Taking into account the more modern political and I guess military scene of the world is traditional military weaponry and tactics choice for such an environment? Most weaponry used today was designed with the traditional concept of how war was to be fought, but in the current sense no nation is really finding itself to deploy troops into such and environment. The tactics or guidelines that most terrorists groups run provide a risk when it comes to the use of modern munitions or weapon systems by simply destroying infrastructure and of course killing civilians in any nation they seem to infect, and in my humble opinion making things worse.

Its not only that the weaponry itself was not devised for this type of environment but that the training of the soldier itself was primarily not based around such methods that terrorists employ, both of which in my opinion seem to lead to a negative situation for the use of force when it comes to real life application against a terrorist foe, or foes really.

The US I think caught wind of this with trying to make a lighter more agile or adaptable force for urban scenarios but I think that much ground could be made up in this area, thus greatly enhancing the ability for say the US or Israel to conduct operations against such an enemy.

So questions for debate are these.

1) Is modern weaponry fit to conduct battle against terrorists and the tactics they employ?

2) Is training for our military and militaries abroad fit for operations against terrorists and the tactics they employ.

gordo:

We need both. Afghanistan and Iraq both prove that we need your more conventional army to defeat your more conventional foe and that such a foe does still exist. But we need to develop the necessary attitude and means to conduct what I will call an "irregular war." I'm still not sure that we have done so, given the old adage about being able to take the boy out of the country but not the country out of the boy, meaning that I'm not so certain that some trying to wage irregular war have left their more conventional roots behind.

Oh, and going back to the thoughts you expressed on that other thread, I trust that you understand that those who wage an irregular war will experience just that much greater emotional/psychological trauma, given that the conventional war is designed for killing at a distance, while irregular war usually means killing up close and personal, preferably after one has "enjoyed" the opportunity to more personally familiarize one's self with the intended target.

Thats just the idea, I never had to kill anyone, I never got the chance and I never even saw the nice people that happened to want to kill people, save for a couple occasions, I think we got them while they were planning or basically trying to hide in the locals and plan, but that only lead to capture by other forces. I did however have to stop people from making bad choices under such stress and confusion, such as a young man running from currently what could not be discerned from a possible car bomb as we came up on it, which of course turned out to be some temporary way to hold part of an engine together, but you have to risk yourself mortally to even deal with that.

I do think that modern military forces are prepared really to tackle the modern issue at hand, and I think that this will not favor us in being successful, simply because we have not moved our forces in regards to equipment and training for such conflicts, I think its evident in Iraq and I hope it does not overall become evident in regards to any future battles fought against such people, its leaves our forces in a protracted occupation and attrition conflict that at the same time becomes heavily destructive on the local population. I hope Israel is not drawn into this conflict in Lebanon, being they already did it once.

Israel has an army of about 160,000 soldiers, I think that is pretty close to what is deployed by the us in the mideast. Israel will be fighting on two fronts. A major aspect of this war is the enemy does not choose to fight were you may be strong such as in the field against your tanks but rather in urban areas that can be populated with non combatants, to simply be disgusted with how they operate is not the only stance that should be taken, in order to show people in the mideast that we are not the things radical Islam portrays I feel it would be very nice of us to modify our forces to combat just the threat and minimize in all ways the idea of another Iraq war.

Back to trauma and the likes, its not something super bad. I dont feel comfortable outside in the masses, and I remember how odd it was to drive around without a gun and a vest, though I am not a cop Peoples brains regardless if they are soldiers are not will get destroyed in a year+ of wondering if that’s a car bomb or does that guy have a grenade in his pocket. Then you have to deal with the issue that its not just the military person that has to take this on, its the non combatant, and of course you can simply turn on the tv to see people on any side suffering this, then to become victims by this, and of course more times then not to become filled with hate by it. The choices the person in teh boots on the ground makes day to day comes to be a heavy part of success or failure, I think we should move in regards to training and equipment that allows our soldiers to be more successful in the face of a threat that diplomacy alone I think will not end, or moreover guided munitions for that matter.

