Recently, more and more retired generals have called for Donald Rumsfeld to resign. More Retired Generals Call for Rumsfeld's Resignation
Growing calls for Rumsfeld's dismissal

Most of the generals cite his performance during the Iraq conflict to cast doubt on his ability to lead the military forward against global terrorism and other problems.



The first to speak up was General Anthony Zinni, the former CentCom commander who publicly criticized the number of troops being used in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Wall Street Journal editorial page has questioned the generals view: What's behind the attacks against Rumsfeld. The WSJ insists that it is current CentCom commander John Abizaid who is the chief advocate of the "small footprint" strategy. They say it was the generals who urged caution in taking Baghdad in the opening days of the way, which may have allowed Saddam to escape. They claim it was Abizaid who was responsible for the delay in putting down the Fallujah uprising in 2004.

General Richard Myers, who recently retired as the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has criticized these generals:

CNN article

Generals defend Rumsfeld

Other generals, such as Michael DeLong have come to Rumsfeld's defense.

The third angle is that if these generals felt that Rumsfeld was so bad, why didn't they resign in protest? If Rumsfeld's so bad, why didn't generals resign?

For further reading: A Reaffirming Conversation With Donald Rumsfeld

Questions for debate:

Should Rumsfeld resign and should Bush accept it?

Would Rumsfeld's departure disrupt our operations in Iraq enough to make a difference in this decision?

Should generals who disagree enough to call for resignations in the civilian leadership have resigned themselves in protest when they were in a position to do so?

Bonus question: Who should replace Rumsfeld? Useful reference

Note: Edited question 3 to change the timeframe.

According to your first link, the six generals who have called for Rumsfeld's resignation are retired.

How does one resign from retirement?

Should Rumsfeld resign and should Bush accept it?

No! The fodder for the 2006 and 2008 elections produced by Rumsfeld is a godsend for Democrats. "Let it be, let it be."

Look at what Rumsfeld said about Iraq's capabilities. Then look at the facts about those non-existent capabilities. In between those two, look at the number of dead innocent civilian bodies. Then look at what he says about "rogue" 'nuclear' nations like North Korea and Iran, then look at his business dealings, *ahem* his NUCLEAR business dealings with those nations and their nuclear programs. If this were any other business, Bush and Cheney and Rumsfeld and Rice would all be fired and every last one of us here knows that. Steal a $1 pen from the Pentagon, get fired. Lie and see those lies kill innocent people by the bushel, nothing....nada...not a demotion...not a pink slip, not a single thing. Business as usual. Why? Because, how could the US Planners risk alienating people like Rumsfeld and Rice and Bush and Cheney? So they could spill the beans on what they know?

Of course Rumsfeld should be fired or resign! The lack of accountability within this administration is one of its chief failings and Rummy is certainly one of those who should be held accountable for gross errors in judgment strategically, tactically, and morally. The generals confine themselves to military mistakes, but Rumsfeld's role in creating the conditions for the torture scandal and his disregard for the innocent lives lost in Fallejah and elsewhere in Iraq with reckless bombing and free fire zones are even more serious reasons to get rid of him. On the other hand, words like should have little meaning to this gang. Truthmarch has it about right, the only ones asked to leave are those who don't go along with the party line. The cabal can't afford to alienate insiders for fear of what they might reveal. Libby is a possible example.

If you don't like the call for resignation from retired generals (perfectly proper in my view but not from active duty officers), you might consider the policy criticism in Cobra II by another retired general and a vetran reporter. (See a Review Here).

1) Should Rumsfeld resign?

First, my own question, concerning a quote from that first provided link...rooted in years of pent up anger? It's been what, three (3) years? So call it spoken like a soldier who understands things strictly military, but who singularly fails to understand the nature of what the late Bernard Fall and I call "revolutionary warfare" [or, RW]. And in terms of RW, we haven't even reached the first television time-out [as it were]. And good that Rummy is sometimes disregarding military advice since the nature of RW is not military, but political, which is to say that when conducting RW, the political is supreme and, accordingly, on any number of occasions will have to override strictly military concerns.

And so I would first suggest that, for a good start, General Swannack read:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/lib...rt/1990/MDI.htm

And then the General should recite, until the same is second nature [as it were]:

"To accomplish their goal of overthrowing the government, the revolutionaries will try to separate the people from the government thereby destroying the legitimacy of the government. The government, on the other hand, will try to keep the loyalty of the people. The people, after all, bestow legitimacy to one side or the other because they pay the taxes, grow the food, support the
cause and provide the soldiers each side needs. That means, for all intents and purposes, the people become the battleground. The people, to put it in Clausewitzian terms, are the center of gravity in revolutionary warfare."

And maybe it would help if the General was made aware that the error made by the military in Vietnam [by Westmoreland & Co. in particular] was simply:

"Vietnam is a good example of what happens when that advice is ignored. For the most part, the U.S. military took the view that finding and destroying guerrillas, or relatively small regular forces using guerrilla tactics, were the keys to winning the war. To highlight that fact, Vietnam was widely labeled and referred to as a "guerrilla war" by civilian and military officials alike. In truth, the enemy conducted a revolutionary war and simply used guerrilla warfare as one of their tools to accomplish their political, social and economic goals."

And, General, how do we define RW? RW is the:

"application of irregular warfare methods to the propagation of an ideology or political system."

And, General, is you are one of those persons who were and/or are thinking that the insurgents can never defeat us militarily, newsflash, such thought misses the point entirely as our military defeat isn't even their goal.

And, General, here is why we rightly took issue with Syria and Iran:

"Probably the most important such condition [for the success of revolutionary war] is the existence [of]...an active sanctuary. An active sanctuary is a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which though not ostensibly involved in the conflict, provides the rebel side with shelter, training, facilities, equipment, and if it can get away with it – troops."

And, General, such also explains why we are "sucking up" to Pakistan, i.e., we are desirous of preventing Pakistan from serving as the "active sanctuary" for the Taliban, al-Qaeda, et al.

And, General, for the same criticism that was made by the late Bernard Fall, who contrasted the thought processes of those engaged in RW with the thought processes then at work in American political and military circles:

"All this differs radically from the American emphasis on guerilla techniques alone and the almost total discounting of the primacy of the political factor in revolutionary warfare operations."

The "all this" was referring to the political, social, and economic measures and platforms of our enemy in Vietnam, espoused by such noteworthy souls as General Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh [Giap you've all probably heard of, Troung Chinh ("Long March") was the Viet-Minh's leading theoretician]. Truong Chinh, in one of his written works, actually chided the West for focusing almost exclusively on things military while rather neglecting such matters as the political mobilization of the populace.

And while it may be vague, General, this is our recipe for victory in the current go round of RW [since we started the same by initiating our own brand of RW]:

"…the overthrowing of a government established in a given country and it’s replacement by another regime...(must be accomplished) thanks to the active participation of the population, conquered physically and morally by simultaneously destructive and constructive processes, according to precisely-developed techniques."

General, you and the rest will need Abode's Acrobat for this, since it's PDF all the way, but the late Bernard Fall provides an excellent discussion of the nature of revolutionary warfare here:

www.ndu.edu/library/ic4/L63-109.pdf

Here is another piece of interest for you, General:

http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/vo...4/08_04_02.html

And here is my problem, General, at least if my underlying assumption is correct:

"...the paradox stemming from America's unsuccessful crusade in the jungles of Vietnam is this--because the experience was perceived as anathema to the mainstream American military, hard lessons learned there about fighting guerillas were neither embedded nor preserved in the US Army's institutional memory."

I didn't say it, General, the US army did, or at least some of our army did. Oh, and please note the explanation for our one and only success at RW, i.e., the defeat of the Philippines' insurgency led by Aguinaldo:

"There were no screaming jets accidentally bombing helpless villages, no B-52s, no napalm, no artillery barrages, no collateral damage. Instead, the Americans conducted a decentralized war of small mobile units armed mainly with rifles and aided by native Filipinos, hunting guerillas who were increasingly isolated both by the indifference or hostility of much of the population and by the concentration of scattered peasant groups into larger settlements."

And, General, why would we invite the insurgents to become part of the process, as we have in fact done? Simple:

"During the Philippine Insurrection from 1899 to 1902, the US military learned to avoid big-unit search and destroy missions because they were counterproductive; to maximize the employment of indigenous scouts and paramilitary forces to increase and sustain decentralized patrolling; to mobilize popular support by focusing on the improvement of schools, hospitals,and infrastructure; and to enhance regime legitimacy by allowing insurgents and former insurgents to organize anti-regime political parties."

So it isn't co-opting the opposition or some other such thing, it is instead a matter of legitimizing the regime. We expect the [former] insurgents to continue to be hostile, but their mere participation in the process lends the process legitimacy, and that's what we need to win the proverbial "hearts and minds" of the rest of the folk.

And, General, we will otherwise win this war when we and the Iraqi people emerge on the same side of the fight. If that doesn't happen, our technological superiority won't mean squat. As our good friends at the Strategy Page report [ http://www.strategypage.com/messageboards/...ges/68-3243.asp ]:

"The renowned author Bernard Fall described revolutionary warfare as follows: "This formula for revolutionary warfare is the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system." The terrorism that we are facing is a tool of guerilla warfare, irregular warfare, now called asymmetric warfare by the Pentagon, used to further the ideology of radical militant Islamic fundamentalism. Professor Fall also taught us the primary definitive dictum of revolutionary warfare: To win, "the people and the military must emerge on the same side." [Bernard Fall Street Without Joy Stackpole 1961 p.375]

Professor Fall goes on: "Any sound revolutionary warfare operator... most of the time used small-war tactics--not to destroy the [German] Army, of which they were thoroughly incapable, but to establish a competitive system of control over the population...the insurgency problem is military only in a secondary sense, and political, ideological, and administrative in a primary sense."

Although we are tactically in a "Guerilla" phase of the war in Afghanistan, the overriding basis for the very existence of the terrorists is, again - they are irregular combatants in a war of ideology - a revolutionary global war. To have the military and the people on the same side we must embrace, befriend and fight with the moderate elements of the Islamic world. There are secular and moderate people of Islam, and there are extremist militant Islamic fundamentalists throughout the world. The Islamic peoples remain divided and we must help the non-militant, non-extremists within that world to rally and support their people - to take away from the terrorist the "political, ideological, and administrative in a primary sense.""

And by the way, General, that's why, as frustrating as it to us, we are doing nothing more than voicing our own considered opinion when it comes to resolving the current political impasse in Iraq, i.e., the Iraqi government needs legitimacy and our running the show won't give it that legitimacy, quite the opposite in fact, and so we allow the Iraqi people's own elected representatives to run the show, as painful and as frustrating as that may be in the interim.

