1. Do you agree or disagree with the legal aspects of the ruling? Why?I think this ruling ignores precedent, even as it cites it. There are cases very, very similar to this one involving warrantless
domestic surveillance, which the Courts have ruled are within the Executive's national security burden.
First off, there is the matter of standing. Have the plaintiffs demonstrated that they have personally been harmed by this program? I don't think they have. Sure, they assert that they have been harmed: shady overseas contacts (sorry, "individuals who have alleged connections with terrorist organizations") won't communicate with them over the phone or internet. But, they do not know if they have been the subject of a warrantless wiretap. It is not sufficient to assert potential harm or future harm--the party must be harmed and harmed specifically by the government action in question. I don't think the plaintiffs have met that burden. In fact, under the state secrets doctrine, the government is not forced to admit (or deny) that the plaintiffs have been, are, or will be monitored.
The judge here does some real legal gymnastics:
QUOTE
In arguing that the injuries are not constitutionally cognizable, Defendants rely heavily on the case of Laird v. Tatum.
<snip>
The Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ efforts to rest standing upon the mere “chill” that the program cast upon their
associational activities. It said that the “jurisdiction of a federal court may [not] be invoked by a
complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere
existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity.”
Laird, however, must be distinguished here. The plaintiffs in Laird alleged only that they could conceivably become subject to the Army’s domestic surveillance program. (Citations omitted) The Plaintiffs here are not merely alleging that they “could conceivably” become subject to surveillance under the TSP, but that continuation of the TSP has damaged them. The President indeed has publicly acknowledged that the types of calls Plaintiffs are making are the types of conversations that would be subject to the TSP.
Huh? Where have the plaintiffs proven that they are subjects of the TSP? Has that been proven, or merely alleged?
The judge continues:
QUOTE
This court agrees with Plaintiffs’ position that “standing here does not rest on the TSP’s ‘mere existence, without more.’” The Plaintiffs in this case are not claiming simply that the Defendants’ surveillance has “chilled” them from making international calls to sources and clients. Rather, they claim that Defendants’
surveillance has chilled their sources, clients, and potential witnesses from communicating with
them. The alleged effect on Plaintiffs is a concrete, actual inability to communicate with witnesses,
sources, clients and others without great expense which has significantly crippled Plaintiffs, at a
minimum, in their ability to report the news and competently and effectively represent their clients.
Can this judge read her own writing? The judge admits that it is an "alleged effect" i.e. not proven. And she claims that it is not the program's "mere existence" but is "more". What "more"? Where's the "more" if the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have actually been surveiled?
Second, there is the separation of powers reasoning that I have gone over before. The Constitution gives national security responsibility to the President and not to Congress or the Courts. The other branches cannot interfere with this authority. Fleming v. Page (1850): [the President may] "employ [the Nation's armed forces] in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy." There has been a de facto declaration of war against terrorists (the AUMF), making terrorist an "enemy" of the United States. The Courts (except maybe this one) have been very reluctant to impede this fundamental duty of the President.
Next: warrantless searches are used all the time by the government. As in: every single day.
Warrantless Searches of Americans? That’s Shocking!In Katz v. United States (1967) the Supreme Court ruled that warrants were needed for criminal prosecutions, but were not needed in national security situations:
QUOTE
[This case] involves the delicate question of the President's power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval.
<snip>
[T]he instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country.
<snip>
We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.
In
United States v. Truong (1980):
QUOTE
The defendants raise a substantial challenge to their convictions by arguing that the surveillance conducted by the FBI violated the Fourth Amendment and that all the evidence uncovered through that surveillance must consequently be suppressed. As has been stated, the government did not seek a warrant for the eavesdropping on Truong’s phone conversations or the bugging of his apartment. Instead, it relied upon a “foreign intelligence” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. In the area of foreign intelligence, the government contends, the President may authorize surveillance without seeking a judicial warrant because of his constitutional prerogatives in the area of foreign affairs.
<snip>
For several reasons, the needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would, following [United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)], “unduly frustrate” the President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities. First of all, attempts to counter foreign threats to the national security require the utmost stealth, speed and secrecy. A warrant requirement would add a procedural hurdle that would reduce the flexibility of executive foreign intelligence activities, in some cases delay executive response to foreign intelligence threats, and increase the chance of leaks regarding sensitive executive operations.
Even lawyers who disagree with the NSA program think that this ruling is
"not just ill-reasoned, but rhetorically ill-conceived."Even the Washington Post has blasted the legal reasoning here:
A Judicial Misfire: The first federal court opinion on warrantless NSA surveillance is full of sound and fury.QUOTE
THE NATION would benefit from a serious, scholarly and hard-hitting judicial examination of the National Security Agency's program of warrantless surveillance. The program exists on ever-more uncertain legal ground; it is at least in considerable tension with federal law and the Bill of Rights. Careful judicial scrutiny could serve both to hold the administration accountable and to provide firmer legal footing for such surveillance as may be necessary for national security.
Unfortunately, the decision yesterday by a federal district court in Detroit, striking down the NSA's program, is neither careful nor scholarly, and it is hard-hitting only in the sense that a bludgeon is hard-hitting. The angry rhetoric of U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor will no doubt grab headlines. But as a piece of judicial work -- that is, as a guide to what the law requires and how it either restrains or permits the NSA's program -- her opinion will not be helpful.
Didn't think I'd ever agree with the Post's editorial board.
2. This will inevitably go to the Supreme Court, how do you think they will rule?I believe this will be overturned at the Appellate level, making a Supreme Court decision unlikely. If the Supreme Court does take it, they will affirm the reversal.