--------------------------------------------------EDIT

I feel the need to add more to correctly address the position I am taking. Its being accepted widely that warfare needs to be conducted against radical Islam in the form of attacking nations that intelligence comes to suggest a concentration or important part of radical Islam.

To take this into a slight bit of more detail that means the use of military force on the ground, from its means in terms of tactics and equipment and the relation between these two in relation to the same formula the enemy has in terms of tactics and equipment.

During the cold war the US saw it paramount to gain a technological advantage and we see overall that the US does have the most powerful military in this case the world over, but this military was defined or adapted to a certain type of environment, or the typical environment one might see in terms of WW1 and WW2 and of course what was wanted again for the cold war.

The tactics the enemy today employees does not allow or produce an environment truly for the use of such, and moreover basically operates in a form that greatly reduces the ability to use such technology effectively in terms of combat.

To take that into account a great amount of success or ground could be made up by simply developing military technology and related development of tactics that are defined into defeating how the foe operates, which currently we do not have and as for our forces in the mideast truly have to adapt to on the fly.

A simple vehicle constructed that reduces in a great amount the methods insurgents can conduct to attack with success would be nice, but then again the US is not running convoys of tanks, its running convoys of the other equipment it has which happen to be very vulnerable to such methods of attack on a constant basis.

Furthermore the typical ground soldier does not have a wide Varity of items developed just for such an environment, or tactics in the long term aspect of training just for such an environment which seems now to be the paramount environment US soldiers in my opinion will come to see in regards to combat anymore.

To make ground up here in itself would greatly in my opinion lower not only the threat insurgents or terrorist pose but the ability for them to wage an overall successful battle against out troops. The typical Iraqi may look at things differently if the insurgent itself was not able to really be able to conduct with success attacks against us targets, which what I am point out would be a potent base of psychological operation.

Basically a force that has equipment that can deal in a urban environment like in Iraq is what such be developed, armored vehicles that require serious munitions to destroy would be nice, and it would be nice for such vehicles to be able to carry soldiers and supplies, and for such soldiers to have ground roots training for such an environment and matching equipment would be nice. Then tactics that are more bent on operational intelligence and of course the ability to obtain favor and support in the local populous would be nice, we do not have an army built for such a purpose, we have a cold war army in terms of equipment and tactics and that is no longer the environment any military force is going to come to face in terms of radical Islam.

Such conflicts that do not favor traditional methods of military might will make such militaries weak and rely only on certain aspects of there force that in themselves were not defined for such, and furthermore this only allows for the enemy to make such a situation to become more protracted and more volatile in regards to the perception the local populous may have.

If we agree that military force is what is the right thing for today’s problems, we then should model a military force that is fit for success in such an environment.

our military is not fit too fight terrorism effectively enough, it's like swatting a mosquito really

I'm actually going to respond to both questions at once, because hey, why not?

I think that our military is absolutely fit to conduct operations against the modern terrorist. You mentioned that our military isn't specifically trained to handle scenarios like these.

Well, simply put, I'd have to say that it's quite the opposite. If anything, our military today is trained to effectively counter guerrila warfare. Vietnam was a huge shock to us. Our troops attempted to fight in much the same way that Korea and WWII had been fought. We were looking for a definite enemy on definite battlefields. To our credit, when presented with such a setting, our troops always won. However, it was quite regrettable that in Vietnam, there just never were that many open engagements. We were fighting everyone. As one soldier put it,

"The same old man who was trying to sell you a coke that day could be firing rockets at you that very same night."

Presented with this new scenario, our military began to train troops to counter guerilla warfare, but it was too late. Nowadays however, I think all branches of our military are quite prepared. Along with the same types of training that they have always received, our current soldiers now receive MOUT training (Military Operations on Urban Terrain), specifically handling the issue of fighting in an area crowded with civilians. We also now have extremely well-trained sappers who are specially trained to identify and neutralize IEDs, which are the Iraqis main weapons. Not only that, but there are organizational differences, such as smaller operational units. Before and up to Vietnam, the smallest unit a force ever really moved in was a platoon. Now our military trains its soldiers to function as individual squads, and in many cases, individual fireteams.

