QUOTE(nebraska29 @ Oct 13 2006, 09:24 PM)

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That information is over a year old.
This might be a little more up-to-date. It's a Qa'eda document found in Zarqawi's hideout after he was taken out:
There is also a letter where it is stated that it is in their interest
to have our presence in Iraq continue as it helps in recruitment and in being popular with the people.
For one thing, that letter is from December '05, although admittedly, I don't know the date of the letter found in Zarqawi's hideout. More significantly, however, the letter you cite was written far from Iraq, in Pakistan. The author therefore may not have as solid an understanding of the facts on the ground as Zarqawi's associates would. The letter itself (which, by the way, can be read in its entirety
here) acknowledges this, by saying "Forgive us also if our conception of your situation there and your circumstances is lacking and unclear, for this is possible and not unlikely, especially with the disruption that exists and the loss of communications."
Basically, the letter is far more pie-in-the-sky than the letter found in Zarqawi's pad. The basic gist of it all (once you've finished trudging through all the excess Islamic verbiage of the "brief" letter

) is that Zarqawi shouldn't be overzealous about going after local Sunnites. The author was trying to soothe Zarqo's apprehensions by assuring him that remaining "steadfast" would work out in the long term, but he didn't really back up his assessment in any meaningful way. It sounded much more like wishful thinking than anything else. Nothing at all like the sober, detailed assessment found in Zarqo's tent.
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Given the fact that civilian killings in Iraq have tripled since february and is at an
all-time high, I'd say that the latter interpretation is a more accurate one and that the former one was pointing out some drawbacks that they experiencing, rather than a statement of imminent defeat and doom.
True the former letter wasn't a statement of imminent defeat, but it definitely had a bit of a doomful feel about it when it referred to "the current bleak situation". As for the increase in deaths, that's not an indication of things going badly from a strategic perspective. Deaths in WWII went way up following D-Day, but that didn't mean we were starting to lose. I don't mean to trivialize these deaths. But in war, they can never be viewed in isolation, but always in comparison to how things would be if we didn't fight.
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He goes on to list, among other things, reinforcing Iraqi forces, arresting insurgents on a massive scale, having a good PR campaign in Iraq (although Zarqawi's declared war on "democracy" probably did that job pretty well for us), causing the insurgency to lose support internationally, and "taking advantage of the resistance's mistakes and magnifying them in order to misinform" (snicker). I heartily recommend reading the whole thing.
Yeah, Zarqawi is taken to task for killing Iraqi muslims, something which is making them look bad. That completely backs my assertion that when we leave, killing fellow Muslims won't win them popularity contests. As a matter of fact, it's creating problems for them that are to our benefit, though limited due to our continued presence.
I understand your point, but there's also an additional consideration. If we leave, the local population will have less firepower and expertise to deal with the terrorists. I agree that it's better to get local Iraqis involved in the fight, but if that can be done without us leaving, then can you agree that that would be the best option? And it looks right now that it's being done without us leaving. Iraqis seem to be waking up to the fact that they don't have anything to fear from us.
Mostly, I suspect, what a given Iraqi fears the most with regard to us is what his neighbors would think if he was seen as being in any way on the side of the Americans. But once he begins to figure out that his neighbors have as little problem with the Americans as he does, that fear will subside. It's like when a group of people are sitting around a table discussing something, and they all have the same "taboo" thought about the matter, but nobody wants to be the first one to actually say it out loud. But then someone gets bold enough to actually do so, and everybody breathes a sigh of relief and says, "You know, I was thinking the same thing!" It looks to me like that process is going on in Iraq right now.
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In other words, he was caught with his foot in his mouth bigtime. The fact that he had earlier been making comments that go well beyond his area of operations ("I don't say that the difficulties we are experiencing round the world are caused by our presence in Iraq but undoubtedly our presence in Iraq exacerbates them.") shows that he may not have been entirely unbiased politically.
So his comment our presence doesn't "exacerbate" the problem does
not mesh with the NIE report, the desire of Al-Qaeda to have our continued presence, the all-time high death rate, not to mention low public opinion polls right? He was stating that as the situation currently stands, we cannot endure indefinitely. Blair is more critical of the general's insight, but what does he know? Is he on the ground? No, he's an insulated politician.
Nor is Dannatt on the ground "round the world". I'd say Blair does have a more global view of that situation than Dannatt does. My point is that by commenting on areas far outside his bailiwick, the General impeaches his own impartiality. As regards the place where he is on the ground, in Basra, his final "clarified" statements are that his troops' presence is not provoking problems among the locals.
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The Iraqi people know what's best for Iraq. No matter what the reason, we should let them decide the matter. Our continued presence inspite of their wishes shows a lack of regard for them and their future. We are hardly protecting them because they are afraid to fight back.
Yes, we should let them decide the matter, through their elected representatives, not through polls. In the meantime, they're beginning to lose their fear of fighting back against what they know is their real enemy.
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As for the native population, it really looks as though their tolerance for aQ is already thinning quite considerably.
It's started yes, but is limited by our presence. It's like having two dogs on your porch that you don't like. Which do you get rid of first? Or do you simply watch them go at it and then do something? It's quite the quandary.
But if your only reason for not liking the first dog is an unfounded fear that he's making the second dog worse, and if you get over that fear enough to see that the first dog (who by the way, had just finished getting rid of a much meaner dog than either of them who'd been terrorizing you for years) will help get rid of the second dog, then what?