And, General, such is also why none of this rather loose talk about war for oil and bases in the Mideast is helping, but is instead rather wholly undermining our efforts at RW in Iraq, i.e., with some now rather loosely talking of war for oil and bases in the Mideast, some are sending the message that (1) we aren't in Iraq for them but for us and (2) the enemy wasn't Saddam and the Ba'athists but the people of Iraq whose oil and land we covet. Those two messages operate to send the further message that (3) it is in fact their citizenship that is at issue/stake in this war. And the reason why such is important is rather simple. Stalin called that other war the Great Patriotric War in defense of Mother Russia, and not the Great War in defense of Marxism-Leninism, and he did so for a reason, to wit, he knew that no matter how horrid his regime was to most, the Russian people nevertheless still loved Mother Russia and would rise to defend her [and their accompanying RUSSIAN citizenship]. And so, when some speak of treasonable words, now they know why, since they are in fact giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and we'd rather they give the enemy a rifle than their ideological agreement, since their ideological agreement not only supports the insurgent, it also alienates the rest of those people that we need to emerge on our side of the fight.

Now, General, back to where I began, with the generals who know things military but are apparently as ignorant as ignorant can be re things political. From that second provided link:

"All six of the generals who have spoken out so far have highlighted Mr Rumsfeld's alleged deafness to advice that clashes with his political objectives."

General, recall again the primacy of the political in revolutionary warfare. Need I say more? If you disagree on politics, fine, but say so. But don't cry when someone who may understand that politics is supreme and the military subordinate, disregards your military recommendations in the context of serving a far vaster political agenda that is THE key to our defeat or victory in this revolutionary war.

And, General, you wouldn't have been caught shouting, "No More Vietnams." No matter, since even if so, such is what we are trying to avoid, and so we didn't put American troops all over the damned place, alienating people through mere inadvertence and ignorance, and who would otherwise serve as the bait for the insurgents to strike in order to prompt a rather overzealous and most thoroughly alienating retaliation on your part, or as you put, subjecting them to pain.


Now, General, that being said, I will admit that we made one rather glaring mistake. Forget the number of troops in Iraq as a per se matter, since that misses the point, but our single, greatest error was simply in not denying the insurgency that "active sanctuary." First thing we should have done, or should I say, along with our initial invasion, we should have closed, as in locked as tight as that drum, Iraq's borders with Syria and Iran. I have otherwise not yet been convinced that the fault for such rests entirely with Rumsfeld, or should I say, in light of the nature of this thread, I have otherwise not yet been convinced that disgruntled generals such as yourself were suggesting that we do the same and that it was only Rumsfeld who got in the way and/or failed to clear a path. Let's take Zinni:

"I think there was dereliction in insufficient forces being put on the ground and fully understanding the military dimensions of the plan."

Was that so that we could avoid the problem of the active sanctuary? Probably not:

"One of Zinni's responsibilities while commander-in-chief at Centcom was to develop a plan for the invasion of Iraq. Like his predecessors, he subscribed to the belief that you only enter battle with overwhelming force."

General, again, please read Fall and some others. Overwhelming force will never provide anything remotely resembling a guarantee of victory in a revolutionary war. As a matter of fact, the lesson to be learned from history is that no matter the number of opposing troops on the ground, an insurgency with an active sanctuary has never lost a revolutionary war.

And I was being generous, General, since we know to a certainty that Zinni's extra troops weren't for avoiding or interdicting the active sanctuary:

"The first requirement is to freeze the situation, is to gain control of the security. To patrol the streets. To prevent the looting. To prevent the 'revenge' killings that might occur. To prevent bands or gangs or militias that might not have your best interests at heart from growing or developing."

And now on General Batiste:

"we've got the best military in the world, hands down, period."

Yeah, and we could say the same about our time in Vietnam. And so, General, would you care to explain that debacle?

And now General Riggs:

"As a soldier I supported the war in Iraq...What I did not support was the way it was being mis/micromanaged by [Office of the Secretary of Defense-Rumsfeld]. Not sure what his agenda was, but it certainly was not to dominate and stabilize the situation on the ground...I think what happened is that we just grossly underestimated the number of soldiers required for the stability phase."

Maybe the good but disgruntled general can remember one rather valuable lesson, and once again, the words of the late Bernard Fall:

"It...is important to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest and that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot make up for the absence of a political rationale. A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously replaced by his own social environment. A dead revolutionary usually is."

And so, General, it took half a million [500,000] or so troops, bearing the finest arms that intelligent human minds could then design and their money could buy, to engage a peasant army wearing black pajamas and rubber tire sandals. And that because they had a political, social, and economic rationale, while we did not.

And let me end where I began, General, with your own words:

"Next slide, please. What I'd like to tell you upfront about Al Anbar province is that the government is operating day to day by Iraqis out there; very successfully, the government is being run by Iraqis. Governor Burgess and the departments out there are very successful in the day-to-day operations. They have a budget; they're using the budget as provided by the ministries in conducting the business there.

There are some areas that need to be improved, as you can see from this slide. Specifically in the area of immigration and customs, we're standing up a border police that will fix that. The emergency services and fire, as an example; they need hoses for their fire trucks. So there are slight degradations in some of the essential services and services provided by the government, however, these are being rectified through expenditures, coalition expenditures and Iraqi expenditures.
***
The other good side of the security situation is the cooperation, the popular support we're getting out in Al Anbar province. This kind of shows you over time, since we've been there, the increase now in tips from the populace, tips from individuals who are tired of the violence in their town telling the police the location of an IED, the location of where an individual is making an IED, the location of where SA-7 missiles are in a cache, or other caches, as you can see up here in the pictures. More and more, we're paying out rewards, as you can see, to Iraqi individuals that come forth with this knowledge. So, I believe we're achieving success in terms of garnering popular support to end this insurgency here."

So, General, are you saying that we are, excuse me, were winning the war? For those students of RW like the late Bernard Fall and myself, it most certainly sounds that way, at least from your report [with accompanying slides].

Please see: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/200...31118-0887.html

General, what has changed since November of 2003, recalling again that you retired in 2004? Did your 82nd Airborne troops engage in the sledgehammer tactics so typical of US military forces and thereby alienate the populace whose support you earlier claimed we were winning? And, General, while rewards for tips are nice, they don't make up for the absence of that political, social, and economic rationale that is needed to ensure ultimate victory [I mean, hey, even Osama can offer rewards, and if all one cares about is money...].

And, General, I find this rather interesting [ http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/200402...1_Swannack.html ]:

"The [Zarqawi] letter goes on to explain that the coalition resolve is strong, coalition intelligence is ever increasing, and the Iraqis do not support the presence of terrorists in their country. Zarqawi indicated that they must strike now before it is too late when the new Iraqi government takes over later this summer."

Seems that Zarqawi believed himself to be a fish just about out of water. I'll leave you to explain, General, just how and why that changed, though if you agree with General Batiste then no surprise:

"I think we need senior military leaders who understand the principles of war and apply them ruthlessly..."

Just what we need, General, the ruthless application of military force to alienate the locals.

And, General, for the likely "give-away" on why you and some others in the military are not happy:

"The military probably since Vietnam, maybe before, became more and more saddled with conflict resolution -- strange conflict resolution -- peacekeeping, humanitarian efforts, nation building. The military has resisted this. They don't like it. They're not trained for it. But there's no one else to do it and it continues to be the mission that confronts us."

So, according to General Zinni, the military has resisted serving as nation builder, since they don't like it, and apparently will not train for it. But more to the point, General, might I simply suggest that "strange conflict resolution" is the proverbial "give-away"? I mean, with all due respect to General Zinni, that phrase sounds to me like code for "I don't understand it and don't really care to." But suffice it to say that providing the Iraqi people with a political, social, and economic ideology/policy/rationale that they can believe in and which would presumably result in the end of any armed opposition on their part, does not sound all that strange a way of resolving conflict to me [just ask Her Majesty how the Crown resolved, to borrow from Pulp Fiction, the "Malayo-Chinese Situation"].

Oh, and by the way, General, I do have a fairly good idea of what went wrong. Seems that you and your 82nd Airborne troopers fired into a crowd of Iraqi protestors in Fallujah. Just what we needed to win the hearts and minds of the locals. And so, keeping in mind the name of the place, the rest as they say, is history. And, General, my advice to you would be, (1) shut up, (2) read Bernard Fall, and (3) learn the lesson that the overwhelming application of force in a revolutionary war does not come anywhere near assuring victory, though it will provide us with a multitude of names to engrave on that wall serving as our war memorial. And, General, since it bears repeating, it certainly seems to me that it is you who does not understand the dynamic of counterinsurgency warfare [ http://www.tnr.com/blog/theplank?pid=13824 ]:

"During the first year of the war, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez was the commander of military operations in Iraq. He never executed a campaign plan--as if, like Rumsfeld, he assumed that America was about to leave. As a result, there was no governing logic to the Army's myriad operations. T. X. Hammes, a retired Marine colonel who served in Baghdad in early 2004, said, "Each division was operating so differently, right next to the other--absolutely hard-*** NOTICE: THIS WORD IS AGAINST THE RULES. FAILURE TO REMOVE IT WILL RESULT IN A STRIKE. *** here, and hearts-and-minds here." In the first year of the war, in Falluja and Ramadi, Major General Charles Swannack, of the 82nd Airborne Division, emphasized killing and capturing the enemy, and the war grew worse in those places; in northern Iraq, Major General David Petraeus, of the 101st Airborne Division, focused on winning over the civilian population by encouraging economic reconstruction and local government, and had considerable success. "Why is the 82nd hard-*** NOTICE: THIS WORD IS AGAINST THE RULES. FAILURE TO REMOVE IT WILL RESULT IN A STRIKE. *** and the 101st so different?" Hammes asked. "Because Swannack sees it differently than Petraeus. But that's Sanchez's job. That's why you have a corps commander.""

And so, yes, General, the initial attitude and conduct of the 82nd Airborne Division is what led to what we later saw in Fallujah. There wasn't much of an insurgency in Iraq until some "hard chargers" liked you decided to do some "hard charging" and so on two separate occasions your troops shot up a crowd of largely innocent protestors. But you claim to understand the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, while Rummy does not. Sorry, General, but you are mistaken in that regard and some of your own troops, and some Iraqis as well, are dead because of that ignorance. And, General, could you otherwise have the doubtful grace [at least at this point in time] and please save both us and the Iraqi people from "endearing" quotes such as this one: "They can make it easy on themselves and tell us who the bums are, and we'll go search them out, or they will be subjected to some pain."