Technology has also played a huge role in our ability to effectively combat modern foes. For example, just about every combat arm of Army now use M4s instead of M16s for easier close-combat operations. We also have increased or non-lethal technology. A company has produced a product known as White-Light for our military. Basically it's just a series of weapon-mounted high-intensity lights. Whereas this may sound relatively inconsequential, it's been a huge aid to our soldiers. It makes it easier to identify friend versus foe in nighttime engagements, and has also proven to be an effective tool in just scaring off the enemy without bloodshed. There have been numerous reports from APC .50-cal gunners who said that once a group of terrorists gets in the beam of their White-Light, they just start running, because they know that "where there's light, bullets aren't far behind."

Then there are our Special Forces units. SF back in Vietnam were already trained incredibly well in the art of guerrilla warfare. Nowadays they're the best, hands-down. The simple fact is that pretty much no terrorists or other guerrilla-warfare-waging enemies can stand up to them. In other words, we're effectively beating them at their own game.

Even more traditional weapons such as artillery are useful against modern foes. Because our technology is so incredible, the artillery units are unbelievably mobile and accurate.

I actually just spent some time up at West Point and Camp Buckner recently, and go to talk to a lot of Rangers and guys from the 82nd Airborne who were just shipped back from Iraq. Not only were they all still in good shape, but they were supremely confident not just in their own abilities, but the abilities of everyone in every branch of our military to effectively wage war against modern enemies.

So whereas you make an excellent point that, yes, there is always room for improvement, I'd have to say that our armed forces are perfectly capable of combating modern foes.

<edited for one quick add-on that I had forgotten to mention>
Our satellite technologies are so good right now that we can take overhead photos of an area, construct digital 3D models of the terrain, and let our troops actually explore the terrain on computers to get a first-person ground view of the area they're about to go into. Pretty sweet stuff.

I have been through mout training, its nice, but what I was more or less suggesting is that mout training is the armies answer to the fact they do not train soldiers from day one in regards to the modern environment soldiers are most likely to face.

The reasons we have to be able to move and operate in smaller units is because of a reaction to the foe, again such training should start in a ground root fashion not three months plus then have a nice trip, even if it is solid training. Many soldiers overseas have to act in an infantry capacity, and even the infantry itself was never solely trained heavily for this purpose. A m4 rifle is hardly a lasting or only possible solution for our troops.

3D training is nice, I have also played video games. You can actually buy them for home systems now, they are retarded also, video games cannot exploit the biological reality of having fear put your mind in a tunnel and the fact for some reason you hearing is gone, plus if things were as easy as the video games made it we would have already defeated the last boss and have the high score.

Its nice to know that people have confidence in themselves, that’s a great attribute.

We see the logic and or need to model our forces to meet the threat, I do not think the army has done such yet or really the government in the face of the modern threat we see today. Soldiers will of course meet the mission, but a few inches of armor will only protect against so much, and the troops would always like more armor or ways to survive. I cant remember the last time I heard about an ied killing troops in an Abrams tank, unfortunately an Abrams tank cannot carry troops or supplies in any real capacity past what it was designed for, plus tank rounds happen to be rather devastating. Artillery in terms of Iraq is not used really, most active duty artillerymen in Iraq are not doing artillery. The Stryker vehicle is nice, but that area of development and training I think was cut down, though I am not sure.

I would not doubt that our special forces soldiers happen to be top rank, it also takes about four years I think to turn one of them out, depending on specialization maybe more maybe less, *** NOTICE: THIS WORD IS AGAINST THE RULES. FAILURE TO REMOVE IT WILL RESULT IN A STRIKE. *** an added bonus I think the army pays them over a 100,000$ to stay in in such capacity.

I overall simply strongly believe that we are conducting operations with a cold war military in an environment that’s not matching and what we are seeing is another Vietnam because of such. We still do not have any possible date our troops our coming home and the horror stories of that place seem to be getting just that much worse day to day, the sectarian violence alone is actually amazing in regards to the amount of people being killed day to day anymore, and for the past years its still the same with hearing about our troops dying from basically the same thing that could be stopped really if they just had better equipment and training, or such developed to meet that environment.

