1. Is the NSA's program of call logging constitutional?I don't believe it is. It's clearly not legal, but whether it is a direct violation of the Fourth Amendment seems to be a matter of debate. I would argue that it
is a direct violation of our right "to be secure in [our] persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures". The counter-argument seems to hinge on
Smith v. Maryland and the definition of "non-content" - though I would first like to address some significant differences between that case and the NSA obtaining our phone records.
In Smith v. Maryland, the Smith in question was a suspect in both a robbery and the subsequent threats made to the victim over the phone. The police had a physical description of both the suspect and his car and used them to identify him. While I would argue that the police
should then have obtained a warrant (and would agree with just about every point the three dissenters made in the case), they at least had probable cause to request that the phone calls of the suspect be monitored specifically to see if any calls were being made to the victim's number. They were not fishing for evidence for no apparent reason.
Another significant difference arises from the fact that Smith was an individual: only
his calls were being monitored. The police were not also recording the calls made by the victim - or the calls made by those that the victim or the suspect called. It was a single record, not a database.
The third major difference surrounds the whole question of "content" - or "non-content".
Amlord has presumably taken this to mean (and he can correct me if I'm wrong) the actual content of telephone
conversations - phone-tapping in other words. The court mentions phone-tapping (in relation to
Katz v. United States), but it also mentions that this was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the police were recording "
only the telephone numbers that have been dialed" and that by only looking at "the numbers dialed into a telephone system", they were not invading Smith's privacy.
Can we assume that anything in addition to a list of numbers dialed
does constitute "content"? Even just having a
network of calls - the numbers dialed by everyone you've ever called - is a certain level of content. This is what the President described the other day as presumed "affiliates". Such presumption is itself worrying: how many degrees of separation are there between any one of us and a suspected terrorist? We should be surprised that there aren't
more than ten million "terrorist affiliates" in the NSA's database - though I suspect their work is far from done.
Further, the records now in the possession of the NSA also include the
duration of calls. Is this content? Suppose a man dials the number of an escort service several times over the course of a few days. In the Smith v. Maryland case, that's all the police would know. It could have been the number of a business associate that he wrote down wrong and tried calling several times in error. But as the NSA
also knows that each call lasted from three to five minutes, that implies content consisting of more than "Sorry, wrong number."
In any event, I wonder how applicable cases from 1967 and 1979 are in light of subsequent legislation - the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example (of which, more in a moment).
But I don't think we
really need to cite court cases or constitutional law at all. I'd say that actions speak louder than words. First, this is the sort of thing that the Bush administration actually
tried to do with the Total Information Awareness program established by DARPA in January, 2002, and headed by convicted felon John Poindexter. Within a year, its activities were suspended pending a Congressional review of privacy issues and, following a report on its activities, it was defunded by act of Congress - because it was seen to be open to potential abuse - such as, oh... using it to identify a journalist's sources or trace whistle-blowers or engage in industrial espionage or blackmail. The Executive
knew that establishing this type of database had already been thwarted by Congress - for damned good reasons.
Second, we're not hearing much about the Qwest refusal, which is actually kind of interesting. According to statements made by Qwest itself, I wouldn't exactly call the process "voluntary" as it has been characterized here. According to the original
USA Today story, when Qwest refused to hand over the records, the NSA "pushed back hard":
QUOTE
NSA representatives pointedly told Qwest that it was the lone holdout among the big telecommunications companies. It also tried appealing to Qwest's patriotic side: In one meeting, an NSA representative suggested that Qwest's refusal to contribute to the database could compromise national security.
More interestingly, Qwest asked the NSA for a court order before releasing their records.
They were refused. This is not unusual since, until "national security" was evoked in the wake of the September 11 attack, even AT&T's policy had "required law enforcement agencies to present a court order before they would even consider turning over a customer's calling data". Following increased pressure from the NSA, Qwest then asked for FISA approval before turning over the records.