Sorry for that last, General, or at least its tone, but our attention spans don't seem to last all that long, and probably very few reading this will recall that in the beginning of our "occupation," Fallujah was one of the more peaceful places in all of Iraq. Then came you and your subjecting them to some pain. And now here we are. I mean, heck, even Wikipedia reports that Taha Bidaywi Hamed, the then new mayor of Fallujah, was "staunchly pro-American." But all that changed on April 28, 2003, when some 200 or so Iraqis were protesting the presence of US/Coalition forces in the city, things got out hand, and 15 Iraqis were shot dead by your troops. There were otherwise no US/Coalition casualties in the incident, so when I said, things got out hand, let that last fact put such report into its proper perspective, or if you prefer, General, let such inform you as to just who got out of hand.

And pity that the Marines could not have been to Fallujah first, given that upon the Marines' first involvement in and with Fallujah, Major General James Mattis modified the 1st Marine Division's motto to include "Do no harm" [in addition to the long-standing "No better friend, no worse enemy"].

Lastly, General, seems to me that in blaming Rumsfeld, you are trying to cover your own six and otherwise avoid the blame for your own failings in conducting operations in Iraq.

Now back to Batiste. Blames Rummy for Abu Ghraib, reporting that not enough troops put too much responsibility on incompetent officers and undertrained troops. Sorry, General, but incompetent and undertrained don't explain the glow-stick up the ole wazoo [and never mind for now the accompanying photos home]. The good general also made this rather extraordinary statement:

"We need leadership up there that respects the military as they expect the military to respect them."

General, sounds like some of you are suffering what some of the rest of us would call "bruised egos."

And, General, what about Rummy's plan for transforming your army? Were you, and are you, for that, or against that? So no surprise, then, your current hostility?

Sorry, General, let me close before I puke. You and your ilk have done nothing other than play politics with the lives of your troops. That Nancy Pelosi and her ilk can't refrain from using your sin to work their own is their problem. But please know that you so richly deserve the glow-stick up the ole wazoo. Perhaps you and General Batiste can lend us some incompent officers and undertrained troops for the accomplishment of that task, and, no, there won't be any photos home...Sorry, General, one more, please don't blame Rummy for your incompetent officers and undertrained troops, since it is as much your responsibility for their training as it Rumsfeld's....

Oh, and Amlord, to answer your third question [nos. 2 and 4 are irrelevant given my position], perhaps the generals in question should have put their commission on the line and stood in the door, and not now, but back then...

KivrotHaTaavah, your rant seems entirely misdirected given how completely the administration and Rumsfeld mis-managed the political side of the war. The decision to invade was itself a strategic blunder and Rumsfeld was instrumental in arguing for it from 9/11 onward, but that is a separate issue. Once the invasion was complete the major decisions made in Iraq almost systematically encouraged an insurgency. Not enough troops to control systematic looting, failure to secure arsenals, failure to hold early elections, attempts to establish American puppets, indiscriminent bombing and firing on civilians, mistreatment and torture of detainees, scorched earth campaigns, imposed laws designed to open Iraq up to western corporations, the dismissal of the Iraqi army, and the alienation of a key part of the Shiite population - the list is almost endless. Bernard Fall would be a huge critic of this administrations attempt to impose its will upon the Iraqis.

Interesting that you brought up Bernard Fall. His books were instrumental in 1965 in converting me from a simple minded blind anti-communist supporter of the war to an understanding that Vietnam was really engaged in a civil war and that American intervention had to be judged by its cost to the Vietnamese and not simply in Cold War terms. The fact that he argued for an enlightened kind of intervention doesn't indicate that he could have stomached what unfolded.

Mr. Bush defends Rumsfeld and is very proud of his performance in Iraq.

The public opinions including the 6 retired army generals who asked him to resign recently have no more information than what is released to them by the media.

What is missing to the public, is that Bush knows all the facts and he is very satisfied with Rumsfeld.

So what is the missing information to the public specifically?

Remember Chalabi the first Iraqi opposition leader who is known by his credentials not as a fraud man who is wanted by Interpol, but as a Shiit leader that the Americans relied on as well. This man was the first who landed in South Iraq in 2003 along with the American troops and a military force was under his command as well!

This military force was of Iraqi Americans who were fled from Iraq by American forces in 1991 and were evacuated to live in Los Angles and Alabama, Detroit and other refugees buildings. They were allowed to live in the lowest standards streets with minimal amount of money.

In 2003 an Iraqi American army was also to go and revenge from Iraqis inside Iraq.

This army is the unseen hand of the American forces in Iraq. They are still –most likely - run by Chalabi. Their custom is either normal civilian look, or any other form that suit their tasks.

The duty of this force is to attack civilian people, and to master massacre against different suburbs and other random killings of people to eliminate intellectuals, endorse race killing and other purposes.

By this way the occupants are encountered in another line of war against the people of Iraq that relief all the pressure on the normal American and English occupying forces.


This secret American army started by 20,000 soldiers in 2003, and it is now about 120,000.

That is why Rumsfeld does not need to increase his official army, because he already increased his unofficial army, and instead of having white and black soldiers who don't want to fight, he is very confident that this secret army has enough hate against Iraqis that they are doing the killing with will and determination, yet they are rewarded by generous money from the American Tax Payers who naively listen to their president and defence minister with astonishment.

S1000+

The comments by the dissenting generals are valuable information to the public. However, I do not think the call for the resignation of Rumsfeld makes much sense. The President is setting policy and Rumsfeld is administrating this policy. The errors seem to be in the area of policy much more than administration. Having a different person doing the administration would do nothing to change policy and hence be ineffectual to improving the situation in Iraq.

TedN5:

I answered the first question posed on its on own terms, in my otherwise own inimitable fashion. The disgruntled generals are otherwise apparently not claiming that Rumsfeld & Co. botched the politics of our "crusade" in Iraq, but instead that Rummy & Co. are "deaf" because they put political considerations above military considerations. Since you've read Fall, then you know just how wrong that assessment may very well be, and given the lack of specifics on the details, why should you or I conclude other than that the assessment is rather open to question? The criticism from the disgruntled otherwise sounds a lot like the "looking for a scapegoat" mentality of those who have often been heard to proclaim that it wasn't us but the politicians who lost the war.

Now on to the matters that you raised, well, first, the one that you called a separate issue. Strategic blunder? For a rather rich and savory irony, no less than General Zinni might, well, he ought to conclude otherwise. I'll try and find a link to the interview when circumstances permit, but I recall General Zinni, opponent of the war before it started, reporting that while Saddam did not have an operating prohibited weapons program, he did have his affairs arranged such that he would be able to ramp-up such a program once Hans & Co. gave Iraq a clean bill of health and oversight and sanctions later ended. Maybe it's just me, but the mind tends to boggle at the notion that one opposed the war because no operating program existed but yet all that could be in place was in place to begin/resume such a program once the lights went out and the crowd left the hall. Again, maybe it's just me, but I call that a distinction without much in the way of difference, at least if one's view extends beyond next year. Or should I say, if the choice is, attack now with a rather weakened Iraqi military the opponent, or attack at some later date when the Iraqi military might not be in such a weakened state, that we attack now.

Now let me interrupt the flow and deal with what has been called my "rant." Maybe so, but why not? And why also not tossing my cookies, or as I said, puke? Fine, you are not Rumsfeld's biggest fan, but some, one, of those doing the criticizing, well, since you are familiar with the late Bernard Fall, from his Street Without Joy:

"Americans still have to learn from the French that the latter lost during the Indochina war over 500 armored vehicles, 398 of which (almost two armored divisions!) were destroyed by enemy action between 1952 and 1954. The most important aspect of that part of the war was that eighty-four percent of those vehicles were lost through mines and booby-traps and only a handful through conventional anti-tank weapons. Present operations in South Vietnam confirm that [the] Viet-Minh have none of their fearsome ability to lay traps for motorized convoys. Many an ambush in recent months differed only in size from that which destroyed G.M. [or, mobile group] 100 in 1954. Otherwise, the errors of the friendly forces and the tactics of our enemy were entirely the same."

The italics are in the original, while the [/B]bold[B] is my emphasis. Now answer this question for me: how many people have we lost in Iraq to IEDs? And for question no. 2, do such persons represent the majority of our combat deaths in Iraq? Ted, as you can see from Bernard Fall, we and the French have already been there and done that. And bad enough that we didn't learn from the French and thereby avoid a portion of the debacle that was Vietnam, but to have not learned, despite Bernard's plea, then having gone through it ourselves, and then not learned again, and now having to go through it again, is, well, how about a bit too much too ask and/or a good reason to rant and puke? Let me put it this way, Street Without Joy was first published in 1961, then again in 1963, and then again in 1964. And as you presumably know, Bernard Fall lost his life while on patrol with US troops in Vietnam. So it wasn't like he was off in some dark corner speaking to imagined demons. And what do we find some 40 or so years later [1964-2004]? Well, the reason to rant and puke:

"We had a steep learning curve to figure out exactly how these individuals employing improvised explosive devices against us, and I believe we can identify just about 50-50 now, 50 percent, one out of two we identify an IED."

That was General Swannack at a briefing in Iraq...but "steep learning curve"? Maybe we might have needed to "modify" to fit the local circumstance, but a steep learning curve when the Viet-Minh had already used IEDs to great effect against both French and US forces in IndoChina?

And, Ted, this hardly qualifies as a ringing endorsement of General Swannack:

"'Its good to see the Marines here, sir,' says Sgt. Arthur McIntyre, of the 82nd Airborne. 'They are very particular about the IEDs...how they get set up, how do you look out for them.'"

So, Sgt. McIntyre, proud member, and rightly so, of the 82nd Airborne Division, apparently needs to rely on the US Marines to keep him safe from IEDs [and any Marine reading this has just smiled and raised that glass]. But re that "steep learning curve," didn't someone think that with the advent of remote controlled devices and cellular phones that some others might replace the proximity nature of their IEDs with the remote controlled and/or the dialed up? How long have we had remote controlled toys for our children? And how long have we had cellular phones? With the answers to those questions in mind, I am wondering why this occurred when it did, and as opposed to some time prior [ http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,1463...ch_IED,,00.html ]:

"So far, the strongest push to silence the bombs has come from the Army, which has ordered thousands of radio frequency jammers from Simi Valley, California firm EDO Communications & Countermeasures. The devices, called Warlock Green and Warlock Red, intercept "the signal sent from a remote location to the IED instructing it to detonate," an Army official told the military newsletter Inside Defense. The signal "cannot make contact, therefore when it can't make contact it doesn't detonate," he added. "[It's like] the cell phone never gets through, but [enemy forces] think it goes through.