Politicians always try to portray themselves as the real patriots, its sad that the idea of patriotism has become yet another political battleground to push ideas on. The reality is our troops could use a lot of attention, and they don’t get it really, I hated that coming home crap, it made me sick actually and I ducked out of it, something serious needs to be addressed and its simply not getting there for whatever reason, its like global warming.

You certainly make some good points about those sort of tactics not being the military's main focus. However, if I may say so in a constructive way, you're being rather vague. You keep mentioning that we should improve our focus and tactics, but without any specific references to current shortcomings.

I guess it's my opinion that yes, there's always room for improvement, but we're still in plenty-good shape to fight the war.

gordo:

As I said prior, I too am in favor of a more small unit response. But I didn't state my reason. The reason is simple. We will never, not in a million years, win our war in Iraq by military means. The only way to win that war is to win the political war. That was the Israeli problem in Lebanon prior. They only exercised control over that part of Lebanon that they occupied. And the Israelis otherwise never even attempted to exercise such control over Lebanon as would afford them the ability to reshape the political landscape in their favor. To take the best illustration, forget surrounding and shelling Beirut, and simply limit yourself to the occupation of southern Lebanon when that's all that it was. With that the reality, how could Israel ever hope to change the political landscape given that a goodly portion of the landscape was beyond its effective control? And you otherwise saw what happened, which is to say that even if we assumed that the Israelis had managed to convert some of the locals to their brand of politics, those others who were chased out prior would simply return following Israeli withdraw and revert or eliminate the newly converted locals.

Israel does not have the ability or desire to accomplish the necessary end. And I'm not saying that it is Israel's fault since it isn't. You see, the prior history simply refutes the claim of some here that some simply want to grab land. First, if they had had that desire, they would have stayed [both in Lebanon and in the Golan Heights city of Kuneitra]. Second, the goal was otherwise simply to create that buffer that they so desire now. And if you asked, over a stiff drink or ten, you'd probably find some admitting that the prior pullout was a mistake, since it allowed some others to reoccupy and shorten the range.

The Israelis otherwise know their limitations. During the Yom Kippur War, before the Iraqi intervention, which effectively changed Israeli plans with regard to Syria, but before the noted Iraqi intervention, well, the plan was never to take Damascus. They don't have the people that such would require. All they desired to do was to get within artillery range of Damascus so as to be able to use the threat of artillery barrage as leverage in negotiations with Syria. And so too here. They won't get stuck in Lebanon, unless the same is simply to create the space need to put Haifa out of missile range. Conquering Lebanon for purposes of occupation is, as related, beyond both ability and desire. Oh, and before some, not you, get too happy, please note the implication of that, which is, since they cannot effectively occupy all for long, should things ever get too bad, then the war of extermination might become necessary. Oh, and note that we ourselves heard that echo, given that some were heard complaining that, owing to shock and awe, the Iraqi army simply evaporated and so we didn't get the chance to exterminate some before they could become insurgents.

As you can see, we are in a different position in Iraq, since we can, theoretically, control the entire nation and so afford ourselves the occasion to reshape the politics of the nation in our favor. And the military minded won't like this, but again, we won't win this war by use of that M4, which is not to say that the M4 won't have a role to play, only that, as I've related here prior, we win when we and the Iraqi people emerge on the same side of the fight. And so we've already won the war insofar as Kurdish populated territory is concerned [well, we've won it but can always lose it].

I think that we otherwise need change our tactics. I'd spend less time tracking everybody down, and more time securing the borders. And why we waste our time asking Syria to do so simply boggles my mind.

Let me interrupt both you and me. The Syrians are in rough spot, and Assad Jr. is proving that he's not the smartest potato. As I posted on that other thread, we have this war because Hezbollah and Syria don't want the Syrian regime to fall as a result of some being charged and convicted for their role in Rafik Hariri's assassination. And so they drag Israel into it, and that so (1) the relevant UN body won't be able to do its job with bombs raining down and (2) the largely ignorant of the true state of affairs Arab/Muslim world will have the knee-jerk anti-Jewish/Israeli attitude, and so (3) some others, more than a few in the EU, will play the role of abject coward afraid of oil embargo and conduct policy accordingly.

