Question for debate:
Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?

Right now, Bush is in a lose-lose position. If he withdraws troops from Bagdad, he loses his base completely and will certainly be viewed in history as a failed president. On the flip side, he can't get enough troops to actually make a difference in salvaging Iraq. There is literally nothing he can do.

But the third option is the best for him - pin the loss on someone else. Announce your plan for victory knowing the democrats will kill any plan that involves escalating the war and putting more targets between the Sunnis and Shi'ites. And when that plan gets killed, what do you do? Tell America the democrats are soft on terror, tell America you can't fight a war because the democrats won't let him, and tell America we are less safe because of defunding "the central front on the war on terror".

Bush will use the "it's not my fault" excuse to defend the loss in Iraq. And if he frames the debate and takes control of it, the democrats will suffer big. If we get hit with a terror attack between now and Nov 2008, America might hand the keys to the house back to the republicans.

In my opinion, the democrats have already taken the bait and not left themselves a very effective out.

Plan or ploy?

Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?

If it doesnt work, it will hurt him, so if he doesn't think it will work, it makes no political sense for him. Thus one must assume he thinks theres a chance that it might succeed.

Many people are acclaiming this as a "we'll I can't think of anything else to do" plan.

I am pretty sure it won't succeed in any significant sense. It may increase the holding capacity of the army, but not enough to end the game of "wacka mole" I should think. Especially since it sounds like these troops are going mostly to Bagdad? 20,0000 just ain't enough, and of course he can't get funding for much more.

Democrats basically want to pressure the Iraqi government into doing whats neccessary to resolve the secular disputes, by starting a phased withdrawal. There is a very good chance that wouldn't work...leaving would likely motivate factions to consolidate their power for self defense...maybe it would provoke overtures, I don't know, I shirk to imagine the potential consequences if there no effective ones.

To quote Obama "We face with a quagmire to which there are no good solutions". There probably no way to salvage the bad situation we face, but leaving it would be a catastrophe.

I would not want to be the President of the United States right now. I agree with you that the situation in Iraq is pretty much a no-win situation. Every possible choice of action seems like a bad one. It's hard to see what is the least of many evils.

What really disturbs me is that there is some indication that many military leaders -- the people who actually have to run the war -- are not in agreement with the idea of a "surge."

Link



I cannot read the mind of the President, but I hope this is less of a cynical attempt to avoid blame, and more of an act of desperation when faced with an impossible situation.

Victoria I think there is, as you would expect, more than one opinion in the military about this issue. The quote below is from the same article.

I see the change of commanders there as a way of getting a fresh look at the problems. One comment I have heard from commanders and foot soldiers is than many in the Military feel our “Rules of Engagement” need to change because they are effectively being used against us. While some blast us for killing even one civilian the enemy regularly uses Mosques and civilians to cover themselves preventing soldiers from getting to them. I will bet that cleaning out Sader City will be a nightmare if it can even be done with current ROE


Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, split with the administration in the spring of 2003 over the planned size of the occupation force, which he regarded as too small.

Im not sure why it would be disturbing to disagree with some military leaders that are "actually" running the war in Iraq, more like a breath of fresh air because they are obviously not doing a very good job.

I believe it is a legitimate plan that needs to be implemented in conjuction with the Iraqi government. Not only are US troops being retained and redeployed quicker for this plan but thousands of the Iraqi governments own forces are being deployed to different area's and I can only hope they are sending the most competent and reliable troops they have. They also need to be given full authority to do whatever is neccessary. None of this tip toing around the bad guys because you might make someone angry.

What Iraq needs to quell the violence is permanent troops on the streets period. There's no other magickal way to do it without the grunt work of security.

It's not a question of will more troops work, it's a question of how many. If we leave now we'll just be back later.

I think the "duh" in this entire plan lies in the stupidity of the premise in the first place- simple math.

We had, at our peak of the occupation, 165k troops+ or - a couple thou, with the "surge" they will now have 155k troops- at least 10k less than we have had there before.

So how in the heck is this surge supposed to work when 165k didn't work before? Um, "DUH".

CR, your post and 'Duh's' only address the number of troops, not the tactical plan itself. There is no reason to believe at face value that it will fail based solely on your simple math.
I have no doubt that politics played a large role in Bush's plan, but the plan itself can work. Will it work? We'll see. I for one, would much rather debate you on why specifically the plan cannot work, rather than compare numbers.

Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?

It's not a political stunt, and it's not a plan that could possibly work, either. It's an attempt to ensure that George Bush won't have be the one who admits defeat. Give him two more years, and by then, he'll be out of office. Then he and his diminishing band of supporters will have the luxury of saying that if only Jon Edwards, or whoever happens to be president then, had only tried as hard to win as they did, "victory" would've been inevitably achieved.

It is starkly obvious that the perpetrators of the Iraq war never believed that it was about the security of the United States. If they had, they would've called for sufficient national sacrifice necessary to expand the army and send the 300,000-400,000 troops necessary to do the job. There would've been a draft, and steeply increased taxes to pay for it all. But no, it was always war on the cheap; war without sacrifice except for the saps unlucky enough to be in uniform or stupid enough to believe that they should sign up and Save America from Terror. Except for the unlucky few to have children or spouses in uniform, there has been no sacrifice from ordinary citizens, beyond the cost of one of those magnetic yellow ribbon thingies that you stick on your tailgate. It has been war based on utter ignorance of Iraqi society, and the false assumption that Iraqis would hail us as their saviors from the brutal Saddam. There was scant understanding that Saddam Hussein, for all his brutality, actually stood for something important to many Iraqis.

