ ” in the house. Brief for Petitioner 3. Sergeant Murray asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which he unequivocally refused.
The sergeant turned to Janet Randolph for consent to search, which she readily gave. She led the officer upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as Scott’s, where the sergeant noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue he suspected was cocaine. He then left the house to get an evidence bag from his car and to call the district attorney’s office, which instructed him to stop the search and apply for a warrant. When Sergeant Murray returned to the house, Janet Randolph withdrew her consent. The police took the straw to the police station, along with the Randolphs. After getting a search warrant, they returned to the house and seized furtherevidence of drug use, on the basis of which Scott Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine.
On the morning of July 6, she complained to the policethat after a domestic dispute her husband took their son away, and when officers reached the house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user whose habit had caused financial troubles.
She mentioned the marital problems and said that she and their son had only recently returned after a stay of several weeks with her parents. Shortly after the police arrived, Scott Randolph returnedand explained that he had removed the child to a neighbor’s house out of concern that his wife might takethe boy out of the country again; he denied cocaine use, and countered that it was in fact his wife who abused drugs and alcohol.
One of the officers, Sergeant Murray, went with Janet Randolph to reclaim the child, and when they returned she not only renewed her complaints about her husband’s drug use, but also volunteered that there were “ ‘items of drug evidence’ ” in the house. Brief for Petitioner 3. Sergeant Murray asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which he unequivocally refused.
The sergeant turned to Janet Randolph for consent to search, which she readily gave. She led the officer upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as Scott’s, where the sergeant noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue he suspected was cocaine. He then left the house to get an evidence bag from his car and to call the district attorney’s office, which instructed him to stop the search and apply for a warrant. When Sergeant Murray returned to the house, Janet Randolph withdrew her consent. The police took the straw to the police station, along with the Randolphs. After getting a search warrant, they returned to the house and seized furtherevidence of drug use, on the basis of which Scott Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine.
The lower courts and the majority opinion ruled correctly here, this was a bad search. Your legally separatedwife returns, a fight of some kind happens and as pay back she tells the cops that you use cocaine and she can show them where. They ask you if they can search the house and you say "no" (which is your explicit right according to the 4th amendment) and the cop turns and asks your legally separated wife if he can search and she says "yes". Notice a problem with that? The cops go upstairs and find something and then she tells them she revokes the right to search and they take the evidence anyway.
I don't know how you can even begin to suggest that this is a "strict constructionist" or "textualist" interpretation of the 4th amendment or established case law. What it does prove is that the aforementioned terms are really code-speak for "conservative activist" and it does not surprise me at all that the only dissents were Roberts and Scalia.
QUOTE(hayleyanne)
His dissent in Gonzalez v. Oregon is entirely consistent with a textualist approach. Textualism gives much weight to precedent and precedent dictates that great weight is given to an attorney general's interpretation of a federal regulation.
Again I don't know where you are coming up with that. This from the summary:
QUOTE
The Oregon Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempts from civil or criminal liability state-licensed physicians who, in compliance with ODWDA’s specific safeguards, dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient. In 2001, the Attorney General issued an Interpretive Rule to address the implementation and enforcement of the CSA with respect to ODWDA, declaring that using controlled substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is unlawful under the CSA. The State, a physician, a pharmacist, and some terminally ill state residents challenged the Rule. The District Court permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the Rule, reasoning that, by making a medical procedure authorized under Oregon law a federal offense, it altered the balance between the States and the Federal Government without the requisite clear statement that the CSA authorized the action; and in the alternative, that the Rule could not be squared with the CSA’s plain language, which targets only conventional drugabuse and excludes the Attorney General from medical policy decisions.
In other words Gonzales sought to enforce the administration's policy through his own creative interpretation of the law on the books. What that amounted to was the Attorney General deciding what was a legitimate medical procedure when clearly the state of Oregon had already decided that at the voting booths. The Supreme Court rightly slapped the attorney general down.
Of course our conservative activists, I mean "textualists" sought to enforce Republican policy instead of the law.
Do the Chief Justice’s Opinions on the Court thus far indicate that he is a strict constructionist? Why or why not?
Strict constructionist? I don't know if we can judge by two rulings. What they do show is that he is the type of judge I want on the Supreme Court.
Let's take Georgia v. Randolph. Although Cube Jockey did a nice job summarizing the case for us, he is incorrect on a few crucial details.