But if our man in Damascus was a smarter brand of potato, say one of those from Idaho, he would have realized that our history teaches us that deals can be made with murderers. We just did so with our man in Libya, ole Moammar Ghaddafi. So why not Assad Jr.? Just get out of Lebanon, stay out, and police your border with Iraq by way of keeping the undesirable from entering Iraq, and what do you know, we forget about any Hariri related prosecution and we talk with our more secular new friends, and some Sunnis, in Iraq, and try to come up with a plan that allows for fair Sunni representation, for fair Shia representation, and fair sharing of resources for both, but not for a mullah theocracy along the lines of Iran. But alas, with Assad Jr., the cry is, if he only had that brain. You see, Assad Jr., if he survives the Hariri assassination aftermath, is otherwise in danger of being nearly surrounded. And here's where the blinding hatred of all things Israel is rather counterproductive. But posit that Iraq goes the way of mullah ruled Iran, i.e., the Shia in Iraq take over and establish their Islamic state with the mullahs running the show. Then say Hezbollah does the same in Lebanon. Then say some finally succed in their effort to overthrow the Hashemite regime in Jordan and install their hoped for Islamic Republic. Now look at a map and see where a secular Ba'athist Syria would be. And so Assad Sr.'s effort to crush that which is most dreaded by way of crushing Hama and letting it serve as the example to others would all go to waste. And as I said on that other thread, Assad Jr. ought to sooner, rather than later, realize that, in the end, Lebanon boils down to a battle between the secularists and the Islamists. And why he wouldn't want the US ...AND... Israel as allies in that struggle simply defies description [and we can be covert and not overt allies, at least if the NY Times shuts up]. Things were different when Syria ran the show in Lebanon, but with Syria gone, Hezbollah, while still on the leash, has more room for manuever and their goal is that Islamic state. And as some are so fond of saying, and I'm among them, Hezbollah only need gain the reins once, and then keep them by way of a rather authoritarian and repressive state.

Now back to Iraq, I'd secure the borders, since as I've said here on AD before, if they have 100 mortars, then they have 100 mortars. And as soon as they expend them, they'll need more. So we need box them in. The box can be large, provided our interdiction effort is sincere. Someone otherwise need come up with that list of all those things that one can use to make explosive devices, and ban import of the same. And so on and so forth. The insurgency will, of course, be just that much easier to deal with when they've only spitballs to shoot at us. And that's where the impatience comes in. Since we not only should have done that a while back, such would also require some time before we see the return on our investment. And that's the problem with just killing these people. I mean, given that the press and news in the Arab/Muslim world is so distorted such that some do indeed genuinely think, and from the portrait that some have allowed to be painted, justifiably so, that we are indeed the "great Satan," we kill some and all that happens is some others come into country and join the Crusade in their stead. And back to Assad Sr. and Hama. Not policy and practice for the entire country, but we send the same message. We brutally crush some and we build some others up and improve their condition. And then we say, that's the choice. Choose wisely. And only the loon and the malignant would choose death over improved living condition.

Now back to the Isaelis and Lebanon. The attitude of some is obviously not so pleasant now, but the propaganda war isn't anywhere near over yet. We ought not expect kind word for the Israelis while Israeli bombs are raining down and some need take flight. But if the propaganda is handled well, and some rather valuable assistance comes from some in the Arab/Muslim world, then the message will eventually sink that the whole thing was a Syrian plot to escape liablity for Hariri and otherwise regain its control over Lebanon. That won't sit well with a goodly number of Lebanese.

Now back to Iraq. First item, I think that we need to get out and walk more. Those vehicles are only RPG magnets. And tank fights tank and not so much the infantry soldier. And we need take out that plot and look to see just how we might resupply. As you can imagine, the less time on the road, the less occasion for attack. So too with people, I mean, easier to secure the desert than the city. And we might also consider night resupply by parachute [so unless they have the necessary equipment, kind of hard to interdict us]. So I would look for the shortest possible route, taking into account the increased risk coming from the more populated areas, and I'd not have a number of routes, but only a few, and I'd secure them, sincerely so. And if that requires that we post a squad of six every so many thousands of yards, then we do so. And we get ready to pound, rather quickly so, those who would attack that secured line of transport. And as I said, to the extent that we can resupply by air by parachute at night, we do so. And, of course, it's a different route every night, to reduce the window of our vulnerability.