And it was all forseen by us anti-war people, you know? I stood on the street corners of my home town here in Ohio on several successive Saturdays leading up to the war, with several hundred other folks from this particular corner of our city, and held up signs against it, and plenty of people honked their horns in favor. And I debated some deluded "patriotic" counter-demonstraters who were there, saying pretty much exactly what I am saying now. Except that the debate then was more focussed on weapons of mass destruction. I remember saying, "You BELIEVE that they have those things!?" And they said, "Yeah, and Bush has better intelligence about it than YOU do, so who do you think we believe?" How times do change! But I remember thinking that these particular idiots weren't alive for Vietnam, so they don't know that the U.S. government ALWAYS lies when it wants to go bash some little country somewhere.

But I also remember saying, "You know, war is terrible and unpredictable. If you unleash he dogs of war, you never know what you'll get." James Webb even predicted a long insurgency. But no, it was going to be a glorious display of fireworks followed by a flower-drenched parade.

Well, now that the aquarium has been turned into fish soup, there's no way to turn it back into an aquarium again. There is no popular support for escalation, and the situation in Iraq is a disaster. George Bush's war has been a miserable failure. After four years of fighting, the insurgency is stronger than ever. There is no government of Iraq that has any power outside the Green Zone. The Iraqi infrastructure remains in ruins, though half-hearted and poorly-overseen attempts rebuild it have enriched several U.S. corporations. There are 3,000 dead U.S. troops and many more terribly wounded, and something on the order of 100,000 dead Iraqis. And there is no sign of anything getting any better.

I really cannot believe that there are people here, like "Donttreadonme," who think the burden of proof should be on those who oppose this paltry little increase in forces, to show that it cannot work. What, when several successive Administration plans haven't worked, not to mention the glorious war itself, who should have the burden of proof? The real question is not whether we should allow George Bush to have this face-saving little delay, but how best to withdraw the forces we already have in Iraq.

No more American sons and daughters should have to die or be wounded, merely to postpone our nation's facing facts in Iraq until George Bush is out of office.

You may, or may not have noticed, that the question for THIS debate thread is about the recent plan to secure Baghdad. You're eloquent post is largely off topic. But let me break it down for you like this: the plan has already been laid out. You are free to poo-poo it, but you like others have not answered why it won't work. Thus since the plan is out for dissemination, the burden does rest upon you if you desire to prove it's ineffectiveness.
Now, I don't know if it will work, and niether do you, but at least I am prepared to debate it on it's merit's, not fall back on the same script that has been recited over and over and over.......

Yes, I did indeed assume that what was being debated here NOW was something of relevance now, namely, the "Surge." But it's is ironic that we had before people saying, "PROVE the plan to defend Baghdad won't work," who now say, "PROVE the 'Surge' won't work." Who the blazes should have the burden of proof, after four years of disaster and failed plans?

And as for "reading from a script that has been recited over and over," the point is, this is pretty much what we anti-war people have been saying since BEFORE THE WAR, while the Administration and its defenders have offered a series of shifting rationales for the war and a series of highly-touted and poorly thought-out plans to win it.

You know, when you have the facts on your side, you DO tend to point to them again and again. Especially when the other side is off in Cloud-Cuckoo Land with plans to win the war by turning around three times and whistling. Our people are dying over there, you know?? And by All-Seeing Zeus, there should be a better reason for keeping them there than, "Prove to me this won't work!" Especially when it's very obvious that the real reason for the continued dying is to save George Bush's face.

You are correct in one regard, the burden of proof rests on the Bush Administration. Whether or not the plan will work will be known when it reaches completion, either in success or failure. I've already stated numerous times, that I (nor you for that matter) knows whether or not we will meet with success or not.
I am left wondering how you can be so convinced, without even taking into account the merits or pitfalls of the plan. So much of your previous post is filled with statements that I agree with, yet you single me out as carrying the banner for Bush, and rely on generalities to make your case. Believe me when I say this, the administrations handling of the war has gone sour ever since the replacement of Jay Garner with Bremer. So many mistakes have been made, it's almost hard to count them. We have clearly been our own worst enemy in Iraq.
But at least with this plan, there has been some thought to all aspects of the fight; civil, military and political.
I completely understand your desire for full and expeditious withdrawl, and essentially I want the same thing. I just happen to believe that plan for Baghdad has a chance of working.

Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?
Plan or ploy?

I think the general consensus around is that the current situation isn't working. In the past, Bush has insisted that the generals on the ground in Iraq have not requested more troops.

As others have pointed out, the cynic can say that Bush is simply using this for political advantage (to win in '08??). The optimist would say he's trying something.

Of course, both are probably partially right. Bush needed to do something and this is a good time to do it with the Democrats rhetoric on insisting on justifications for all increases in funding.

Of course, the real question is whether or not this will turn the tide in Iraq. That is yet to be seen.

Vladimir- DTOM is no GW apologist- that is why he has credibility here- the only folks that have 0 credibility in this debate are those that STILL think he is doing the right thing and always have, and it is the liberals that is causing GW horrific failures

That being said- I don't think it will work, because it is primarily a face saving attempt, because the ISG report's recommendations are along the lines of "I told you so" for many folks.

At this point- I believe we could double the number of American troops, even triple it, and it would have no real effect on the outcome at this point, with the plan as he has it now.

In fact, I believe that the Americans are so provocative to the general pop that any plan that relies on US force, with some backhanded reference to turning over the country to others (eventually) is doomed to fail.

If anything, we need to get other countries to pony up- and the only way to do that is do an end run around GW, which I don''t think is possible- GW has turned out to be the most dangerous man on the planet- for Americans and foreigners.

I believe the only way to start to turn the tide is to really rub GWs face in the dirt on the global scene.