The machines are based on an earlier EDO product, the Shortstop Electronic Protection System, which is designed to protect troops against proximity-fused weapons, like mortar rounds and artillery shells. But the Army won't say much about these updated devices -- to the chagrin of many policy makers. Last week, however, service chiefs signed a contract with EDO for an additional 1,440 Warlock jammers, to be delivered in May at a cost of more than $56 million."

I suppose that the best that can be said in this regard is better late than never.

And lastly before we get back to the Marines, please notice what Bernard Fall was not addressing in the passage I quoted above: lost human life. He was only writing about the destruction of vehicles. Not necessarily as important as human lives, but for an army that lives according to our understanding of the word "mobile," vehicles are rather essential to our method/mode of conducting warfare. And on that note, please further note that, in a very real sense, the whole uparmored humvee episode missed the point, as in, fine, more of us will live with uparmored humvees, but the vehicle itself has a rather essential value and so it too must be protected accordingly.

Now on to the Marines. Well, before we get to the Marines, more Army embarrassment, by way of operating as another "tie-in" point:

"What we have here is basically a constabulary action. I mean, this is pretty much the Old West here. Peacekeeping. Where are the regiment on regiment, division on division engagements? We've seen almost nothing above the squad level. Basically this is not a real war."

That message was brought to you courtesy of Lt. Colonel William Darley. Not a real war? But, Colonel, some are dying like it's a real war. If one combines this statement with that other one I posted prior about strange conflict resolution, then one might better appreciate the apparent magnitude of the ignorance. And, Colonel, the real war is political, and so your army is merely the tactical appendage to the political struggle. If you'd understood that, then you would not be saying that this is not a real war, and maybe then we'd not need some dead Americans on hand to prove to you that, yes, this is a real war.

Ted, these are the people that some want to use to validate their criticism of Rumsfeld? Well, if so, I suppose then that the only fitting response would be: Steep learning curves in a war that's not real...better your motto than mine. Or at least that would be my response if all concerned were not otherwise Americans who presumably care about our troops.

Now on to our good friends, the US Marines. It is a real war to them. And so they are able to provide assistance to the US Army's 82nd Airborne Division. And the war is otherwise so real to them that they have what they call their small wars manual. Please see:

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/nopc/Book%20Re...0-%20Parker.htm

"Some might question the continued utility of a field manual produced prior to the Second World War, especially in light of the claim that precision-guided weapons has fundamentally changed the nature of war. But the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual is something unique in the annals of military literature. Unlike many of the military histories and analyses that inhabit the military professional’s bookshelves, it is not theory, it is not a dissertation, nor is it the analysis of the military’s success or failure in some action or campaign. The Small Wars Manual is a practitioner’s manual written by the Marines who successfully fought America’s small wars for the future practitioners of America’s small wars. As America comes to grips with its present Terror War instead of looking for all the answers in the future, perhaps it would behoove us to learn from the hard won lessons of past.
***
Following the First World War, the United States adopted its traditional isolationist policy and disengaged from “entanglements” in Europe. This was not the case in the Western Hemisphere, where the “Monroe Doctrine” and the Roosevelt corollary ensured continued United States diplomatic and economic involvement. Most commonly termed the “Banana Wars”, these conflicts rarely involved the investment of greater than a brigade of Marines, yet were highly successful in promoting stability and US influence in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. An example of this success was the first incursion into Haiti in 1915. The “First Caco Revolt” (Caco being the common name for the Haitian insurrectionists) was successfully suppressed by the deployment of a Provisional Marine Brigade (2000 Marines), who within a few months established control of a country consisting of over 2 million people, with a loss of three Marines KIA and 18 Marines WIA. Considering the present investment of manpower in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, perhaps the lessons, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the past are applicable."

Oh, and Ted, let this also serve as my response to the criticism of some in the army that one need have hundreds of thousands, perhaps half a million, troops, in order to "pacify" a given locale.

And, Ted, re blaming others:

"The manual makes clear from the start that small wars are conceived in uncertainty, conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, and under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions. "

So, what is their excuse now? Seems that the US Marines are prepared to get along just fine in a small war conceived in uncertainty, conducted with precarious responsiblity and doubtful authority, and under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions. And maybe the Army could borrow the manual and otherwise put it to good use:

"Considering the current amorphous conditions under which many of our forces operate, this manual should be in the pack of every US warrior deploying overseas."

And, lastly, perhaps the most salient point:

"The manual makes clear from the start that diplomacy has not been exhausted in these operations, and that there will be an active role for the State Department, who will often be the primary US agency conducting the operation, and that military measures alone will not re-establish peace. Additionally, it recognizes that the US incursion may range from simply assisting the host nation in re-establishing their operation to assuming the government’s role. Between these two are a whole range of possibilities of employment, which will require “the greatest ingenuity in their application”, and demand “the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity”."

Ted, what was what it that Clint said in that movie, you know, Heartbreak Ridge [not that I'm vouching for all of the movie, since I'm not], but what was it that he said? Improvise, adapt, overcome...Spoken like a true Marine, right out of the manual.

And that exit strategy that some ALWAYS talk about? Well, sorry, one more:

"What makes this publication so different from other current military publications is that it...looks to adapt each campaign to the character of the native people, with the understanding that the indigenous forces will usually have better information, forcing the US forces to either swim or drown in the “fog of war”. There will be no defined area of operations, nor a recognized exit date. In many ways, the military philosopher Sun Tzu would applaud its tenets: encouraging caution and steadiness, and “simple displays of force”, not overwhelming US power."

And, Ted, Bernard Fall would have been proud of the Small Wars Manual:

"It recognizes that ultimate victory will only be possible if the root causes for resistance are addressed to the population, be they social, political, or economic. This can only be determined by a study of the history and culture of the native people and mastered by experience in country. Likewise it recognizes a psychological ascendancy in these types of operations, which speaks directly to re-directing the perceptions and beliefs of the native population, either by psychological operations, or by undercutting the insurgents’ popular support by addressing some of the causes of dissent. Attacking those furnishing material support or improving the lives of the population, obviating their need for insurrectionists, can accomplish this. Personal conduct of US forces must be beyond reproach as “they judge the United States and the ideals and standards of its people by the conduct of its representatives.” Even-handedness and cognizance of belligerent parties, local politics, and customs is one of the keys to creditability and success."

Ted, somebody understands RW...and somebody doesn't. Apparently, unlike the Army, the Marines understand the value of having been there and done that. And they not only have the manual, but an online journal as well:

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/wynn.htm

And lucky for me, we find in that journal:

"Thesis: General Westmoreland believed that pure military action, mass mobilization and search and destroy missions, were the solutions to defeating the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong guerrillas. The Marines better understood the nature of the Vietnam conflict and on a small scale, without sufficient support, were able to combat the spread of communism more effectively than any other civilian or military organization."

A rather bold claim. For some specifics:

"The initial purpose of the Combined Action Platoon was to provide protection for the village and its people from insurgents. It evolved into civic action that in turn, established close ties with the villagers. The villagers gained respect for the Marines because they resided in the village with them. By living among the Vietnamese, Marines were not compelled to conduct their weekly raids in order to clear the village of Viet Cong. This minimized the “everyone is a suspect” attitude. The reduction of harassment towards the Vietnamese people afforded the Marines to observe that the people would rather not support the Viet Cong but were intimidated and unable to defend themselves. They preferred to work their crops, continue their way of life, and live in peace.

The people started to believe that the village, surrounding areas and the inhabitants meant something to the American Forces. The Marines worked closely with the PF's [Popular Forces] in tactics and improving the PF’s effectiveness in combating the enemy, however, the team went further, assisting in farming, erecting schools, and digging or improving wells. Medical attention was also a large part of the program. The respect that was gained from assisting the people was invaluable. These somewhat meaningless tasks to the average person opened lines of communication and helped the Marines to understand the Vietnamese people. It also restored pride among the people and allowed them to help themselves.
***
The adoption of a village proved to be advantageous for the Popular Forces, Marines and people of the village. The CAP established trust between the servicemen and Vietnamese, and the Vietnamese opened up the desperately needed lines of communication with the Marines. The villagers began to feel comfortable with discussing the problems that they were having with the Viet Cong, and explained their fears and concerns about taking an active part against them. The exchange of information allowed the US Marines to carry out their missions while protecting the citizens and ensuring their commitment to them. A family atmosphere and cohesion was established because the Marines didn’t come and go, but stayed in support of the people in the event that the Viet Cong retaliated against the village. The Marines lived among them, ate with them, farmed with them, conducted village projects with them, but foremost kept the Viet Cong from being able to support their war effort. This system paid off as it quickly gave the villages the sense that "they were all in it together”, and that they would prevail or fail as one. It was extremely importany that the Marines live among the people, particularly because the villagers knew that the Marines had nothing to gain by staying. In the eyes of the PF’s and the Vietnamese people, it became clear that the Americans were not the enemy and that they truly cared about them. Barriers were broken and an alliance was predicated by assured hope. The Vietnamese people literally took the Marines in and in some cases considered them their own. The people felt a strong sense of guardianship towards the Marines and developed a sense of emotional responsibility for them. This attitude helped save many Marines lives."

Ted, sound to you like some people understand the nature of revolutionary warfare and the need to have the people and us emerge on the same side of the fight? And that's a far cry from subjecting some to pain, as the disgruntled general put it. And that's why, by the prior report, the 101st had better results than did the 82nd, since the 101st did more things in the way humanitarian and less things in the way of subjecting some to pain. And to make the Marines' case, recall again what Bernard Fall wrote, to wit, the people are the battleground. And so we find in that same article on the smallwarsjournal website:

"For the Marines it allowed them to get involved, be responsible, and feel personally involved with their one piece of the war. By being assigned to one area of responsibility (AOR) it allowed them to know, understand and become very familiar with the terrain in which they were conducting operations. It gave them a cause, purpose, and a sense of understanding that what they were doing in Vietnam was going to make a difference. The Combined Action Program made the efforts of the riflemen rewarding; it justified their presence in Vietnam. That justification was not always their fellow Marine, but the lives of the Vietnamese people that they ate and worked along side of every day. In the months that the Marines spent in the Combined Action Program, it made the war human. The center of gravity for the CAP was the established relationship between the Marines, villagers and the PF’s."

For Fall, the people are the battle; for the Marines, they are the center of gravity.