And then, while this would expose more of us to more risk of death, we also thin out to spread out. As you can imagine, well, let me put it this way, in the Red River Delta in what we might think of as north Vietnam, the French held effective control by day, but not by night. And you can see why, since one sees more during the day than at night, both on the ground and from the air. And since the French did not have enough men, they couldn't possibly hope to control the same territory during the night as they did during the day. And so, as the late Bernard Fall so aptly wrote, night fell over the Red River Delta, and the night belonged to the Viet Minh. We might have to concede some areas, but with the help of our Iraqi allies, we could do a much better job of thinning out by way of spreading out and thereby be able to more continuously exercise just that much more control.

And that big unit mentality, well, who can blame some? I mean, as I said, safety in numbers, even if falsely so. And then who wants to have to explain the desecrated corpses of those soldiers who were swallowed up by the insurgency the night before. And that risk obviously increases when we thin out to spread out. And it isn't just generals who don't want to have to do the explaining, since just ask Slick Willie how he enjoyed having to explain the desecration in Somalia.

And that's another important item. The will of those of us here at home. We can't care that they desecrate our dead. Well, we can care, but not when it comes to deciding whether we wish to remain at war. And in that same respect, we also have to be willing to accept the loss of squad of six every now and again. And pity that some in the antiwar crowd simply cannot see the self-defeating nature of their reporting, in that the continual harping over our dead only serves to increase the hesitancy to accomplish the necessary exposure such that we might ultimately prevail and otherwise not lose more people in the long term.

And, lastly, for now at least, we spread out not only for purposes of expanding our effective control, but also so that we might send a rather crucial message. I mean, it's nice that we have people going around asking the local mukhtar and others of import what we can do for them, etc., but let us please not send the same message that we did in Vietnam, and the French before us. We simply cannot succeed by making our rounds and then returning to base, leaving the locals friendly to us at the mercy of the insurgency. We need stay with them and share their fate. We need expose ourselves to the very same danger that we are asking them to assume. Such will have the wholly salutory purpose of not only proving our sincerity, but also, and again, proving that we are not otherwise asking them to run any risk that we aren't ourselves prepared to accept. And with that living together, also comes our putting a more human, and not M4, face on our efforts in Iraq. My understanding is that we are indeed doing such in certain limited instances. We need to do more. We've otherwise lost some good people because we haven't. Can't recall his name, but there was that Sunni tribal leader, unique soul that he was, who was pro US. Since we didn't stay with him, some were able to more easily kidnap him for purposes of execution. And so we need send the message that even if we can't always succeed, that we will nonetheless risk death to protect our friends. And this will work particularly well in this context, given my prior remark here on AD noting with admiration the overwhelming hospitality shown one's guest, since it isn't just hospitality, but the accompanying duty to also protect one's guest. So the roles are mutually supporting, and they are otherwise supposed to protect us, even if they don't necessarily like us so much [since one always protects one's guest, and so never let it be said that we failed to do so, or we might have to hit you with that shoe]. And as is otherwise obvious, the more humane the human contact, the more the sense of our shared humanity, which can only help win this war.

Sorry, one more. To the extent possible, we DON'T want to do any urban fighting. So in addition to our more national interdiction effort, we have some others for the more common and more obvious entry points for Iraq's cities.

And truly lastly for tonight, it can work, look at Israel. If the Israelis can put the clamp on some, not perfect, but livable, then we can do likewise. And we have the advantage of being able to say something that the Israelis cannot, to wit, that we support a truly indigenous government, elected by the people, that we are simply trying to help get up, running, and secure, and as soon as such occurs, then we can go home but see you again while on holiday leave.

Military training is based around threat overall. So is the development of equipment and thusly the relation between the two.