We need to repudiate him like we wish the Islamic leaders would repudiate violence. The fact that our nation doesn't literally hang GW makes it very hard for us to stand up and say "Why do you allow these poeple to operate in your midst" (meaning allowing terrorists to live amongst them) - I think one of the MAIN underlying cause of the problems now in Iraq is highlighted occasionally on this board- that, one US soldier is worth 10k Iraqi lives, that we are making Iraq pay for our 3k dead by killing 600k of them- even though they had nothing to do with it, from Saddam on down.

This is a war, not as much as force, as about making friends and influencing poeple- and that part is a definate failure.

We are trying to use a military solution to solve a societal problem here- don't you agree? It is thier SOCIETY that we are fighting- NOT thier army. They have a limitless number of recruits- and, I understand that portions of this plan involve (finally) training the military in the customs and language and what not- but it is too little, too late. Had this been done from the begining, perhaps things would have been different- but the damage is done now.

And the ISG report certainly adressed this issue better.



That is why I posted on the "what now" thread on the dems taking power is to force Bush to use the ISG plan- when GW said "they don't have a plan"- that is a straight up damnable lie- there is a fantastic plan- the ISG report.

It is a political stunt because to use the good plan would show "weakness" by the neo-cons. And one thing a cowardly bully CAN'T do is lose face and appear weak to himself- but being a man and admitting he has been a miserable, idiotic, moronic boob is weakness to a coward.

This is one of the tragedies of this entire debacle, how quickly the Iraq Study group was marginalised, and how quickly those few diehard supporters of the President's policy tried to demonise Baker.

Here we had a bipartisan group dedicated to anylising the various possibilities in Iraq and suggesting possible solutions, yet their report was utterly ignored by the President. The Iraq Study group actually considered the possibility of a troop surge and discounted it as unlikely to succeed.

http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_r...roup_report.pdf

Yet less than three weeks after the Baker report provides its assessment, President Bush proposes a plan completely ignoring it, and one judged by it to be not worthwhile. One disapproved of by the great majority of Americans, and one which most major military commanders and the New secretary of defence have previously said would not work.

To me this is proof that President Bush makes up his mind and refuses to have his opinion altered by facts or reality. He suspected the ISG would give him a blank cheque to increase troops levels, and when it did not he simply ignored it. The ISG, when it was formed, was supposed to be a bright shining hope, finally a non-partisan group actually thinking out possible solutions in Iraq, why had this not been done three years earlier?

Yet when the report was released it was instantly sidelined and ignored by a president who had as little concern for disagreeing opinions as he does for contrary facts.

This really bothers me too. The ISG countenanced specifically against escalation of the type Dubya is now pursuing. Yet, here we are doing just that. The NeoCon contingent is still playing the same "Dems have no plan" song, yet this is patently false. Both the Biden plan of federalizing Iraq and the ISG phased-withdrawal plan are on the table but ignored (of course, the ISG is not a Dem plan).

Anyway, will troop escalation work? I believe that only way it could have worked is if 1-2 years we doubled/tripled the US troop presence in Iraq: 300 to 500 thousand troops. Only then could we have had sufficient numbers as policing operation. Not only is Dubya's plan too little, it is also too late.

I singled you out merely for your insistence, which you continue, that it's up to the detractors of Bush to demonstrates that a very marginal increase in troops, plus some nice-sounding words, will make a difference in Iraq.

As for "a chance" of working, I propose that instead of this plan, we build a great alter to Baal surmounted by a large golden calf, then slaughter 10,000 sheep on it. THAT would "a chance" of working -- Baal might actually exist and be so delighted with his renewed worship that He would grant us victory -- and it would not endanger 20,000 more U.S. troops.

Actually, I do "know" that Bush's plan has no chance of working, in the same way that I "know" sacrificing 10,000 sheep to Baal won't work either. The history of the war has already amply demonstrated the futility of attempting to use military force to impose the desired political order on Iraq. If there is going to be some major structural change in Iraqi politics to change that, then it will bring Bush his much-longed-for victory whether we have 140,000 troops there or 160,000. But if, as I think almost certain, there isn't going to be any such change, then 20,000 troops and some shiny power-point presentations most certainly won't accomplish anything except delaying our withdrawal. We've already had our troops up to 160,000, and what difference did it make?

Really, what is there but a lot of cheerful whistling by the Administration and its supporters, to distinguish this plan? And we've already heard a lot of very similar whistling before.

Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?

It is a plan with a different objective.

The small increase in manpower will not be enough to effect change in any meaningful way unless...the increase is used for reasons other than providing security.

To cut to the chase DR, he is using the ploy of security to goad an attack on Iran.

Part one of Mr. B's plan involves removing the pessimistic dissenters, namely John Abizaid, (a fellow with extensive experience with on the ground operations) and replacing him with William Fallon, a general in the navy with both air and sea experience. Unfortunately General Fallon's skillset does not bring the needed criteria to end this conflict.

I argue, his appointment is a tacit admission that all communications in Iraq have deteriorated to unsalvageable levels

Fallon is precisely the general you would want on hand if you wanted to expand the war into a new territory with a bombing run.

CNN interviews Globalsecurity analyst John Pike who makes a compelling arguement that the use of Patriot missiles are not of any use to a ground based enemy that has no missiles.

Also, Bush's recent address suggests that an attack on Iran or Syria is a real possibility. Joe Scarborough does a piece (wait through commercial) which addresses the most important aspect of this tread, the attacking of an Iranian consulate with recognized military forces at the same time the CIA gets the green light to start financial interference against the Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The justification for the consulate attack was not satisfactory among the Kurds. To add insult to injury the men were defended by Iraq's foreign minister and let go despite US assertions

If a reasonable explanation cannot be put forth with the requisite evidence than the attack could be considered an act of war as Pat Buchanan outlined above. Such an action runs a risk of alienating the Shias and adding to the chaos from Iraq and the rhetoric of escalation has little to do with Iraq as it is a ploy to engage Iran.