First of all, the Randolphs were not legally separated. Georgia does not recognize legal separation. They were not divorced so that means they were married. They owned the house jointly. Mrs. Randolph gave the officers permission to search the premises. Not only did she give them permission, she showed them where the drug paraphernalia was.
The question is whether or not Mrs. Randolph has the legal right to allow a search. I think that she does. Legally, the residence still belonged to her (jointly with her husband). If her husband were not there, the search would clearly be legal. So we must ask whether or not the Constitution grants the unequivocal right to hide things in your house and hinders other legal residents' rights to report them to authorities in an expeditious manner.
The officers were in no position to determine who the drugs belonged to. That was for a jury to decide. For all practical purposes, Mrs. Randolph was allowing a search of her property after Mr. Randolph had accused her of being the drug abuser. Common law has always held that cohabitants have a lessened expectation of privacy. As I said earlier, if the husband wasn't there, the search would have been unquestionably legal.
As for Gonzalez v. Oregon, does anyone deny that the DEA has the authority to limit how doctors prescribe otherwise legal medication? Can the DEA enforce laws against doctors who prescribe oxycontin to addicts who will use it for other than its approved use?
The most common drug used for assisted suicide is Pentobarbital, which is a Class II controlled substance. Other class II substances are morphine, cocaine, opium, and oxycodone (the drug in Oxycontin
). If the DEA has the authority to determine illegal prescriptions of oxycodone, it certainly has the authority to determine illegal prescriptions of pentobarbital.
Schedule II drugs are those which:
The Controlled Substances Act authorizes the DEA to investigate drugs to determine potential abuses. The criteria used are:
Notice the first one: the drug is being used in amounts sufficient to create hazards to health. If death isn't a hazard to health, I don't know what is.
Doctors get prosecuted for prescribing drugs (especially pain killers) for uses outside the scope of accepted medical practice especially when it leads to a patient's death: example. Oregon has no authority to determine what legal medical usage is, since federal law trumps state law. Oregon does have a stake in deciding whether or not a doctor assisting in a suicide is murder: since murder is a state crime and not a federal one (except in rare circumstances). But states do not issue medical licenses to prescribe controlled substance drugs: the feds do, specifically the DEA. Since this drug falls within that classification, the feds clearly have the jurisdiction to limit the scope of its use.
Strict constructionist? I don't know if we can judge by two rulings. What they do show is that he is the type of judge I want on the Supreme Court.
Let's take Georgia v. Randolph. Although Cube Jockey did a nice job summarizing the case for us, he is incorrect on a few crucial details.
First of all, the Randolphs were not legally separated. Georgia does not recognize legal separation. They were not divorced so that means they were married. They owned the house jointly. Mrs. Randolph gave the officers permission to search the premises. Not only did she give them permission, she showed them where the drug paraphernalia was.
The question is whether or not Mrs. Randolph has the legal right to allow a search. I think that she does. Legally, the residence still belonged to her (jointly with her husband). If her husband were not there, the search would clearly be legal. So we must ask whether or not the Constitution grants the unequivocal right to hide things in your house and hinders other legal residents' rights to report them to authorities in an expeditious manner.
The officers were in no position to determine who the drugs belonged to. That was for a jury to decide. For all practical purposes, Mrs. Randolph was allowing a search of her property after Mr. Randolph had accused her of being the drug abuser. Common law has always held that cohabitants have a lessened expectation of privacy. As I said earlier, if the husband wasn't there, the search would have been unquestionably legal.
QUOTE(2 GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH ROBERTS dissenting)
If an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or those papers or places with the government. And just as an individual who has shared illegal plans or incriminating documents with another cannot interpose an objection when that other person turns the information over to the government, just because the individual happens to be present at the time, so too someone who shares a place with another cannot interpose an objection when that person decides to grant access to the police, simply because the objecting individual happens to be present.
A warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it. Cooccupants have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit [a] common area to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171, n. 7 (1974). Just as Mrs. Randolph could walk upstairs, come down, and turn her husband's cocaine straw over to the police, she can consent to police entry and search of what is, after all, her home, too.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 (1990), this Court stated that [w]hat [a person] is assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is unreasonable. Id., at 183. One element that can make a warrantless government search of a home reasonable is voluntary consent. Id., at 184; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (1973). Proof of voluntary consent is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but the government may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises. Matlock, supra, at 171.
A warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it. Cooccupants have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit [a] common area to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171, n. 7 (1974). Just as Mrs. Randolph could walk upstairs, come down, and turn her husband's cocaine straw over to the police, she can consent to police entry and search of what is, after all, her home, too.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 (1990), this Court stated that [w]hat [a person] is assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is unreasonable. Id., at 183. One element that can make a warrantless government search of a home reasonable is voluntary consent. Id., at 184; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (1973). Proof of voluntary consent is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but the government may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises. Matlock, supra, at 171.
As for Gonzalez v. Oregon, does anyone deny that the DEA has the authority to limit how doctors prescribe otherwise legal medication? Can the DEA enforce laws against doctors who prescribe oxycontin to addicts who will use it for other than its approved use?
The most common drug used for assisted suicide is Pentobarbital, which is a Class II controlled substance. Other class II substances are morphine, cocaine, opium, and oxycodone (the drug in Oxycontin
). If the DEA has the authority to determine illegal prescriptions of oxycodone, it certainly has the authority to determine illegal prescriptions of pentobarbital.Schedule II drugs are those which:
QUOTE
• The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
• The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.
• Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.
• Examples of Schedule II substances include morphine, phencyclidine (PCP), cocaine, methadone, and methamphetamine.
• The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.
• Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.
• Examples of Schedule II substances include morphine, phencyclidine (PCP), cocaine, methadone, and methamphetamine.
The Controlled Substances Act authorizes the DEA to investigate drugs to determine potential abuses. The criteria used are:
QUOTE
There is evidence that individuals are taking the drug or other substance in amounts sufficient to create a hazard to their health or to the safety of other individuals or to the community; or
There is significant diversion of the drug or other substance from legitimate drug channels; or
Individuals are taking the drug or other substance on their own initiative rather than on the basis of medical advice from a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs; or
The drug is a new drug so related in its action to a drug or other substance already listed as having a potential for abuse to make it likely that the drug will have the same potential for abuse as such drugs, thus making it reasonable to assume that there may be significant diversions from legitimate channels, significant use contrary to or without medical advice, or that it has a substantial capability of creating hazards to the health of the user or to the safety of the community. Of course, evidence of actual abuse of a substance is indicative that a drug has a potential for abuse.
There is significant diversion of the drug or other substance from legitimate drug channels; or
Individuals are taking the drug or other substance on their own initiative rather than on the basis of medical advice from a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs; or
The drug is a new drug so related in its action to a drug or other substance already listed as having a potential for abuse to make it likely that the drug will have the same potential for abuse as such drugs, thus making it reasonable to assume that there may be significant diversions from legitimate channels, significant use contrary to or without medical advice, or that it has a substantial capability of creating hazards to the health of the user or to the safety of the community. Of course, evidence of actual abuse of a substance is indicative that a drug has a potential for abuse.
Notice the first one: the drug is being used in amounts sufficient to create hazards to health. If death isn't a hazard to health, I don't know what is.
Doctors get prosecuted for prescribing drugs (especially pain killers) for uses outside the scope of accepted medical practice especially when it leads to a patient's death: example. Oregon has no authority to determine what legal medical usage is, since federal law trumps state law. Oregon does have a stake in deciding whether or not a doctor assisting in a suicide is murder: since murder is a state crime and not a federal one (except in rare circumstances). But states do not issue medical licenses to prescribe controlled substance drugs: the feds do, specifically the DEA. Since this drug falls within that classification, the feds clearly have the jurisdiction to limit the scope of its use.
QUOTE(Amlord @ Mar 31 2006, 08:11 AM)
The question is whether or not Mrs. Randolph has the legal right to allow a search. I think that she does. Legally, the residence still belonged to her (jointly with her husband). If her husband were not there, the search would clearly be legal. So we must ask whether or not the Constitution grants the unequivocal right to hide things in your house and hinders other legal residents' rights to report them to authorities in an expeditious manner.
The officers were in no position to determine who the drugs belonged to. That was for a jury to decide. For all practical purposes, Mrs. Randolph was allowing a search of her property after Mr. Randolph had accused her of being the drug abuser. Common law has always held that cohabitants have a lessened expectation of privacy. As I said earlier, if the husband wasn't there, the search would have been unquestionably legal.
