QUOTE(Dontreadonme @ Sep 8 2007, 11:19 PM)

Partitioning the countryside doesn't pose as much of a challenge, but how to partition Baghdad? Neither Shia nor Sunni would accept any partition plan without having rights and access to Baghdad.
I don't really see it happening as a result of any "plan". I see it simply happening, as in, like, right now, as we type. Sunnite and Shi'ite are separating (or being separated) from each other, physically.
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The city's infrastructure is not evenly divided throughout the city, and the fact that Shia and Sunni mosques dot the city like 7-11 Stores, only compound the problem. If the country (and Baghdad) is partitioned, one must still deal with policing buffer zones, controlling checkpoints, regulating fair water and power usage, and the dispersion of oil revenues. And that's not even delving into the issue of armed groups on either side, with Iran supplying the Shia, Turkey finally invading Kurdistan, and AQI or other nationalist groups in the Sunni territory. Barring a massive involvement by the UN or other entity, we would have to police the entire country (sound familiar?) without the benefit of a somewhat reliable and marginally competent Iraqi Army.
However daunting something like this may seem, I can't see how it would be any more daunting than the current situation, with Sunnites and Shi'ites all meshed together generally. If anything, it would be all around less daunting. There would be less opportunity for guerrilla warfare as the two sides become separated from each other. Particular areas would come under the more solid control of particular groups, which would make it easier to hold them accountable for what goes on in their respective turfs. Patrolling could be focused more on just the boundary areas between them, rather than all throughout the country. This could be done with fewer troops, and perhaps even with a multinational force of some kind replacing U.S. troops.
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Sunni groups are arming themselves not so much in conjunction with American operations or to stave off our withdrawal, but in preparation for our withdrawal.
Actually I don't think any of those is the case. I think their main motivation, apart from a genuine antipathy towards al-Qa'ida itself, it to end Coalition presence by removing the main draw, which is AQI. As
these two articles indicate, these fighters had been members of the insurgency up till recently.
QUOTE(DaytonRocker @ Sep 9 2007, 09:49 AM)

The number of Al Qaida in Iraq is minuscule and they have nothing to do with the ones that were state sponsored and flew airplanes into our buildings. The war supporters need to magnify this bogeyman to justify this invasion and occupation.
That the number of fighters directly answerable to AQI represents a small percentage of the overall insurgency is acknowledged all around. But where are you getting the idea that they have nothing to do with the rest of al-Qa'ida?
First of all, the ISG treats them as a very serious threat, so to claim that this is just Bush propaganda is itself just propaganda. On top of which, AQI in constant communication with the main Qa'ida group, and despite their small numbers, they've been able to carry out the most spectacular attacks, which would suggest a fairly high degree of outside support and organization. So whatever their exact relation is to the main group, what's clear is that they have similarly ambitious goals, and they appear to be (or at least to have been, prior to the "failed" surge) making themselves well-positioned to carry them out.
So what evidence do you have to argue against this? I mean, other than some commentator dismissing it all as some "Bushco neo-con-job" or something.