And why shouldn't I insist? Not a single person on this thread has even attempted to explain why it won't work, just that it won't work. That's certainly the easy way out. Too many people are stuck on the numbers of troops alone, and are paying no attention to what the troops will be doing. The plan will live or die by it's merits and it's success, not by the current head count of soldiers.
Either you are open to debate, or you are not. By the tenor of your posts, it is clear that you are the one not interested.

But didn't I already point the marginal character of this increase, and to the lessons of four years of war already fought? Aren't these valid arguments? What NEW facts have come before us, that would make anyone think that THIS will change the course of the war?

It is not as if we've had four years of gradually increasing success, and are now suffering military reverses that might be overcome by the application of a little military force. On the contrary, since our initial conquest, it's been pretty well downhill so far as containing violence in Iraq is concerned. Many have said, we're trying to solve a internal Iraqi political conflict by military means, and suggested that that is impossible. So doesn't all this weigh against further dithering?

I do protest that the things I have said here and earlier do indeed address this question; at least, I think they do.

The plan has numerous logical flaws. First, the increase in troops is going to support the Iraqi Security Forces in stabilizing the provinces of Baghdad. The reason the provinces are not stable now were stated by the President in his speech on Jan. 11, 2007.
This begs the question; why do these forces need to be American? If this is a numbers problem, why does American blood solve the equation? If there are not enough Iraqis willing to join the Security Force then that means we will be in Iraq forever. If the Iraqi Security Forces are not skilled enough to stabilize a region, when will they be? Will they ever be? The insurgent are smart enough to wait for our troops to leave an area before they continue the violence. What is going to stop them from waiting until we leave the country or withdraw from a province?
The President fails to mention why these neighborhoods were off-limits. My guess is because entry into these neighborhoods would incite violent responses. We are going to find that out. I get the impression from the President that we are going to be aggressive in our home invasion, our door-to-door operations. How many more insurgents will that create? How many supporters to the new Iraqi government are going to be lost when an innocent citizens door is kicked down by an American backed by the Iraqi Security Force? Or vice versa? This plan is a disaster.

President Bush said to Prime Minister al-Jaafari on June 24th, 2005:Then this on Jan. 11th, 2007. That's a timetable. This statement, coupled with the ever-changing justification for this war make Pres. Bush impossible to believe. His word is worth nothing.

You raise some valid points, why do these forces need to be American? For several obvious reasons. The ISF is not yet capable of quelling violence in a city of six million souls. The confidence of ISF soldiers is emboldened when allied with American forces on operations. This confidence and level of expertise has been growing, especially since the current training doctrine was set forth by LTG Petreaus in 2005.
American forces possess the ability and the technology to assist the Iraqi's in clearing and holding the various Baghdad neighborhoods. The plan calls for clearing these sections, house by house, but not in the manner that you are probably thinking. The goal is to win the trust of the population, so kicking down doors is not going to be standard operating procedure. Once weapons and explosives caches are found, insurgents identities will be known to some previously unsuspecting residents. When the insurgent and the means of carrying out attacks are removed from a neighborhood, the insurgents lose control of that neighborhood. Call me a optimist, but I believe most Iraqi's wish to live in peace with the ability to vote and have freedom of the press. I don't believe most average citizens wish for a return to Ba'athism, or a move to fundamentalism.
Once these neighborhoods are free from sectarian violence, reconstruction and new construction can proceed unhindered, improving life for these residents, and the hope that they will insure that insurgents do not take hold again.
Now, I could be completely off base in my analysis and why it can work; namely what if the insurgents just lie low. That can indeed happen, but if we deprive them of their IED factories, safe houses and intelligence........if we enable Iraqi citizens to establish trust with the Iraqi Army and police, if life begins to improve materially and economically, then many young Iraqi's may not feel the need to get paid to plant IED's or to videotape them for propaganda websites.
What I just laid out is the easy part. The key ingrediant to making this work is the disbanding of the militia's, Al-Sadr's and others. We'll soon see if Maliki is serious about ruling a stable Iraq or simply consolidating Shia power.

Come now, DTRM. This is patently false. Let me sum up the argument(s) concisely:

1. The past four years have seen an increase in the insurgency in Iraq not a decrease.
2. The numbers of troops have at one time or another exceeded the current numbers plus the 20000+ Dubya wants to escalate with.
3. The Iraqi government has been unable to enforce security for the past 1.5 years.

This is the why people think it won't work. They believe it won't work because it hasn't worked already. Ignoring direct empirical evidence because it is inconvenient to the hope that there will be a stable, peaceful Iraq is just...well... willfully naive.

I want, I mean I really, really want, to see a peaceful and stable Iraq. But, I refuse to ignore the evidence before me that this troop escalation will do anything at all to help. We have the wrong plan, at the wrong time, with the wrong leadership.

But, here's a proposal (please take this seriously). Let's say we've waited 6 months (I'll even give you a 9 months) and things continue as they are now. What will you say then?

My post is most certainly not patently false, name me one poster who actually evaluated the plan and came up with a cogent argument as to why it would not work.
As to your last question, I'll say then that we should be executing our phased withdrawl and transfer of all anti-insurgent operations, with the continued support of CA and MiTT Teams; which is something I have advocated before.
Since we are already there, I have looked at the merits of the plan and am willing to give it a chance to succeed, others are not willing to do that, but simply disregard it based on past history. If it doesn't work, in the timeline that it is reasonably expected to, then I believe we should begin withdrawing ground and air forces.

I will debate with you even though you sound like you are regurgitating propoganda.

So the argument is that the Iraqi Secuirity Forces are not qualified to hold these neighborhoods? Fine, but when will they be qualified? Why aren't they qualified already? U.S. forces have been working in tandem with them for well over a year. The new training put forth by Lt. Gen Petreaus was created because the prior methods were ineffective. Now you are telling me that one year later his methods are working? Based on what evidence? None that support your claim. The death toll has increased since 2005, the months have gotten bloodier as the war rages on; new training, more death That means the training is not working. That's the main reason the Democrats swept the Congress, because the war is going poorly. Every approach we have taken has not worked. A review of the failures.