The officers were in no position to determine who the drugs belonged to. That was for a jury to decide. For all practical purposes, Mrs. Randolph was allowing a search of her property after Mr. Randolph had accused her of being the drug abuser. Common law has always held that cohabitants have a lessened expectation of privacy. As I said earlier, if the husband wasn't there, the search would have been unquestionably legal.
And I think the majority opinion laid that out pretty nicely as to why she doesn't have the legal right to authorize a search, especially when her husband did not consent to the search.
The long and the short of it is the police jumped the gun and acted outside their authority. What they should have done is take a moment to get a warrant from a judge based on Mrs. Randolph's story and then do the search. Had the judge denied the warrant they would be out of luck. But that isn't what happened and the lower courts and the Supreme Court rightly swatted it down.
I fail to see how one can say the dissent was a "strict constructionist" ruling on the case.
QUOTE(Amlord)
As for Gonzalez v. Oregon, does anyone deny that the DEA has the authority to limit how doctors prescribe otherwise legal medication? Can the DEA enforce laws against doctors who prescribe oxycontin to addicts who will use it for other than its approved use?
Doesn't matter. Gonzales accused them of violating the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) claiming that using the drugs for assisted suicide is not a "legitimate medical purpose" when in fact he does not have the authority to define what a "legitimate medical purpose" is and the law does not define them either. It is up to the state to define what a "legitimate medical purpose" is in their state and the voters clearly did that.
I'm not claiming these are not regulated substances and neither was Gonzales, so your whole argument about the DEA misses the mark.
Again, if the people that claimed to be "strict constructionists" or "textualists" actually acted according to the definitions attributed to those words they would have ruled with the majority because the law does not define "legitimate medical purposes" and the attorney general does not have the power to define them so the states must have the power to define them in the abscence of a federal law (there isn't one). Remember the 10th amendment? "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171, n. 7 (1974) says that the government may obtain permission for a search from a third party if the third party has "common authority" over the premises. This judgement is as stare decisis as Roe v. Wade. The court needs to respect established precedent, does it not? 
Does stare decisis fly in the face of strict constructionism? Are they always at odds?
As for Gonzalez v. Oregon, it is illegitimate to use controlled substances to kill patients in 49 out of the 50 states. Isn't it the logic used by some anti-death penalty advocates that such overwhelming solidarity should mean that the will of the people has decided (of course, in the case of the death penalty, the plurality is much, much lower).
The CSA only covers controlled substances, which are specifically enumerated under that statute. Oregon physicians are, unfortunately, free to use any number of drugs to kill people as long as they are not covered by the Controlled Substances Act. Since Oregon feels that killing people is properly called medicine, so be it. Its physicians, however, cannot use drugs listed under the CSA. They should just use Draino injections and be done with it.
Does stare decisis fly in the face of strict constructionism? Are they always at odds?
As for Gonzalez v. Oregon, it is illegitimate to use controlled substances to kill patients in 49 out of the 50 states. Isn't it the logic used by some anti-death penalty advocates that such overwhelming solidarity should mean that the will of the people has decided (of course, in the case of the death penalty, the plurality is much, much lower).
The CSA only covers controlled substances, which are specifically enumerated under that statute. Oregon physicians are, unfortunately, free to use any number of drugs to kill people as long as they are not covered by the Controlled Substances Act. Since Oregon feels that killing people is properly called medicine, so be it. Its physicians, however, cannot use drugs listed under the CSA. They should just use Draino injections and be done with it.
QUOTE(Amlord @ Mar 31 2006, 10:54 AM)
The CSA only covers controlled substances, which are specifically enumerated under that statute. Oregon physicians are, unfortunately, free to use any number of drugs to kill people as long as they are not covered by the Controlled Substances Act. Since Oregon feels that killing people is properly called medicine, so be it. Its physicians, however, cannot use drugs listed under the CSA. They should just use Draino injections and be done with it.
The dissent in this case is based on a policy preference. It was a policy preference for the attorney general, it is a policy preference for you and it was a policy preference (weakly backed with legalese) by Scalia and Roberts in the case. I'd say your statements here pretty well illustrate that.
QUOTE(Amlord)
United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171, n. 7 (1974) says that the government may obtain permission for a search from a third party if the third party has "common authority" over the premises. This judgement is as stare decisis as Roe v. Wade. The court needs to respect established precedent, does it not?
Well that's easy, why don't you take a look at what the majority had to say about this.
