entspeak:
There isn't any coercion inhering in my cross-examination of the complaining witness in a rape case either, at least not in the strict legal sense. The coercion however does inhere in my potential subjection of the complaining witness to my insult, opprobrium, and/or ridicule, and so, having been properly advised, she might well decide to forego testifying and thereby save herself from the anticipated insult, opprobrium, and/or ridicule. Again, that is why we have the rape shield law. The SF Board can otherwise do what I have described as well as I can [I don't claim to be singularly unique in this regard]. But unlike the SF Board, I do not exercise governmental power. And to not leave out a point I probably should have included prior, no matter whether one might win in the end, since the mere expense of obtaining the appropriate redress [in terms of both time and money] may very well result in (1) a rather Phyrric victory, which might (2) cause me conclude that it might be better to change my behavior rather than undergo another Phyrric victory. The other side can call it a victory by attrition [i.e., they didn't win by winning, they won by wearing me down and so I quit the game and otherwise said, I surrender].
As concerns facts, what facts do you need? I gave you all that is necessary to properly understand the issue. Perhaps the difficulty lies in your not having my familiarity with the matter of "prior restraint." I was otherwise only offering my own circumstance as a further example, and no "venting" was intended or involved.
Perhaps this will help [
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/SCR_RJEEP.html ]:
"REVISER’S NOTE.
DISSENT TO PROPOSED RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES
I am opposed to the creation of an arm of this court that will presume to be the ethical arbiter for “judges and aspirants to judicial office” in political campaigns and in “ethical matters that may arise in the ordinary course of judicial service.”1 I oppose the scheme principally because it poses a threat to political free speech and because it intrudes upon the constitutional functions of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline.
The court creates a “standing committee,” whose duty it is to tell judges what is right and what is wrong, or, as it is put in the rules, to render “opinions regarding ethical matters.” The insinuation is that judges are such moral dwarfs that they are not capable of making ethical judgments on their own—especially in political campaigns. It has been my experience that judges are morally competent and that they are as capable of making moral judgments as are any of the amateur ethicians who will comprise the court’s morals committee.
***
Having summarized my position in this matter, let me now state, as concisely as I can, three specific objections to the creation of another, court-sponsored body having extra-constitutional powers in the field of judicial discipline and ethics:
1.
The Rules are constitutionally suspect. The court’s plan to issue ethical proclamations (through its “standing committee”) that advise judicial candidates that their campaign practices are not ethical or “proper” is, on its face, dangerously close to being an infringement on a candidate’s right of free speech. I realize that there is no provision in the rules for the court’s actually censoring candidates’ political statements or for ordering them to cease and desist; still, authoritative ethics declarations by the court (through its morals committee) proclaiming that one or another candidate’s political campaign is not “proper” is, in my view, a “chilling” prior restraint on a candidate’s right to freedom of expression during a campaign.
***
3.
Aside from being constitutionally suspect and unnecessary, the morals committee scheme is unworkable. I do not like what I see when I look at the morals committee and how it is supposed to work under the newly-adopted rules. The gist of these procedures is that the morals panel is empowered to conduct secret morals trials. The procedure is that an offended candidate may file a complaint with the committee’s “executive director” (truly); then, if the charged candidate denies that her or his “actions” are morally unacceptable to the committee’s ethicians, the matter proceeds to a trial at which the accused is “invited to attend.” The trials are private, and all concerned are forbidden to make “any public reference to the fact that the matter is pending before the committee.” If the accused is found guilty of ethical infractions, the committee has the “authority to impose sanctions.” The only sanction mentioned in the rules, however, is that of publishing the results of the morals trial."
Does that help? As you can see, admittedly, there is no provision in the rules for the judicial candidate's speech actually being censored or for the judicial candidate's being ordered to cease and desist, still...still, maybe a judicial candidate foregoes speech because he/she doesn't want to run the risk that the results of some "secret trial" will be made public should the amateur ethicians decide that he/she is indeed a moral dwarf...
And for a further aid, simply picture the SF Board creating a "morals committee" for permit applicants along the same lines as that apparently now in place with respect to judicial candidates in Nevada. Once you've done that, simply consider that the SF Board skipped the "morals committee", excuse me, appointed itself as the "morals committee", rendered its verdict, and has now made the results public via the resolutions in question. Justice Springer and I simply believe the same to constitute a prior restraint on speech.
Now on to the mob. Ever wanted to be a mob lawyer? Why not? Is it because you don't like the mob and/or you don't wish to associate in any manner with those you consider "unsavory"? Or is it because you know that the federal government goes after the mob by going after their lawyers, and though you've done nothing wrong, covert surveillance and tax audits [one after the other] are not your proverbial cup of tea and you can otherwise earn a handsome living attending to other persons who have their own legal problems?
And back to "warnings" and "chilling effect[s]", please, lastly, see:
http://www.rcfp.org/news/1996/0715c.htmlSorry, one more. Something else that I probably should have made clear prior. You do know that the permit process itself is a form of prior restraint, yes? And we view that form of prior restraint to be reasonable because it is supposed to be "content neutral." Tell me, what was content-neutral about the resolutions in question? And did those resolutions turn the purportedly content-neutral permitting process into something not so content-neutral? As the US Supreme Court has otherwise already said, even nominally content-neutral and otherwise reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions can inhibit and stifle speech. And I would lastly submit that it's not that far a walk from my reading of a prior restraint here and that involved here:
http://www.gannett.com/go/newswatch/2005/april/nw0429-4.htm"Perhaps the most helpful aspect of this decision is Justice Kennedy's observation that the First Amendment's protections are not limited to formal prior restraints such as court orders that explicitly bar the news media from publishing or broadcasting. Threats of prosecution by government officials also can chill speech to the point that they constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint."
Yeah, and knowing that you will be formally insulted and ridiculed whenever you choose to apply for a permit may very well have that same chilling effect. And, ent, it is precisely because the SF Board knows that it could not ultimately prevail in a contest over a permit denial that it chose to do what it did. As I said, call it the next best thing to outright prohibition.
Lesly:
Yes, that One is "lazy" and so we have that old adage about how the Lord's work must truly be our own...And the matter may not be of import to you, but it has some rather enormous implications when one considers our philosophical construct. As the noted guest author reported, well, reported and implied, rights given by God cannot be taken away by men, while rights given by the state can indeed be taken away by the very state that gave them.