Over a year ago, Pres. Bush said this about the Iraqi election results.
But in this last speech he admitted:

This was the last speech prior to the invasion.
After the U.S. Presidential election in 2004, Bush made this speech in December of 2005 prior to the Iraqi elections. He said:
The President has been wrong so many times, I can't remember the last time he was right about anything.
Now I would like to focus on this comment from you:It is true, that the insurgents cannot blow up people or buildings without explosive devices. But you are neglecting one major possibility; what if they can replenish their weapons? What if they are being supplied by Iran, or Syria, or Hezbollah, or Hamas? What all the houses are cleaned out and all the IEDs have been removed and the insurgents return with new weapons from sympathetic allies in foreign lands? What then? You just assume that if you take their weapons that they cannot get more. How naive can you be?

Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?

I think DTOM makes a fair point. Who here has really brought a considered evaluation of the merits of the plan?

As far as I understand it, the plan is to bolster the US presence in the Iraqi capital and stop the rot from spreading there. Whilst its not likely to work due to the constrictions of time, such a move has been sorely lacking for at least a year now. Muqtada al Sadr's followers have been gradually annexing the capital, one house at a time, and 'ethnically cleansing' it. They have only been able to do this due to a lack of security.

Its been pointed out that this surge is not really any such thing, but rather a re-allocation of available resources and manpower, but if the emphasis is on regaining the initiative and ensuring the security of the capital, then I for one, think this is probably the best move to establish some measure of hope for the current Iraqi government that the USA could make at this time. Success will depend on various factors, but amongst these is the will to succeed.

One has to wonder just how many Americans actually want the USA to fail in Iraq. It seems a great many would rather see GW Bush fail than America succeed. I am acutely aware of this paradox where by people expressing their lament at the death toll are opposed to any plan that would grant those deaths a purpose. To pull out would certainly guarantee that 3,000+ US soldiers died for nothing and the anti Bush argument would have their 'stick with which to beat the wicked dog'.

Any success in Iraq that granted the dead a purpose, and the Iraqi's a viable state, would grant new life to the GW Bush perspective, perhaps even long enough to be politically useful, but be an anathema to the anti war position. I wonder which is more important? A measure of sucess in Iraq or defeating GW Bush...? I very much suspect the latter.

Whether or not its a real plan or a political stunt is immaterial. It is naturally both. Such is politics.

The cogent argument(s) don't have to do with the specifics of the plan's execution but the fact that the plan requires a 21500 troop escalation in Iraq. From my admittedly very superficial reads, it does not contain metrics to evaluate success or failure of the objectives. It does not suggest what should be done if the plan does not meet its objectives. There is no provision for failure; there is simply the hope, the wish, that it will succeed.


So, we agree in principle here. The only difference in our positions is the number of chances we're willing to grant for US troop presence in Iraq. In other words, if things don't work out with this plan, then you'll call for withdrawal. So, here's my question. Why does your patience run out in, say, 6 months as opposed to now?

Ooookay.......I outlined the tactical plan, if you merely dismiss that as propaganda, why are even bothering to debate? Tell me please, how stating what the plan is, is anymore propaganda that what you are saying?

I based my optimism on the fact that this plan is modeled after the pacification of Tal Afar.

Link

I base my optimism on Iraqi proficiency on the fact that we have been embedding MiTT Teams for the last year or so, with quite a bit of success. I believe the influx of soldiers designated for Baghdad, coupled with the Tal Afar model, along with increased ISF competence has a chance of working.
I could well be wrong.....I could come back with hat in hand and state that I was wrong. I am willing to admit that, but I would hope that our informed members would at least look at this plan, the current plan.........not the past failures, which I've already commented on over the last couple of years, but this plan.
I don't believe I am naive at all, I can envision all possible outcomes, I'm simply not tied to believing in the worst possible outcomes.


I agree with you, Bush should have laid out a 'what next' provision. Hopefully, if it doesn't work, then my idea of a withdrawl begins.


Primarily because I'm willing to give a chance to a plan that I think can succeed.

Which only validates exactly what DTOM had said, mainly that people are only looking at the troop #'s, and disregarding the plan on its face. No mention whatsoever of the different strategy being employed, which is really what the plan is about. Troop strength only become relevant when looked at in terms of the strategy shift. Ditto for whether or not the Iraqi government has been unable to enforce security. In fact, that is exactly what the plan is geared to address, at least in the Baghdad area. So, thank you for summing up the argument so concisely, and thereby validating DTOM's statements about no one really addressing the plan at all.

Your description of the breakdown of events is quick and easy. "We add more troops, go house to house, stick around for a while, and bickety-bam, a free and stable Iraq." Each step has several possible outcomes. You have admitted that success is a probability and not a guarantee. You think it will work, I do not. The reason I believe that it will not work is because history has shown that our policies fail. Interesting fact that may surprise you, I voted for George W. Bush in 2004. I believed him when he said Saddam was a threat with ties to al-Qaida. I do not believe him anymore. He has proven to be a liar, a poor leader, and a horrifying strategist. You think Pres. Bush has found the answer even though analyst after analyst has said the solution is political and cannot be accomplished militarily. So what do we do? Increase our military presence.