QUOTE
(a) The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of a premises when the police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, common authority over the property, and no present co-tenant objects. Matlock, supra, at 170; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177, 186. The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in such cases is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are influenced by property law but not controlled by its rules. Thus, Matlock not only holds that a solitary co-inhabitant may sometimes consent to a search of shared premises, but also stands for the proposition that the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part a function of commonly held understandings about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests. Pp. 4–6.
(
Matlock’s example of common understanding is readily apparent. The assumption tenants usually make about their common authority when they share quarters is that any one of them may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may be admitted in his absence. Matlock placed no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical arrangements, absent reason to doubt that the regular scheme was in place. Pp. 6–8.
(
Matlock’s example of common understanding is readily apparent. The assumption tenants usually make about their common authority when they share quarters is that any one of them may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may be admitted in his absence. Matlock placed no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical arrangements, absent reason to doubt that the regular scheme was in place. Pp. 6–8.So there's what they had to say about Matlock, and then they went on to consider another case:
QUOTE
© This Court took a step toward addressing the issue here when it held in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91, that overnight houseguests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters. If that customary expectation is a foundation of a houseguest’s Fourth Amendment rights, it should follow that an inhabitant of shared premises may claim at least as much. In fact, a co-inhabitant naturally has an even stronger claim. No sensible person would enter shared premises based on one occupant’s invitation when a fellow tenant said to stay out. Such reticence would show not timidity but a realization that when people living together disagree over the use of their common quarters, a resolution must come through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to authority. Absent some recognized hierarchy, e.g., parent and child, there is no societal or legal understanding of superior and inferior as between co-tenants. Pp. 8–10.
(d) Thus, a disputed invitation, without more, gives an officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have absent any consent. Disputed permission is no match for the Fourth Amendment central value of “respect for the privacy of the home,” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 610, and the State’s other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh it.
(d) Thus, a disputed invitation, without more, gives an officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have absent any consent. Disputed permission is no match for the Fourth Amendment central value of “respect for the privacy of the home,” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 610, and the State’s other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh it.
So there they go, completely debunking your Matlock claim and I agree with this part of the decision as well. They then go on to say basically what I just said, the police should have sought a warrant based on what Mrs Randolph said.
QUOTE
The question here is whether customary social understanding accords the consenting tenant authority to prevail over the co-tenant’s objection, a question Matlock did not answer. Second, a fine line must be drawn to avoid undercutting Matlock—where the defendant, though not present, was in a squad car not far away—and Rod-riguez—where the defendant was asleep in the apartment and could have been roused by a knock on the door; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not part of the threshold colloquy, loses out. Such formalism is justified. So long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance specifically to avoid a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when no fellow occupant is on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s expressed contrary indication. Pp. 16–18.
Now who is not following stare decisis Amlord? What the dissent did, just as you have done, was simply ignore other relevant precedents to make their argument.
First let me say, well done CJ. Now,
I don’t see how his decisions do. Lets refresh ourselves on the Fourth Amendment.
In Randolph, from a strict constructionist point of view of the Constitution, the search is unreasonable because there was no Warrant. That would be interpreting the Fourth Amendment narrowly. Now laws have been written over the years that help to define reasonable warrantless searches. If Roberts is a constructionist, then where is the written law that states that police can conduct a general search of the home without a warrant after you expressly refuse to allow the search? Roberts didn’t show me that law in his opinion. If you can, then I’ll gladly reconsider my stance.
Same for Gonzalez. The Constitution specifically states that
How does a strict constructionist, looking at the text of the highest law of this land, come to the conclusion that the Feds have a right to overrule a State law like this one? Especially a law that was voted in directly by the people twice.
The fact that Scalia and Roberts have agreed on both of these is an indication that Roberts is more like Scalia than Rehnquist. I agree that it is not fully conclusive, but here is how I see it: Gonzalez v Oregon was seen as a similar case to Gonzalez v Raich. Rehnquist ruled for the states in Raich. Scalia ruled with the feds just like he did here. On this issue, it is clear to me who Roberts resembles.
The Tenth Amendment disagrees with you.
Very good questions. From the definition, I don’t think a constructionist is going to ever give more weight to prior decisions than to the actual wording of the laws that those decisions were made on. They should not be at odds at all if the prior precedent was based on actual law though should they?
QUOTE(hayleyanne @ Mar 30 2006, 06:12 PM)
Frankly, I don't see how you could begin to argue that Roberts' decisions in these two cases lack constitutional backing.