One of the weapon systems that was in development was a 20mm smart munition. basically you laze an area, the munitions travels that distance then explodes, maybe over cover or around a corner basically, that would be cool. Today’s soldier has the .50 cal. A nice and successful weapon, but the reality is more would be nice for an urban environment. Then you have the mk-19, a fully automatic 40mm grenade launcher, that would be nice for in the field or when you really need to destroy an enemy, the problem with a 40mm grenade launcher that happens to be fully auto is even a slight tap will shoot around three rounds, the ability to create damage not only to non combatants but your own troops in an urban environment with that weapon is high, though i guess it could help to break contact if you wanted it for that purpose.

M4 rifles are nice, you can hold them like a handgun really, but it will never be more then just a rifle that is prone to errors, more so in a dusty environment, and overall that weapon system is simply just prone to errors period, unlike the ak-47 which can be used on a regular basis without the soldier having to worry or react to failure in a bad time, also the ak in close range can punch through six inches of a tree and kill the guy using it for cover.

This is all relatively pointless to the subject at hand though. What would be nice is a vehicle, that can carry troops and or supplies, something inbtween a bradly and an abrams really. so troops could operate from it, and be dropped off or picked up as needed without the fact of worrying about rpg or ied simply blowing that idea out of the water. I have talked to many troops myself and the tactics the enemy runs is basically to simply hit where they will get results. Convoys of hummers even with added armor happen to be just that, troops that have to rely on not only current weapons but tactics in an open urban environment, which is the worse or most dangerous, happen to be just that. When soldiers can actually rid an area of non combatants, you dont have to enter into that fray, you can fire missiles into it really, but with the urban environment of not being able to obtain pid makes that option is not always open to you. Simply put I imagine the war in Iraq would be much different if for one convoy attacks were basically null to non existent and we had troops that had tactics and training to match the environment overall, I would go as far to say the war would be something completely different. It would make the enemy lose moral and it would save much of our own troops moral from generating a different conflict in which our forces were able to be superior in the environment. Training for such an environment needs to be done in a ground roots fashion, from basic training almost so its instinctual, and troops know how to react and what is a safe and logical decision giving the many situations or variables that can be taken into account.

In Afghanistan our troops our doing much better because our army or total force as it was designed can actually come to bear. The leadership there has been able to take advantage of this and we have much better footing with the locals. We need to develop a force that is able to make that reality real giving the modern situation of today as it relates to the most likely environment troops will come to face, I mean the US is only fighting a global war on terror, so lets make a force that was designed to conduct a global war on terror then.

The urban environment the US troop is most likely to see today giving the methods of our enemy is more or less an attrition war and react to ambush, it does not have to stay like this.

I'd have to say absolutely not on both counts. First of all, we all know the US is the strongest power in the world. Much if not most of that power stems from something as simple as one aircraft carrier, the deliverers of US omnipotence. The US has the most power in the conventional sense. But that's useless against an unorthodox i.e. weaker enemy. Since they can't hope to defeat the US in a confrontative military engagement, they use the old stand-by i.e. tactical hit-and-run attacks. Here's an interesting tidbit. The US spent billions developing the 'indestructible' Abrams tank. Each one costs in the tens of millions of dollars. So what did the Russians do? Rather than trying to keep up with the US and developing a tank of their own, they invested their time and money into something that would knock out the Abrams. The Kornet anti-tank missiles.

You did not define “who’s” weaponry. The US has the best weaponry for war of any kind including urban conflict. In a nutshell accuracy and scalability of response is key to keeping down civilian deaths and reducing “collateral damage”. No one is better in this regard than the US. In WWII and even Vietnam bombers would have to drop hundreds of bombs over a wide area to destroy a target. Now we can single out a structure, bridge etc and kill it with one or two bombs with little collateral damage. That said there is really no way to fight this type of war with any assurance of no civilian deaths especially when the enemy specifically uses civilians as human shields. This despicable practice is common in the middle east. We see it now in Lebanon where the terrorists block roads to prevent civilians from getting to safety!


Yes. Although it makes the job harder when you enemy shoots at you from behind women and children