Tal Afar is a city with a population of 250,000 citizens. Baghdad has a population of 7 million. We would need 28 times the troop strength that Col. McMaster's had to pacify Baghdad. Which is where the number 20,000 came from. So we pacify a population of 7 million then we can bring our troops home? Or wait. American forces defeated the insurgents and left about 500 troops in the city. However, Iraqi authorities lost control of the city in May 2005, and insurgents began taking over again. OK, so when we leave, the violence continues. Great! We'll stay forever. The plan we are following, the one that you believe will lead to success, fails when we leave. McMaster's plan is a failure if we are not there to execute it. Do you suggest we stay forever?
When do you determine that the plan is a failure? Six months? A year? Two years? How long? Or do you shy away from timetables too? When do you decide too many Americans have died for Iraqi's freedom? If they don't want to die for it, they can live without it. When do you get to that point?

What an odd position to take, Hobbes. The whole argument hinges on whether or not one believes 20000+ extra troops can effect change in Iraq. If the 20000+ troops are not necessary, then there's no need to add them in first place. If the 20000+ troops are necessary, then it doesn't matter what the other parts of the plan contains. In fact, the other parts of the plan might contain the most well thought-out strategy plan in the history of humanity but for the simple fact that it requires another 20000+ troops. The other parts of the plan are therefore completely immaterial with regard to this argument.

In logic, there are these things called necessary and sufficient conditions. In other words, all conditions must be true and all must be present in order for the conclusion to be true. If any one of these conditions are false, then the conclusion must be false as well.

Since it has been said that few to none have actually dealt with the specifics of the plan and why it cannot succeed, perhaps I might be able to rectify that situation:


First, the peripheries.

The issue of numbers of troops has been dealt with before. A slight correction, assuming 21,000 troops added on to the current total of 150,000 troops would actually bring the current US forces deployed in Iraq up to more than had ever been deployed there before over the course of this war, by about 3,500 troops. Thus there will be (slightly) more US forces in Iraq than have ever been there at one time since 1992.

This does not alter the basic premise however. Troop totals in Iraq over the last four years have varied between 167,000 and 108,000, yet the periods with a significantly larger number of troops have recorded no resulting reduction in number of attacks of effectiveness of attacks by the Insurgency, in fact if anything the number of attacks increased more than normal. October/ November 2005 was (until this current surge) the period with the most US troops deployed in Iraq, and it was accompanied by the largest percentage hike in Insurgent attacks, and spike in US casualties. Upon troop numbers being reduced again, in January 2006, the Insurgency was by every measurable statistic, stronger than it had been before that ‘troop surge’.

Worse, as time has progressed, the potential effectiveness of small infusions of troops will have been reduced. The number of Insurgent attacks per day has steadily increased: in May 2003: there were 10 per day recorded, June 2004: there were 52 attacks per day, May 2005: there were 70 attacks per day, by January 2006 there were 100 attacks per day, and the number as of December 2006 is over 120 attacks per day. We cannot infer a direct proportional link between these numbers and the strength of Iraqi insurgency, but even if we assume an indirect link, that still implies the Insurgency has grown by more than a factor of 10x in the last 3 years, and continues to grow. During this time, the number of US troops deployed has remained static. Will a 12% increase in US troops now counter the approximately 1200% increase in Insurgency? Clearly not, as larger influxes of troops in the past were unable to quell or even affect the growth of the Insurgency, back when it was considerably weaker.

So that deals with the number. What about the new tactics?

In fact, these are not new tactics at all. Clear-and-Hold operations have been launched around Iraq and in Baghdad over the last two years. Operation together Forward, Operation United Front, Operation Bold Action and dozens of others, all of which have been complete failures at adding to the long-term security of the regions, and in some cases failed even to add to short term security.

In every one of these cases, the operations plan was to move in, sweep-and-search the area for insurgents, then hold the area as long as possible. In every case the reason the United States forces withdrew is NOT because holding was not part of the plan, but because they eventually exceeded their resources and were unable to maintain that many men in such concentrations in specific areas. Such hold deployments in some cases (but only some0 did reduce local attacks, but at the cost of occupying the vast majority of the deployable US forces, and turning them into local police. Thus operations could not be maintained in other places.

It is also worth noting that these attacks and operations, the largest (and most spectacular failure of which as Together Forward) were aimed only at small communities, or small districts of Baghdad. Yet they were still unable to maintain a troop presence for evry long, and eventually they left and Insurgents reappeared. Worse, the Insurgents did not just reappear, but started reprisal killings on any they falt had not resisted the Americans sufficiently.

This troops surge involves the entire combative region of Baghdad, and included several areas never before targeted by operations of this nature, such as Sadr city. The area of operations is several times larger than anything attempted before, and yet with only a small number more troops, when previous numbers on much small areas, were ineffective. Basic logic dictates this cannot succeed.

In fact, pentagon planners know this cannot succeed, which is why US forces, and the President himself as indicated in his speech, are counting on the assistance of Iraqi forces who are being deployed in support of this surge. These are, sadly, the same Iraqi forces who have been singularly unable and/or unwilling to confront Insurgents in Baghdad for years. The Army and police are fully penetrated by the insurgents, and in many cases when ordered into battle, Iraq army forces either desert or simply refuse orders.

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Assessing_...e_2006_999.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6112100171.html

The second article is very depressing regarding the capability of the Army, rife with Insurgents and sectarian views of their own.


Sp the tactics are in fact not new, they have failed in the past and the very simple reason they failed in the past, too few troops and too large an operation have not been addressed, in fact they have been exacerbated. Dependence on the Iraqi military is unlikely to be any different than US dependence on the Iraqi military at every stage of the war so far, a complete failure, ranging from the army units refusing to go into battle at Fallujah, to wholesale desertions in Anbar.


So that is troops and tactics dealt with. What other problems can we demonstrate?

Well there is the problem with the ‘new troops’ themselves, in that they are not new troops. Some are exhausted forces due for rotation breaks who are being compelled to stay past their tour dates, the rest are new recruits planned for deployment in September/October 2007, who are being rushed into combat early. Not exactly the best combination for new line troops.