I don’t see how his decisions do. Lets refresh ourselves on the Fourth Amendment.
QUOTE(Fourth Amendment @ US Constitution)
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
In Randolph, from a strict constructionist point of view of the Constitution, the search is unreasonable because there was no Warrant. That would be interpreting the Fourth Amendment narrowly. Now laws have been written over the years that help to define reasonable warrantless searches. If Roberts is a constructionist, then where is the written law that states that police can conduct a general search of the home without a warrant after you expressly refuse to allow the search? Roberts didn’t show me that law in his opinion. If you can, then I’ll gladly reconsider my stance.
Same for Gonzalez. The Constitution specifically states that
QUOTE(Tenth Amendment @ US Constitution)
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
How does a strict constructionist, looking at the text of the highest law of this land, come to the conclusion that the Feds have a right to overrule a State law like this one? Especially a law that was voted in directly by the people twice.
QUOTE(hayleyanne @ Mar 30 2006, 06:12 PM)
Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
I am not sure we can answer this question by looking at these two decisions. In both cases Scalia and Roberts signed on to the same dissent.
I am not sure we can answer this question by looking at these two decisions. In both cases Scalia and Roberts signed on to the same dissent.
The fact that Scalia and Roberts have agreed on both of these is an indication that Roberts is more like Scalia than Rehnquist. I agree that it is not fully conclusive, but here is how I see it: Gonzalez v Oregon was seen as a similar case to Gonzalez v Raich. Rehnquist ruled for the states in Raich. Scalia ruled with the feds just like he did here. On this issue, it is clear to me who Roberts resembles.
QUOTE(Amlord @ Mar 31 2006, 11:11 AM)
Oregon has no authority to determine what legal medical usage is, since federal law trumps state law.
The Tenth Amendment disagrees with you.
QUOTE(Amlord @ Mar 31 2006, 01:54 PM)
Does stare decisis fly in the face of strict constructionism? Are they always at odds?
Very good questions. From the definition, I don’t think a constructionist is going to ever give more weight to prior decisions than to the actual wording of the laws that those decisions were made on. They should not be at odds at all if the prior precedent was based on actual law though should they?
Do the Chief Justice’s Opinions on the Court thus far indicate that he is a strict constructionist? Why or why not?
SCOTUS hasn’t delivered enough dissenting opinions to answer this question. So far Roberts’s few dissents remind me of Scalia’s dissents minus the chief justice arguing himself into a corner in the near single-minded pursuit of making chop suey out of the majority.
Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
So far closer to Scalia. Rehnquist served longer than any conservative associate justice in the court, but he never entertained the concept of an existing corporate personhood penumbra in the First. I can’t say the same of Scalia, who seems to side with or against the majority on the personal prejudices. (To be fair, modern liberal justices are as much a part of the usurpation of the Bill of Rights by corporate interests as their conservative predecessors.)
The Tenth Amendment disagrees with you.
Just a clarification.
Brandishing the Tenth is as meaningful as throwing labels like textualist and living constitution around. The Tenth at this point in history is meaningless without a judicial resurgence guaranteeing its place in the Bill of Rights. This won’t happen.
For one thing, judges would have to consistently back states and “disregard” federal law or make “originalist” interpretations of the Constitution when siding with states and increasingly hedge in and/or toss out sections of federal law. Aside from hardcore libertarians the current judiciary lacks the will to take this position. The closest we’ll come to that is the kind of arbitrary and ideologically opposed conclusion SCOTUS reached in Gonzales v. Oregon.
Secondly, the judiciary consults the Tenth after reviewing other amendments. Jagwease doesn’t post anymore, but he took pity on me and explained it better than I could on another board. We were discussing Rumsfeld v. Forum For Academic And Institutional Rights, the recruiting case. He agreed with SCOTUS. I’m posting it here ‘cause he cuts to the chase:
You take a too huge of a swipe at the unconstitutional provisions doctrine. It applies in some places and not in others. Here there is no choice, but Congress was nice and did not make it a federal crime to obstruct access. That would also be Constitutional. You would probably see a very different result if Congress mandated that the Democratic and Republican Parties must be allowed to interview on campus.
The IX and X Amendments are pretty meaningless. The IX is a truism and the X has been gutted by V and XIV so they look there before X.