And for more on the agreement betwen Fall and the Marines, please note that the same article on the smallwarsjournal website also reports, QUOTING PARET AND SHY's GUERRILLAS IN THE 1960s:

"It is erroneous to think that military defeat pure and simple will be a final solution. Unless the population has been weaned away from the guerrilla and his cause, unless reforms and re-education have attacked the psychological base of guerrilla action, unless the political network backing him up has been destroyed, military defeat is only a pause and fighting can easily erupt again. The worst military mistake in fighting guerrillas is to treat them as if they were conventional opponents. In the long run, the ability to control certain pieces of ground, or to mount periodic expeditions into and out of a particular area, means little in this sort of warfare."

And Fall's Street Without Joy provides:

"As Peter Paret and John W. Shy correctly point out in their slim volume on Guerrillas in the 1960s,

...The current assumption that the popular mind, especially in illiterate, unsophisticated societies, can be manipulated at will is false. Unlike machine gun bolts, ideologies are not easily interchangeable...

Thus the tasks of counterguerilla warfare are as much political as military--or even more so; the two continually interact. As with the guerillas themselves, political considerations may often have to override military considerations if permanent success is to be achieved."

Ted, what was it, again, that the disgruntled said? Something about Rumsfeld turning a "deaf" ear to their military considerations in favor of his "political objectives"? In light of all of the above, need I say more? And please note what I did not say, that Rumsfeld was right on the specifics. I didn't say that because the disgruntled have chosen to speak more in terms of vague generality and not specifics, and as concerns the general, Rumsfeld is right and they are wrong, since Rumsfeld does indeed need to hold dear the notion that the political is supreme and the military subordinate.

Oh, sorry, let me interrupt the discussion by way of a brief return to Truong Chinh. As Bernard Fall reports in Street Without Joy, in his 1947 work La Resistance Vaincra [The Resistance Will Win], Truong Chinh relates, among other items:

"...[there are] those who have a tendency only to rely on military action...They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people;...fighting spiritedly, they neglect political work; they do not...act in such a way that the army and the people can wholeheartedly help one another..."

And back to IEDs, their wreaking havoc on our troops, and the rather belated preparations to deal with the same [ http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/jan2...a011905wm2.html ]:

"Members of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat Task Force spoke to 4th Infantry Division soldiers here Jan. 11-13 about improvised explosive devices, one of the main weapons of choice used against U.S. forces in Iraq.
***
During the class, Williams discussed several threat indicators and how to become aware of whether an improvised explosive device may be present. New dirt or gravel piles, personnel on overpasses, absence of the ordinary, and obstacles in the roadway are all signs of a possible improvised explosive device attack.
***
“Look for existing holes or previous [improvised explosive device] sites. Look for freshly covered holes and new dirt piles. Look for red wires. Avoid overpasses, potholes and manhole covers. Drive in the center of the road,” he said.

“Most importantly, conduct every convoy as a combat operation,” Williams told the soldiers. “You must be aggressive.”

For many soldiers, the training proved to be an eye opener and taught them a bit more on what to expect from the enemy."

Just one question, why isn't this already a part of the basic training for every soldier assigned to or otherwise destined to serve in a combat unit? And, fine, you can blame Rumsfeld if you like, but he hasn't been running the show from 1964 through the present. And given that he's a politico and the disgruntled generals are not, I expect them, and not Rumsfeld, to be primarily responsible for the proper training of the troops. The disgruntled may have to come with hat in hand to beg for this or that weapons system, this or that parcel of real estate for some new base, and this or that troop level to ensure that we have the people we need, but when it comes to telling them to exercise care when on or near overpasses, such is first and foremost the job of the disgruntled and not Rumsfeld. Or if you prefer, you may blame Rumsfeld for this particular failure if such is your desire, but please know, going back to General Swannack's remarks, that Rummy is a politician and not a military man, while Swannack is a military man and not a politician. And so, it is General Swannack, and not Rumsfeld, who ought to have known of the threat posed by the rather likely use of IEDs by an outnumbered, outgunned, and in other respects, outtrained, force of former Ba'athist regime elements, and he should have ensured that his troops were properly trained to meet that threat, and never mind concerns about just who respects who.

Now that I've concerned myself, you, and some others with the rebuttal to the disgrunted, there is the matter of the systematic looting that you mentioned. We have had some looting in our country during the last decade or so, and I've yet to see the same give rise to any insurgency. So while I will admit that the Iraqi people would have been better served if we had been able to prevent the noted looting, kind of hard to blame the insurgency on any looting. Now, if we were the ones who had done the looting, then of course that would be an entirely other story. I otherwise trust that while the Iraqis might be a little unhappy with the initial breakdown of "law and order", that they also understand that it was simply not possible for us to provide a substitute "law and order" under the circumstances then prevailing. Which brings me to your and my next items...

Failure to secure arsenals? And dismissing the Iraqi army? Is the claim here that the speed of our victory over the Iraqi Ba'athist regime worked to our disadvantage? Or more correctly, that the utter collapse of the Iraqi armed forces worked to our disadvantage in this regard? And was the reality here otherwise unique in any respect? Which is to say that I am thinking real hard trying to recall when this scenario has existed before. I mean, the usual circumstance is that we secure arsenals, if any, as we ourselves assume control of specific real property, which is usually accomplished following defeat of the opposition in some battle or other, and the other side continues to control that part of their arsenal that is not under our newly assumed control. How often does the opposition simply evaporate and leave much of their arsenal in place? Fine, we "officially" dissolved the Iraqi armed forces, but the reality is that long before that was done, the Iraqi armed forces had disintegrated and more or less evaporated [as Scott Ritter (of all people) reported: "one must remember that the majority of pro-regime forces, especially those military units most loyal to Hussein, as well as the entirety of the Iraqi intelligence and security forces, never surrendered. They simply melted away."]. What happened, as you well know, is that when the fighting more or less ended, the members of the Iraqi armed forces simply went home and they took whatever they thought worth taking with them when they went. And going back to our first item of discussion, what was left by them was then looted by some others.

Now back to what some might have reasonably expected to occur, which is to say that if the Iraqi armed forces [or more correctly, a constituent part thereof] had to bag out because we were hot on their tails and for whatever reason they couldn't take it with 'em when they left, the usual SOP would be to blow up or otherwise render inoperable those arms and munitions being left behind so as deny the enemy [us] use of the same. And if bagging out wasn't an option [nowhere to go], there's always that thing called the surrender in place, and so the various elements of the Iraqi armed forces could have rather easily maintained themselves as units in control of their own arsenals and then surrendered themselves and their arsenals to our troops when called upon to surrender. And, yes, I expected the "generals" on their side to bag out, but one might have hoped that some residual and/or rudimentary sense of honor and pride in self, unit, armed force, and country, would have compelled instructions to the major to take command of the troops, secure the base and all things located thereon, and wait for the demand for surrender, and, yes, major, I trust your judgment when it comes to doing right by the troops and so I know that you will effectuate the surrender of our forces on the best possible terms. And then maybe the major has the honor and pride to do his duty. But it didn't happen that way and coupled with the speed of our advance, their evaporation without any apparent consideration of what will come of their leaving all of these weapons and munitions behind for any ole soul to make his own, created the unminded arsensals that you wrote of. And to that can be added that we didn't even know where any number, a large number, of arsenals were located. And we probably still don't [most armies don't bury arsenals all over the landscape, but Saddam did].

And, Ted, might I suggest that the criticism itself is otherwise unfair, at least in a certain sense. Do you admit that we cannot protect the average Iraqi from the violence of the insurgents? If so, then how can you object to Abdul the Iraqi keeping a locked and loaded Kalashnikov in his bedroom closet? And given the prior history, more specifically, our standing by and watching Saddam and the Ba'athists have fun with the Kurds, the Marsh Arabs, and all those Shia who were urged to rebel and revolt under Bush I, why would we expect any Iraqi to rely on us for their protection? Let me put it this way, given the prior history and the rather incredible uncertainty concerning all things future, if I had happened to be an Iraqi in Iraq at the time, the very first thing I would have done is procured myself an AK-47 or two or three or four, along with a rather healthy supply of ammunition for the same.

And lastly re the purported dismissal [evaporation] of the Iraqi army, I found this interesting remark on Islam Online [ http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/20...article02.shtml ]:

"Another volunteer, 20-year-old Nazeeh Abbas from Baghdad, who served in the dissolved Iraqi army, highly appreciated what he termed as "the very good treatment by the U.S. training force, compared with the ‘rough’ treatment by the former Iraqi officers.""

Oh, and Ted, General Eaton is on record as taking personal responsiblity for the evaporation of that first attempt to get that first unit of the new Iraqi army to take the field with us during our attempts to reduce/destroy the insurgency in Fallujah. The only specific criticisms that I've heard the General make are: (1) the call for the training of a new Iraqi army occurred a tad bit too late [i.e., subsequent to the actual invasion of Iraq, when, according to Eaton, it should have been planned for before] and (2) he and his project were never fully staffed and resourced. The latter criticism may have merit, though I must confess that I simply do not have access to the necessary information to make my own informed judgment in that regard. As concerns the former criticism, maybe the late call was owing to what I reported above, i.e., no one thought that the Iraqi army would simply evaporate and there was otherwise no plan to totally dissolve the Iraqi army, and so when the evaporation occurred, some were caught with their pants down [as it were]. If that can be called a mistake, then call it a mistake, but please note that some mistakes made are more reasonable/understandable than others. I would not have anticipated the evaporation, which is not to say that I would not have expected some to simply melt away so that they might live to fight another day by way of an insurgency, as indeed I expected that part, but I didn't think that the poor [literally] privates and corporals would simply bag out [might as well stay and see if the new powers that be have any use for one, especially if there's a salary involved].

And re planning as a general matter, from someone who claims to have been involved at the time, and please note the rather lively commentary re Defense Department versus State Department [ http://www.nationalreview.com/rubin/rubin200405030836.asp ]:

"Ironically, it was the Defense Department and not the State Department which sought to implement the recommendations of the Future of Iraq Program's "Transition to Democracy" report. The report is worth reading. According to its preamble, "Nothing...requires the United Nations or United States to police or manage into existence the new and budding democratic institutions. That is a challenge that the people of Iraq must and will face up to on their own." The Defense Department agreed and proposed immediate sovereignty for a government combining exiles with "internals," weighted to the latter. It was a surprise when we learned the State Department opposed its own recommendations and sought to promote exiles like Adnan Pachachi known not for his opposition to Saddam Hussein during his decades in exile, but rather for his oft-stated opposition to Kuwait's right-to-exist.