Finally, does anybody think this plan will work? The outgoing Military commander, Abizaid, clearly stated it will not work. The outgoing central Military commander, General George Casey, also stated the troops surge would not succeed in halting the growth of the insurgency and could not be sustained. The incoming commander, Adm. William J. Fallon has never commanded ground forces in combat and has no experience whatsoever with counter-insurgency tactics. If an operation is as good as its commander, then this is clearly a problem.

The new Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, stated he did not believe adding new troops to the region was an effective tactic in his confirmation hearing. Do not forget that Gates was a member of the James Baker Iraq Study Group, which specifically addressed and rejected the idea of sending more troops to Iraq as ineffective and in fact counter-productive.

According to a recent survey, only 12 members of the entire Senate would support such an idea. The most common confusion was why the ISG was even formed if the President was going to utterly ignore its recommendations?

http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/opini...cle_1404710.php


Finally, we get to the last of the practical reasons why this project cannot succeed, Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr. This is a man who supports, and is supported by, the Iraqi president, and who controls a personal army estimated between 10,000 and 30,000 strong fanatical fighters. They have influence in every level of government: pressure by Sadr got the Iraqi President to demand the United States cease its blockade of Sadr city. In October of last year US forces captured his top aide on multiple charges and turned him over to Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi police released him the next day. Sadr’s people are responsible for the release from prison of Saddam Hussein’s nephew, and many more examples. He is also extremely popular. Sadr is just one of the militia leaders never before openly confronted, which the US plans to attack, depose and pacify with this new operation. They will also have to deal with the Badr organisation, another large militia they have never openly confronted, and a half dozen other, smaller sectarian or religious militias. This alone puts 15,000 to 30,000 new opponents in Iraq against the Americans and Iraqis, not including those infiltrated in the Iraqi army itself. And that only assumes the armies soldiers, not the loyal followers who will rise up to support their leaders as they have in every such previous example.


For these simple reasons this troops surge cannot hope to work. It is modelled on the same plans that failed previously, with much larger objectives and engaging new enemies as well as old ones, depending on allies proven to be utterly unreliable and occasionally even hostile, all with a small influx of tired, exhausted troops or fresh, green ones, all under the auspices of a new commander who has never commanded ground forces in combat.


I hope that is sufficient explanation for your purposes…

There is one HUGE downside, of course, that no one has mentioned, and DTOM, I am suprised you have not mentioned it as a military man- what is plan B should this fail? That alone makes this plan unworkable- every plan, as you know, can go horribly wrong, and go wrong fast, so you have a plan B in contingency to correct the mistakes of plan A.

Let's say, it doesn't work- what then? I, as a lowly citizen of this country- can think of a couple very bad things very quickly

1) Okay- 21k wasn't enough, now how many do you ask for- and, with the failure of plan A- how do you go to the American public and ask for more? At this point- the "cut and run" types- that just want to bug out with NO force left behind- NO stability- will probably win the day- and you notice, I don't think to many folks on this board have said they would just bug out right now, with everything, and let civil war happen

2) Okay- plan A didn't work- but now, we have to try the ISG plan- but, in the diplomatic arena, we are bargaining at this point from incredible weakness.

And on and on- the very fact that they don't have a good backup plan as a followup is enough to doom this plan altogether.

I do not believe that is correct at all. The whole argument hinges not on troop numbers, but on the strategy employed. What if I told you we were going to be adding a half million troops, but that they were just going to stand there doing nothing? You'd say that wasn't a feasible plan, not based on troop number but on strategy, correct? As I said above, troop count ONLY becomes relevant when evaluating it within the framework of their mission. It is the strategy employed that is relevant to the debate here...troop count is merely secondary, and only in relation to the strategy.



This doesn't make sense to me at all, unless evaluated from the perspective than any troop increase is bad on its face, which leaves no room for debate. Let's assume that this was the most well thought-out strategy...then what's the problem with it requiring another 20,000 troops?



What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of which you speak? It would seem that reducing troop count is inferred to be one of them, which at best leaves no room for debate.

Actually, I have already addressed this. I said earlier that big problem with Bush's plan is that he did not lay out a 'what next'. No what next if we succeed, and no what next if we fail. That's been one of the major problems since we entered Iraq. If we don't succeed, then I believe we should begin withdrawing. Baghdad is the key to Iraq, if we fail to control the violence and end the sectarian violence with this operation, then there is no other alternative, this is no other course of action. Implement some portions of the ISG report, notably on the diplomatic front, but begin withdrawing.


What is different about the new plan is the holding part. In previous operations, we did not 'hold' the areas we had cleared. Sure, we remained for a short period of time, but not anywhere near what I would term holding. In this plan American and Iraqi units will stay in the neighborhoods. If this plan succeeds, it will be because we will have earned the trust of the local citizens, the citizens who will see us everyday, who will see the garbage being picked up, will see their children going to school without as much fear of bombs going off on crowded streets. The fact of the matter is, we will be employing the same tactics that insurgents use, and have used for many years. Win the trust of he citizens and gain their support by showing them that life can proceed as normal if they reject the cult of chaotic violence being preached by insurgent fighters and Imams.
I would think you have to agree with me that the simple acts of clearing garbage and insuring running water does as much if not more to gain support of citizens than patrolling and searching for weapons caches. The goal here is to do one first, then the other.