In regards to Georgia v. Randolph, the standard before SCOTUS took up the case was if one co-inhabitant was not present the police could make a search without a warrant at the request of another co-inhabitant. This time the co-inhabitant was present. (In United States v. Matlock, since Matlock was arrested before the search took place SCOTUS treated Matlock as if he wasn’t in a position to object. ) In Randolph Mr. Randolph is present and within his right to object. Roberts’s domestic abuse scenario is a red herring. Police don’t need a warrant to enter a house if they suspect domestic violence.
Georgia v. Randolph is a case that splits hairs, but it’s no more frustrating than not allowing police to make a stop on a DWI tip, be allowed to search pockets if police see a bulge on routine stops without a warrant, not allowed to search a vehicle on a routine stop without a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has engaged in or is about to engage in criminal activity even after written consent has been given, allowed to search the vehicle after a DUI arrest without a warrant, etc.
SCOTUS hasn’t delivered enough dissenting opinions to answer this question. So far Roberts’s few dissents remind me of Scalia’s dissents minus the chief justice arguing himself into a corner in the near single-minded pursuit of making chop suey out of the majority.
Is Roberts closer ideologically to his predecessor William Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia?
So far closer to Scalia. Rehnquist served longer than any conservative associate justice in the court, but he never entertained the concept of an existing corporate personhood penumbra in the First. I can’t say the same of Scalia, who seems to side with or against the majority on the personal prejudices. (To be fair, modern liberal justices are as much a part of the usurpation of the Bill of Rights by corporate interests as their conservative predecessors.)
QUOTE(Just Leave me Alone! @ Mar 31 2006, 04:30 PM)
QUOTE(Amlord @ Mar 31 2006, 11:11 AM)
Oregon has no authority to determine what legal medical usage is, since federal law trumps state law.
The Tenth Amendment disagrees with you.
Just a clarification.
Brandishing the Tenth is as meaningful as throwing labels like textualist and living constitution around. The Tenth at this point in history is meaningless without a judicial resurgence guaranteeing its place in the Bill of Rights. This won’t happen.
For one thing, judges would have to consistently back states and “disregard” federal law or make “originalist” interpretations of the Constitution when siding with states and increasingly hedge in and/or toss out sections of federal law. Aside from hardcore libertarians the current judiciary lacks the will to take this position. The closest we’ll come to that is the kind of arbitrary and ideologically opposed conclusion SCOTUS reached in Gonzales v. Oregon.
Secondly, the judiciary consults the Tenth after reviewing other amendments. Jagwease doesn’t post anymore, but he took pity on me and explained it better than I could on another board. We were discussing Rumsfeld v. Forum For Academic And Institutional Rights, the recruiting case. He agreed with SCOTUS. I’m posting it here ‘cause he cuts to the chase:
QUOTE(Jagwease)
QUOTE(Lesly)
If the answer is yes or perhaps because within of the scope of Congress’ powers under Article I there is no such thing as placing an unconstitutional condition on petitioners and states, what’s the point of the Tenth and the Bill of Rights in general? There’s a big window for Congress to abuse power and judicial activ… er, I mean too much room for judicial interpretation. Period.
You take a too huge of a swipe at the unconstitutional provisions doctrine. It applies in some places and not in others. Here there is no choice, but Congress was nice and did not make it a federal crime to obstruct access. That would also be Constitutional. You would probably see a very different result if Congress mandated that the Democratic and Republican Parties must be allowed to interview on campus.
The IX and X Amendments are pretty meaningless. The IX is a truism and the X has been gutted by V and XIV so they look there before X.
In regards to Georgia v. Randolph, the standard before SCOTUS took up the case was if one co-inhabitant was not present the police could make a search without a warrant at the request of another co-inhabitant. This time the co-inhabitant was present. (In United States v. Matlock, since Matlock was arrested before the search took place SCOTUS treated Matlock as if he wasn’t in a position to object. ) In Randolph Mr. Randolph is present and within his right to object. Roberts’s domestic abuse scenario is a red herring. Police don’t need a warrant to enter a house if they suspect domestic violence.
Georgia v. Randolph is a case that splits hairs, but it’s no more frustrating than not allowing police to make a stop on a DWI tip, be allowed to search pockets if police see a bulge on routine stops without a warrant, not allowed to search a vehicle on a routine stop without a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has engaged in or is about to engage in criminal activity even after written consent has been given, allowed to search the vehicle after a DUI arrest without a warrant, etc.
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