We were fiercely opposed by the State Department when we wanted to plan for the future. Future of Iraq program director Tom Warrick and others stonewalled Defense Department attempts to train a Free Iraqi Force (FIF). Had the program been implemented fully, it would have helped co-opt and coordinate Iraqi Army conscripts as they switched their allegiance from Saddam Hussein's government, to that of the Iraqi people.
***
While pundits blame the Pentagon for dissolution of Iraq's army, the truth of the matter is that the Iraqi military dissolved itself. Conscripts, long-abused and humiliated by the predominantly Sunni Arab officer corps, simply returned home. Mid-level officers returned to the private sector or joined the Iraq Civil Defense Corps. Senior military officers like Jasim went into hiding, fearing popular retribution for their crimes. While Iraq did not degenerate into the degree of vigilantism predicted by the Future of Iraq program, Iraqis do remain bitter about the abuses of the past. When I visited Nasiriyah in October 2003, locals said that Interior Minister Nouri Badran would be unwelcome in their city because he had hired as his secretary an officer whom residents said personally executed 30 locals following the 1991 uprising.
***
The State Department opposed involving the IRDC in Iraq's reconstruction, perhaps fearing the challenge those familiar with Iraqi society might make to Foggy Bottom's long-held assumptions regarding the role of tribal sheikhs and Islamists in society. Some ambassadors even refused to speak with IRDC colleagues. State Department officials working for Jay Garner sought to stall IRDC deployment claiming lack of space at a time when beds were available. The racism and condescension toward Iraqi Americans were typified by a meeting which Garner called in early May 2003, at the request of his State Department aides. Gathering IRDC members around him, he told them that the diplomats were in charge and, as "Iraqis" they should subordinate themselves to the "Americans." The Pentagon learned of the incident and Garner apologized the following day for insinuating that Iraqi Americans were somehow less American than career diplomats. Nevertheless, the attitude pervaded. And so liberation became occupation, with sheltered American diplomats eating food flown in from Kuwait while the IRDC employees patronized local markets and ate in Baghdad restaurants. While Coalition officials lived in Baghdad's showpiece Rashid Hotel or air-conditioned trailers, many IRDC officials rented apartments in Baghdad. The office of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator L. Paul Bremer distributed brand-new SUVs to American diplomats, many of whom seldom drove outside the Green Zone, but forced IRDC head Emad Dhia to purchase a car in Baghdad out of pocket so that he and other IRDC members could inspect factories and ministry offices, talk to workers, and generally do the jobs which Arabic-speaking diplomats failed to do. More than 150 IRDC members have served their country well. They have helped calm protests in Sadr City, and have identified security and political problems in the countryside. One IRDC member in Basra made the ultimate sacrifice, bound, gagged, and executed while investigating a smuggling and corruption ring.

While first the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and then its successor Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), reported to the Defense Department, the State Department retained effective control over the political operation. Of the first 18 senior advisers deployed to Baghdad, none were from the Defense Department; perhaps half were State Department bureau of Near Eastern affairs ambassadors or policy-planning staff members.
***
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ryan Crocker became both Garner and Bremer's governance director. He handpicked the political team, staffing it almost exclusively with career Near Eastern Affairs diplomats and members of the Policy Planning Staff. I have worked on the Iraqi issue for several years, and knew many of the diplomats and analysts from de-briefings following the academic year I spent teaching in Iraqi Kurdistan. Few supported Bush administration policy. In a seminar I attended before joining government, one U.S. diplomat spoke about the fallacy of regime change in Iraq. Several diplomats openly disparaged President Bush. One high-ranking career diplomat spoke of his affection for Howard Dean. I was surprised to see that a particular British analyst had joined the governance group. Shortly before the September 11, 2001,terror attacks, he had argued that any Saddam replacement would be "as illegitimate as Israel." Rather than promote democrats and liberals, the Crocker team sought to stack the Governing Council with Islamists, Arab nationalists, and tribal leaders; they largely succeeded."

So why are we blaming Rumsfeld? And hasn't the complaint always been, from both Democrats and Republicans, that we have to get control of these career bureaucrats in the State Department? Administrations and their party may change, but the 'crats at the State Department continue to serve on, and as you well know, any and all administrations have rather frustratingly complained that State sometimes acts as a brake on administration policy.

Now on to American puppets, what puppets are you talking about? I am not aware of any Iraqi who could have and/or can still be called an "American puppet." I know that it is all the rage and much in fashion on the left to refer to any and all foreign nationals who support opposed US policies as "puppets", but we are adults and not children and so something more than mere name calling is in order in this regard. Oh, sorry, an example. There was some piece appearing on the Counterpunch website having to with "American puppets" and I was struck by the claim that someone who the author claims lied to US officials was our "puppet." If we assume the lies, wouldn't the reverse be true, as in the US is the liar's puppet? Apparently, such thoughts don't occur to our friends running Counterpunch. So if you would be gracious enough to provide some more detail on just who are our puppets in Iraq, then we can discuss the matter further.

But while I'm near the subject, please note that this is one instance wherein the "this is just like Vietnam" mantra does not hold. The elections in Iraq were model elections when compared with those held during our era in Vietnam, and unlike the district/local/village chiefs who were appointed by way of political cronyism and thus were also the subjects and objects of much resentment, the interim Iraqi government isn't doing that and, as stated, the elections can otherwise be called "fair." So to give credit where credit is due, we've already avoided one problem that plagued us in Vietnam.

And now onto mistreatment, abuse, and/or torture of persons in our custody. Ted, you'll have to either forgive or indulge me [or both], but this is the allegation that gets one's, my, blood to boiling. How stupid do you think that Rumsfeld is? Before you answer, ever hear those two words, to wit, plausible deniability? Somehow, I cannot help but think that if Rumsfeld were all gung-ho re the mistreatment, abuse and/or torture of our detainees, then we wouldn't have ever read of glow sticks up the ole wazoo and we wouldn't have ever seen pictures of any naked human pyramid. And here, I am dividing the moral from the practical, i.e., you could always blame Rumsfeld, in the moral sense, for authorizing and/or condoning any abuse, mistreatment, and/or torture, but the stupidity involved in providing a good propaganda tool for our opposition is just that, stupidity, and never mind whether the underlying conduct at issue is moral in the abstract or not. And, sorry, but the disgruntled general otherwise needs to know that it was his Army that was caught taking the photos and then sending them home. And going back to my dichotomy, while some may have to answer to Deity for any abuse, mistreatment, and/or torture, the propaganda coup provided by the photos is a whole other matter and I don't think that we can blame Rumsfeld for that. Which is to say that in terms of winning this war, it isn't the abuse, mistreatment, and/or torture that are the problem, but the photos, and while Rummy authorized what some would call torture, he didn't authorize photos, nor did he authorize that any such photos be sent home. And, lastly, re this matter, I will offer this to the disgruntled, the words of a now retired major general: "This is beyond the pale in terms of lack of command attention. Where were the flag officers? And I’m not just talking about a one-star...This was a huge leadership failure."

Yeah, Ted, where were they? The response of the disgruntled: uhhh, it was incompetent and undertrained soldiers. And you know he was talking about those in the photos and not those with stars on their bars. Call it buck-passing at its worst. And, Ted, unlike the buck-passer, at least Rumsfeld was honest enough to report that he initially "failed to recognize how important this was".

Lastly, you do know what the disgruntled are truly angry over, yes? Rumsfeld, in a memo to aides:

"Our prerequisite of perfection for ‘actionable intelligence’ has paralyzed us. We must accept that we may have to take action before every question can be answered."

One response back:

"[you should] break the 'belt-and-suspenders' mindset within today’s military...we 'over-plan’ for every contingency...We must be willing to accept the risks."

And some more choice words from Rumsfeld:

"DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution either within DoD or elsewhere."

How well do you think that all went over with the disgruntled? Before you answer, simply consider our Lt. Colonel who spoke of this not being a real war, and then consider that last Rumsfeld remark. So Rummy is trying to get some to fight what they don't consider a war. And so some are fighting back.

Should Rumsfeld resign and should Bush accept it?

Didn't he try to resign some years back and President Bush refused the resignation?

I really don't know if he should resign or not. He at one time thought he ought to. The miracle boxes in the plan did not get miracles, so should he be blamed for the idiocy that brought it on? Maybe not, maybe so. I'm not the fly on the wall.

However, the whole bunch needs to get booted out the door. This will take a bit of doing, like VOTING in November. That'll be a start.

Would Rumsfeld's departure disrupt our operations in Iraq enough to make a difference in this decision?

How? What does the guy do for a living? Would we have not enough troops, not enough armor, not enough supplies, not enough recruits, what? Seems we've had all these problems already.

Should generals who disagree enough to call for resignations in the civilian leadership have resigned themselves in protest when they were in a position to do so?

Can you actually do that in the military? Hey, I don't like this, so I quit.

Isn't that AWOL?

Or does it work differently if you've got one or more stars?

You know, this administration is worse than the military. It is full of corporate-think yes men and women concerned more for their careers than the country. As for military leadership, it looks like a prerequisite to go along with the commands from above. It's a weakness in this type of hierarchy, which extends to the civilian corporations too, just not as thoroughly. Some outfits do have their heads in the clear air.

Anyway, I suppose so, resign under protest if you can while the mess is going on rather than later, after getting the fat pension. One would need to have courage beyond imagination to pull this off, then a very well thought-out and prepared game plan. It would be throwing the career away for a principle, similar to walking off the job due to crooked book cooking. There's no better way to get blackballed right quick.

Eh, seems like a lot of self-interest going on. There will probably be a book deal. I am astounded at how much care I don't have. Vote the bums out and start fresh.

As for who would replace Mr. R, who cares? It'll just be more of the same, which isn't good.

I respect the effort you put into your posts but they seem wildly off base to me. Indeed, how can anyone with hind sight not regard the invasion of Iraq as a strategic blunder? It has overstretched the military, it has generated terrorism where little existed, it has diverted resources from real terrorist threats, it has destroyed our influence in the Middle East, and it done irreparable damage to our moral influence in the world.

To some extent I share you view of the Marines, although they have often been used for immoral interventions by policy makers. Consequently, I find your criticism of General Zinni surprising. After all, he was a Marine general and once commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton. I'm sure he is intimately familiar with the "small wars manual." That didn't prevent him making remarks before and after the beginning of the illegal preventative invasion like:

(See Smearing General Zinni).