They were again refused.Now, assuming that this information is vital to national security - as the National Security Agency was arguing to the phone companies (and as supernumeraries like the President of the United States have been arguing since) - why
didn't they get a court order or FISA approval? Because they knew
they would be refused? And if such a request is perfectly legal and constitutional, why on earth would they be refused? The NSA can't have it both ways. If access to the phone records of millions of citizens is both urgent and legal,
why the hell didn't they just get a court order?Something tells me they knew that what they were doing was unlawful. In fact, there is no other credible explanation for their failure to secure legal sanction for the records they so desperately needed from Qwest to complete their terror-vanquishing database.
As to ECHELON, there are again key differences. First, ECHELON was initially set up (during the Cold War) for the purpose of creating an international spynet to capture information related to espionage. It was not intended to monitor domestic communications within
any of the participating countries, but rather communications between countries - especially those considered "threats". Not unlike the stated intent of the warrantless wire-taps. There was also a secondary purpose (which may, in fact, have been its
real purpose), which was to conduct
corporate espionage benefitting American business - as former CIA Director Woolsey has admitted.
Second, ECHELON could only be used for data
mining (and this was confirmed by FISA). It could only seek out and collate key words and identify a flagged source - a phone number, for example, or IP address. And, wothout a court order, nothing more. According to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, telecom companies are
prohibited from producing "personal identifiers" - names, addresses, billing information - in the absence of probable cause. Without a court order, phone companies cannot reveal "calling habits" such as the duration or frequency of calls to other numbers or any information regarding incoming calls. The NSA's approach to the telecom companies in question circumvented all of that.
What compounds this most recent disclosure is that a list of phone records can be
combined with data mined through programs like ECHELON, including phone calls, email traffic, and websites visited - and can be collated with data like our bank and credit records, library records, tax records, credit card purchases - you name it.) Indeed, I'm convinced that was the intent from the outset. I'm
not convinced that the most autocratic and invasive administration we've ever had, which uses
everything for politcal ends, has been limiting the use of these records to tracing the "terrorist affiliations" of ten million citizens.
Regardless of the convoluted language of court decisions or the vagaries of government regulations, the
actions of the NSA demonstrate that they knew they could not get these records via legal means - dating back to the dismantling Total Information Awareness (or, at least, the Congressional directive to do so) and supported by their refusal to seek court orders, even through FISA. If they
could have got these records via legal means, they
would have.
I have no problem with the NSA (or the FBI or the CIA or the DEA or anyone else) being granted access to phone records - so long as it is done through
legal channels and with
probable cause. In other words, I have no problem with
constitutional action. But I
do have a problem with a "unitary executive" that thinks it can do whatever it damned well pleases and then tries to come up with some sort of "national security" rationale for having broken the law after (and
only after) it's been caught.
2. How (if at all) will revelation of this program effect the new CIA nominee's chances for confirmation?I think it's too soon to tell. We don't really know who initiated this action or who was privy to the decision. If this plays out like every other unlawful act perpetrated by this administration (and, at this stage, they are legion), we may never know. The NSA has already told the Department of Justice that it is not allowed to investigate them.
What we
do know, though, is that the warrantless wire-tapping of US citizens was done with Hayden's knowledge and consent (possibly even at his prompting), so I have no reason to doubt that he was at least
aware of the largest database in the history of the universe, if not one of authors. Should this prove to be the case, it could bode ill for his nomination. In this Congress, of course, that means he'll be asked a few awkward questions, answer them with jingo and lies, and promptly be approved.
What this all boils down to is that there may be no
government transparency under the Bush/Cheney regime, but there sure as hell is
private citizen transparency.
3. Can communications companies be compelled to provide this information without a warrant?No. If they could, Qwest would already have been duly compelled. They can be
subpoenaed to provide this information quite legally (per the
Telecom Act) and, in our current climate, I would imagine quite easily. But they weren't subpoenaed. Maybe "probable cause"
does still mean something, even if Michael Hayden has never heard of it.
Note: There appears to be additional information at Glenn Greenwald's Unclaimed Territory (he's quite good, if you haven't read him) in an article called "Legal issues governing the Administration's newly disclosed surveillance program" (citing Orin Kerr and others), dated May 11, 2006. I haven't made my way through his yet, so there may be more detail that could amplify or modify some of the above.