When General Zinni was looking forward to the consequences of an invasion Rumsfeld was part of the cabal pushing us into war. With reference to Iraq, he made remarks immediately following 9/11 like,

(CBS)

At the same time, he was backing Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz when Wolfowitz publicly humiliated General Shinseki and let remarks like Richard Pearl's "it will be a cakewalk" stand unrefuted.

I ask you, whose strategic vision was the most sound Zinni's or Rumsfeld's? Grand strategy is all about choosing both the battles to fight and how to fight them with the forces you have. Rumsfeld knew the kind of high tech forces he controlled and thought he could prevail with "shock and awe." He was wrong and should be held accountable.

As for your deplorable defense of Rumsfeld's role in the torture scandal, words fail to describe how appalled I am. The role of high administration officials, in suspending prisoner treatment prescribed by the Geneva Conventions and in issuing and signing off on legal opinions redefining torture and seeking to inoculate interrogators from legal liability for their treatment of prisoners, is well established. (See Torture for a few relevant links). The resistant of JAG officers, the FBI, and officials in the State Department has also been documented. Rumsfeld's own role in issuing a list of "approved techniques" for use at Gitmo has also been revealed. His personal role in monitoring the application of these techniques to at least one prisoner has recently come to public attention. General Miller was dispatched to Iraq to "Gitmoize" interrogation by an Under Secretary of Defense (probably with Rumsfeld's direction). Prisoner abuse amounting to torture was widespread throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. Renditions continue with who knows what kinds of treatment. These acts by themselves negate any claim of the moral high ground we might have claimed.

I find it morally reprehensible that you seem to share Rumsfeld's opinion that the real crime was exposing the torture not creating the conditions for it and performing it? I'm sorry but Rummy still controls armed forces that have a residual democratic spirit and some basic humanity. Rummy should have expected these kinds of activities to come out. He should shoulder some responsibility for both the acts themselves and the publicity nightmare that they created.

I will not attempt to defend all of the generals who have asked for Rumsfeld to resign. After all, some of them probably share command responsibility for war crimes with the Secretary of Defense. Perhaps there is an element of finger pointing for the failure in Iraq but in this case the one pointed at certainly shares a lot of the responsibility.

Overall, my own attitude about responsibility for errors in the war is best summed up by the Army War College study referred to in This Article.



Sounds a lot like General Zinni before the war!

Ted5N:

May I simply report that I disagree? You related in your last:

"Indeed, how can anyone with hind sight not regard the invasion of Iraq as a strategic blunder? It has overstretched the military, it has generated terrorism where little existed, it has diverted resources from real terrorist threats, it has destroyed our influence in the Middle East, and it done irreparable damage to our moral influence in the world."

Maybe it looks that way now, but what happens if things improve? Would that mean that the purported damage to our moral influence in the world would still be irreparable? I otherwise disagree with the "it has generated terrorism where little existed," at least to the extent that such may be implying "terrorism" beyond that normally and usually engaged in by former regime elements shortly after their removal from power. To the extent that some are complaining about al-Qaeda and other groups now engaging us in Iraq, all I will say is, would you rather have their focus be on engaging our hopefully trained and presumably armed troops in Iraq, or would you rather have them sitting at that cafe over cocktails and appetizers planning on how next to use some usually quite valuable means of transportation as an IED here in the USA?

As concerns our influence, moral or otherwise, with the single exception of the immediate post-WWII period, there has never been a time when those in power were influenced by much more than our money and the force that we could project. Sorry, one more, since there is also the matter of our will, which is to say that as concerns the force that we can project, that force will not have any influence unless certain persons believe that we have the will to use it. Two words: paper tiger. Osama was right. His miscalculation was simply in not appreciating the rather likely possibility that our paper tiger mental construct would undergo some not so pleasant for him transformation following fuel-laden passenger jumbo jets being flown into our skyscrapers by his compadres. And please recall again that conversation from Band of Brothers:

"Lt. Speirs: You wanna know if they're true or not. The stories about me. Did you ever notice with stories like that, everyone says they heard it from someone who was there. Then when you ask that person, they say they heard it from someone who was there. It's nothing new really. I bet if you went back two thousand years, you'd hear a couple centurions standing around yakking about how Tertius lopped-off the heads of some Carthaginian prisoners.
Sgt. Lipton: Well, maybe they kept talking about it because they never heard Tertius deny it.
Lt. Speirs: Maybe that's because Tertius knew there was some value to the men thinking he was the meanest, toughest son of a bitch in the whole Roman Legion."

Ted, how many of the people in power around the world really give a damn about how moral we are? But thinking that we are the meanest, toughest sons of bitches on the block might give them cause for pause or otherwise influence the analysis.

And, Ted, the Vietnam analogy is getting old and rather tiresome. Nice of Mr. Raimondo to include the same, but I am not aware of a North Iraq that is waging war against a South Iraq. So in that sense, a rather critical one, Iraq is nothing at all like Vietnam. And also nice of Mr. Raimondo to include General Zinni making the Vietnam analogy as well:

"…The goal of transforming the Middle East by imposing democracy by force reminds him of the 'domino theory' in the 1960s that the United States had to win in Vietnam to prevent the rest of Southeast Asia from falling into communist hands."

First off, we are not imposing democracy by force. And we didn't otherwise put a gun to someone's head and say, please vote now. To borrow from the late Michael Collins, we are giving the Iraqi people the freedom to achieve freedom. How they make use of this opportunity is ultimately up to them. And re the so-called "domino theory," perhaps General Zinni ought to take his head out of the Small Wars Manual and speak with Lee Kwan Yew regarding former events in SE Asia. Seems to Lee Kwan that US action in SE Asia gave some in SE Asia the time to recover from WWII, the end of colonialism, and otherwise establish stable governments before our communist ideologue friends and their running dog lackeys could become a more serious threat. I otherwise believe that to describe Lee Kwan's position re the US in Vietnam would be to say that he was a "staunch supporter" of LBJ's policy in Vietnam. ASEAN was otherwise formed in 1967, and had as its original members, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The timing was not coincidental with the beginning of our ramped-up involvement in Vietnam. And don't rip Lee Kwan and call him bad names, since I will only have to then report that Singapore has a higher per capita GNP than its former colonizer.

And back to our influence, well, that, and, to borrow from that other thread here on America's Debate, there's also visions of that last chopper out as well [ http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/other/culture.html ]:

"FZ: What if Japan did follow the trajectory that most great powers have; that it was not content simply to be an economic superpower, "a bank with a flag" in a writer's phrase? What if they decided they wanted to have the ultimate mark of a great power -- nuclear weapons? What should the world do?

LKY: If they decided on that the world will not be able to stop them. You are unable to stop North Korea. Nobody believes that an American government that could not sustain its mission in Somalia because of an ambush and one television snippet of a dead American pulled through the streets in Mogadishu could contemplate a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities like the Israeli strike on Iraq."

Paper tigers. As I said, Osama was right. And he wasn't alone, since that was the world view. Maybe now we've changed that image, and while I don't think the end goal is to have all in fear of us for all of eternity, given that there are indeed some who wish to do us real harm, then maybe some fear in the interim isn't such a bad thing. Or if you prefer, let them start worrying about us, and what we can do to them, since maybe that will afford them less time to contemplate what they'd like to do to us.

Oh, and Ted, by the way, the Vietnam analogy here is quite simply imbecilic and idiotic, and not simply because there is no North Iraq waging a war on our South Iraq ally. True, there was an indigenous insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam conducted by persons we called, Viet-Cong, but it was not the Viet-Cong that ultimately defeated and toppled the Republic of Vietnam, but instead, main force NVA units, who defeated and toppled the Republic of Vietnam by conducting a phase I conventional war on the Republic, and so we saw that main force NVA battle tank crush the gate to the Presidential Palace in Saigon and then we saw that man wearing the standard issue NVA uniform running up those steps carrying the flag of North Vietnam. So why should I, or anyone else for matter, including General Zinni, believe that (1) Iraq is another Vietnam, and (2) even if it is, that the indigenous insurgency can defeat the Iraqi government when the Viet-Cong were unable to topple the Republic of Vietnam?

And maybe General Zinni is otherwise operating under certain false premises [as it were]. We don't have to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. All we need do is establish a government that can remain stable in face of the insurgency. When that happens, then we can bring our troops home. And that's why you hear some in this current administration reporting that as soon as they stand up, we will stand down [as opposed to saying that as soon as they are defeated we will come home].

And, Ted, maybe General Zinni would like to explain: "Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf region. This is primarily due to its large conventional military force, pursuit of WMD, oppressive treatment of Iraqi citizens, refusal to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), persistent threats to enforcement of the No Fly Zones (NFZ), and continued efforts to violate UN Security Council sanctions through oil smuggling..."

And back to what I said last time re Zinni's remarks re Saddam's retaining the ability to ramp-up a prohibited weapons program or two once the lights went down and we all left the hall:

"While Iraq's WMD capabilities were degraded under UN supervision and set back by Coalition strikes, some capabilities remain and others could quickly be regenerated. Despite claims that WMD efforts have ceased, Iraq probably is continuing clandestine nuclear research, retains stocks of chemical and biological munitions, and is concealing extended-range SCUD missiles, possibly equipped with CBW payloads. Even if Baghdad reversed its course and surrendered all WMD capabilities, it retains the scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure to replace agents and munitions within weeks or months. A special concern is the absence of a UN inspection and monitoring presence, which until December 1998 had been paramount to preventing large-scale resumption of prohibited weapons programs. A new disarmament regime must be reintroduced into Iraq as soon as possible and allowed to carry out the mandates dictated by the post-Gulf War UN resolutions."

See that sentence starting with "Even if...", so yeah, even if Saddam had surrendered all and had otherwise allowed all to come and visit, either we keep him under surveillance forever, or we go home at some later date and he resumes his shenanigans. So why not remove him and his regime now, while it was weak, rather than waiting until some later date when Saddam & Co. might prove to be a tougher nut to crack?

And from a speech that Zinni gave at UCLA:

"And I think that will be the first mistake that will be recorded in history, the belief that containment as a policy doesn't work. It certainly worked against the Soviet Union, has worked with North Korea and others."

Uhhh, General, Vietnam, which you call a "quagmire," was part and parcel of our effort at containing the Soviet Union, which you just said was successful. And to say that we are containing North Korea when our biggest fear is that the NK regime will sell nuclear and other technology to anybody who has the legal tender to pay for the same is, well, what is the word to describe something that not even "nonsense" could begin describe? Zinni's reading of history is otherwise that of a child. We didn't "contain" the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union simply collapsed. But before that occurred, the Sovs cleaned our proverbial clock on nearly all occasions. And to make the, well, find that word so that I can use it, but to say that we "contained" the Soviet Union when the Cuban Missile Crisis was the direct response to our effort to encircle the Soviet Union is, well, please find that word that I am looking for so that I might use it here. And so I am somewhat clearer than mud in the meantime, please note what the CMC was about. We tried to ring the Sovs and the Eastern Bloc, and were stationing nucs wherever we could do so in the process. One such place was Turkey. And a certain passage there, and a certain body of water there, gave the Sovs access to the Med. And so the Sovs said, turnabout is fair play, and then the Sovs sent missiles to Cuba, and then the Sovs told us, capitalists with your running dog lackeys, how do you like it when nucs are real close by and pointed at you? And so we graciously agreed to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in exchange for removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Game, set, and that match to the former Soviet Union.
And, Ted, please also note here, while I am discussing the Soviet Union, that to the extent that Iran and Syria are functioning as an active sanctuary, then those remarks made by Zinni and some others re our military being "overstretched," "overtaxed", what have you, are doing nothing but giving aid and comfort to our enemy. Which is to say, as I related above, power only has influence when the other believes that you will use it. So telling Syria and Iran that we have no power to exercise because we are stretched too thin, etc., rather undercuts our ability and/or capacity to be perceived as having the power and the will to use it, and so does nothing in the way of eliminating or reducing the threat posed by the sanctuary provided by Iran and Syria. But such talk does give them every reason to continue in their nefarious activities. And in stark contrast to our SOP, which was rightly defined as the last chopper out, as Bernard Fall reported in Street Without Joy:

"The Soviet Union fully recognized the importance of the active sanctuary problem when she notified Norway, Turkey, Pakistan and Japan after the U-2 'spy-plane' affair that she intended to bombard with guided missiles any foreign bases from whence 'aggressive acts' would be committed against her."

I suppose that we'll have do the same to Syria and Iran, given that any threat of troop invasion will now ring hollow, given the reports of our being stretched too thin, overtaxed, etc.

And then there's this fine remark:

"The idea that we will walk in and be met with open arms. The idea that we will have people that will glom on to democracy overnight."

Ted, would you care to ask General Zinni just how many Iraqis participated in elections? Need I say that if we only used voter turnout as the measure, that we'd have to say that Iraqis have done a better job "glom[ming] on to democracy" than we Americans?

And then there's:

"The third mistake, I think was one we repeated from Vietnam, we had to create a false rationale for going in to get public support."

What false rationale was that? And wasn't the General just speaking of the success of our policy of containing the Soviet Union? Was containment the false rationale [recall again his words re those falling dominoes]? Is the General claiming that while the rationale was false, that we nevertheless did a good job at the containment? Is that what he's saying? Or is he simply suffering from lack of an internally consistent mental construct? And that "quagmire" that some call Vietnam, yeah, it was, but the reality remains that in 1968, the Viet Cong and their NVA backers launched what has come to be known as the Tet Offensive. The expectation was, for those honest enough to admit the truth, that with this overwhelming military uprising, the population of the South would rise as well, and the Republic of Vietnam would simply be swept away. But there was no popular uprising and the Republic of Vietnam was not swept away. And so there is no mistake, it was a war. Anyone who was in Hue at the time knows that. But the popular support that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were expecting never materialized and so the Republic of Vietnam was not swept away. So my question for the general is, when the quaqmire that you are referring to consists of millions of people who remained faithful to both the Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America, why are you calling it a quagmire? They were and are people, not things that we step into. Ted, I'll let the general inform us as to why he reduces the human to the inanimate.

And then there's:

"We failed in number four, to internationalize the effort. To the credit of President Bush 41, he set a standard that held up throughout the post-cold war period up until the Iraq war very well. He went to the United Nations before we undertook the operation to expel Saddam from Kuwait. Tremendous diplomatic effort to get a resolution from the United Nations to authorize the use of force and then a tremendous diplomatic effort on his part to create what I think is one of the most remarkable coalitions, the coalition we had in the Gulf war, where we had Arab countries, Islamic countries, European countries, contributions from the Far East all over the world. That model was extremely successful, and if you think about it, every intervention we had since we used the model, and it worked. We did it in Somalia,..."

This one is rather rich, Ted. Gulf War I was a failure and so we had all that happened after, to wit, sanctions resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands, maybe a million, from thoroughly preventable disease and malnutrition, no fly zones, etc. As some other general said, and rightly so, you only go to war to change regime, and if we ain't gonna be doing that, then why go to war?

And he called Somalia a success? Ted, if for some reason you run across the General, please have him speak with Lee Kwan Yew about our "success" in Somalia.

And, Ted, now let me provide you with the confirmation of what I said to end my last:

"I think the fifth mistake was that we underestimated the task. And I think those of us that knew that region, former commanders in chief, I guess we can't use that term anymore - part of transformation is to change the lexicon..."

See that word, "transformation?" Why is that even on his mind, given the context? Call it an example of the proverbial Freudian slip. Do you see now that such is what all of this criticism is really about? Fine, you don't like Rumself and you think Iraq a mistake. I disagree. But these disgruntled souls aren't doing this out of concern for some higher principle, instead, they simply don't like a suit and tie telling them how to run their Army/Marines. And so the out of context remark about the not so respected transformation [so maybe they ought to be honest and tell us that in saying that Rumsfeld and some others do not respect them, that such description is simply them projecting their own thoughts re others onto those others].

And lastly on Zinni:

"Disbanding the Army, this is one I'll never understand because when I arrived at CENTCOM as the commander, there was an on-going program started by my predecessors to run a psychological operations campaign against the regular Army. Every time we struck Iraq, we dropped leaflets on regular Army formations and garrisons saying "If you don't fight when the time comes, we'll take care of you." We sent messages to them to this affect through people in the region. When I did interviews on Al Jazeera TV and other Arab networks, I would always mention the poor Iraqi soldiers of the regular Army - victims of Saddam. We had always intended if they didn't fight, we'd get rid of the leadership, we'd keep them in tact, we'd provide for some of their training, and we would have the basis for a ready-made force to pick up some of the security requirements. But they were disbanded. And on and on and on, we've had this series of mistakes."

As I said, we did not disband the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army simply evaporated. If either you and/or Zinni wish to prove me wrong, then please identify the Iraqi army unit[s] that surrendered and the US or other Coalition unit that took their surrender [date and place would be useful as well]. And as the quote I posted from Islamonline provides, the one 20 year former soldier is now in the new Iraqi army. So even now it is false to say that we weren't and aren't willing to allow former Iraqi army troops to serve in the new Iraqi army.

Sorry, one more. For the simply and utterly fantastic:

"After getting that, I would first go to the countries in the region asking their help. I would do things like ask the countries to give us five or six officers for each of our battalions and regiments and brigades and above, five or six Arab officers that have attended our schools. For each of those units, that have gone to our command and general staff colleges, that not only speak English but know us, and we know them. And I'd put them on the planning staffs of these units, as advisors, as planners. If I'm a battalion commander down there in the middle of Fallujah or Najaf, I need more than some kid who happens to be of Arab descent and speaks Arabic that I drug over there and probably doesn't speak the dialect. I would like to have five or six of these guys that I went to school with, that I know, that would be there, that would be seconded there for me as planners, advisors, and to help me in these situations."

May I rant now? General, could you please put your thinking cap on and then tell me just which regime in the region has any interest at all in seeing a democratic Iraq? And so why on earth would you expect them to provide us with troops? And maybe that explains why they all rushed to join us in Gulf War I, but when notions of regime change and the establishment of a democratic, representative government later came to the fore, all concerned were rather conspicuously silent or nowhere to be found. You see, Ted, if it works in Iraq, then it can work anywhere. And maybe, if the uprising is large enough, the existing regime can simply be swept away without any outside intervention at all. And the people in power that Zinni believes would help us if only approached with proper decorum know the reality as well as I do. And so they aren't about to help.

Now on to shock and awe. Not the indiscriminate bombing that you referred to, but the most precise exercise of tactical and strategic air bombardment ever recorded in human history. And the irony here, though I doubt that you and some others will appreciate that irony, is simply that we'd probably have been better off in terms of the insurgency if we'd killed a few more people with our shock and awe. And, Ted, let us otherwise make that comparison:

Combat deaths in Vietnam by year:

1965: 1,080
1966: 3,770
1967: 6,470
Total: 11,320

Combat deaths in Iraq by year:

2003: 486
2004: 848
2005: 846
2006: 200
Total: 2,380

So, we lost more in 1966 alone in Vietnam than we've lost in Iraq from March of 2003 through April 2006. And if the January through April 2006 period can be used to calculate our dead through the end of this year, then there will be 600 or so US combat deaths in 2006, which is 200 and some lower than the prior two years, which will hopefully indicate the start of a downward trend.

And since this is not a case of a one size insurgency fits all, UK combat deaths in Iraq: March 2003 through April 2006: 104

Now let me put the above numbers into some more perspective:

US combat deaths in Vietnam by year; troop strength in country

1965: 1,080; 184,000
1966: 3,770; 425,300
1967: 6,470; 485,600

Now what was the general, excuse me, what were the generals reporting about how this vast increase in the number of troops on the ground would have presumably prevented the problem? It didn't in Vietnam.

Now back to shock and awe, and some other things too. Consider our combat deaths from the date and time of the first bomb drop that commenced shock and awe through Dubya's proclamation of victory. Which is to say that we conquered Saddam's Ba'athist regime and lost fewer troops in doing so than we did when a terrorist on a suicide for glory mission drove his vehicle through the main gate and blew up that barracks of Marines in Beirut. I don't suppose that you'd be willing to give Rumsfeld or the administration any credit for that?

And, Ted, at least one Iraqi blogger otherwise disagrees with your assessment re the war being a mistake:

"The third anniversary of the invasion of Iraq also evoked divergent emotions among bloggers.

While lamenting the violence in Iraq, a blogger who uses the pseudonym "The Mesopotamian" praised the war that ousted Saddam.

"The blood and sacrifices by the American soldiers and people will never be forgotten," The Mesopotamian wrote. "It was right, it was just and it was ordained by God that a murderer and tyrant should be overthrown.""

Please see: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials...4/21/2003303835

And, Ted, on the matter of Why We Fight, please see the second matter discussed here, under the heading, Kill us, but you won't enslave us:

http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/

"It was the day he [the blogger's sister's husband] was celebrating the opening of a foundation that was going to offer essential services to the poor but the criminals were waiting for him to end his life with their evil bullets and to stab our family deep in the heart.

Grief and pain is killing me everyday as I hold my dear nephews