Two reasons that your logic may be incorrect. First, the primary areas that will be entered by US and Iraqi forces are those that lie along a rough North-South axis that encompasses a sort of border area between Sunni and Shia parts of the city. This is also the area where most of the sectarian violence takes place.
The number of 21,500 for the 'surge' is the number of additional troops that Gen. Petraeus estimated will be needed to pacify the nine districts of Baghdad as part of this plan. That's five American Brigades. But the media circus surrounding this plan has failed to take into account the seven Brigades already in the Baghdad area. That means approximately 4600 soldiers will be in each neighborhood. Not enough? OK, add to that the 18 Iraqi Brigades being added to force structure. Thats around 7000 more per neighborhood, given that Iraqi BDE's are roughly equivalent to our own. So we now have around 11,500 soldiers per neighborhood, that falls short of US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine by a few hundred. Not short enough in my opinion to cause concern, especially when we can probably agree that some neighborhoods will be easier to clear and hold than others, freeing up soldiers to shift to other locations.


I'm not sure where you're getting this information. Only one unit (MN National Guard, based out of Tallil AFB) has been extended. That unit will be extended to continue it's Theater Security (Convoy Security) mission, and will not be part of the operation in Baghdad. Only one of the Brigades was not expected to deploy to Iraq this year, the rest are leaving on time, or slightly earlier than already planned. I'm not sure where your 'new recruits' comment comes from. Every unit that has ever deployed to theater contains some number of new soldiers, but no unit can be termed as you have described.


This doesn't matter in the least. CENTCOM is a joint command, and all theater commands can be headed by any nominated member of the Armed Forces. The theater commander controls all air, sea and land forces with his geographic area. Gen Petaeus, as Commander, MNF-I, will be directing the ground campaign, not Fallon.

We're going in circles. We agree that it is impossible to secure and hold key parts of Iraq without more troops. What we don't agree on is whether or not that goal can be achieved with 20000+ more troops. Now, if I saw a plan suggesting an escalation by 150,000+ of troops, then I would be more inclined to give credence to the other sections of the plan. Simply put, what has been demonstrated is that minimal troop increases (relative to the current size stationed in Iraq) cannot secure Iraq no matter how good the other parts of the plan may be. It is simply not enough police per capita.


Because a 20000+ troop escalation is bad on its face. Thus, I suppose there is no room for debate.


Um... Since this debate is the "plan or ploy" thread, I think there's plenty of room still to debate. This is not a plan, it's a delay tactic, it will fail.

Is president Bush's plan to send more troops into Bagdad a real plan, or is it a political stunt?

This is a question we may be able to answer in 20 or 30 years. As it is, it reminds me mightily of What Nixon did in Vietnam. Kissinger had told the North Vietnamese (through China) that the US was prepared to end the war, but that they would like a "decent interval" before doing so - a decent interval that lasted until just after Nixon's re-election.

It's possible that Bush is trying to make the best of a bad war, by using it to try and snag another presidential election for the GOP. Whoever runs on the Republican ticket can have a "Secret Plan to End the War."

On the other hand, it could just be another deluded strategy in a deluded war. We are at war with Eastasia. We have always been at war with Eastasia.

I believe I addressed this in my previous post. These operations were sweep and hold operations, meaning the US forces in the area were to hold them with troop concentrations as long as possible, and they did, as long as possible. These forces were withdrawn because it was not practical to have several thousand increasingly tired troops on duty all the time in hostile areas, while other parts of the country caught fire. This will not be any different.



Except according to the plan, and according to President Bush's speech, baghdad will not get 21,500 troops. Iraq will get 21,500 troops. Of which 4,000 will go to Anbar province and 1,500 will go the the Iranian border. That is seriously cutting into the forces to be deployed in baghdad.

Secondly, even ignoring that fact, your almost-but-not-quite-sufficient number is only achieved by adding in all the Iraqi forces which are supposed to be deployed. Yet there has always been a remarkable disparity between that the Government promises and what is actually deployed, and whatever forces are in the end deployed suffer the problems and unreliability which I discussed in great detail in my previous post. To presume one promised Iraqi soldier is the equivalent of one US soldier in the troop-per-neighbourhood plan is resting unrealistic assumption on top of unrealistic assumption on top of unrealistic assumption.

The 'media circus' has not ignored the seven brigades currently in baghdad, they pay rather close atatnetion to the fact that they stay in the Green and safe zones during daylight, are subject to constant attack and have been utterly unable to slow the growth of the Insurgency, let alone quell it, and that is without stirring up the hornets nests of the various militias this new plan will attack.

But the media circus surrounding this plan has failed to take into account the seven Brigades already in the Baghdad area. That means approximately 4600 soldiers will be in each neighborhood. Not enough? OK, add to that the 18 Iraqi Brigades being added to force structure. Thats around 7000 more per neighborhood, given that Iraqi BDE's are roughly equivalent to our own. So we now have around 11,500 soldiers per neighborhood, that falls short of US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine by a few hundred. Not short enough in my opinion to cause concern, especially when we can probably agree that some neighborhoods will be easier to clear and hold than others, freeing up soldiers to shift to other locations.




You may chose to believe that removing an experienced and locally wise commander who is 'not politically treliable' with a totally inexperienced officer who has never served in a desert of any kind, let alone Iraq, ahas never commanded ground forces, let alone counter-insurgencies, 'doesn't matter in the least', but I disagree. If his position makes no difference, then why have it? Whats the point of having his post as head of forces if somebody else will need to do his job because he is utterly inexperienced, on the even of a critical attack?

I believe this has been a large part of the problem that the militia's have not been confronted. There needs to be an ultimatum made to some of these militia's.. lay down your weapons or die. We need to stop trying tip-toe around these problems and do what the US military does best and hit them head on instead of them sneaking around all the time trying not to get caught. There's not a single militia there that will stand up to even small amounts of US forces head on and that's the best leverage we have. If you don't disarm we are coming after you. Of course this will increase the violence as expected in the short term.

Will the increase in troops work? I don't know if it will be enough but I will tell you that no one here has a better sounding plan other than "cut and run" which if we do I think we all know what will happen then.

So if anyone has a more realistic plan that could actually be implemented, which rules out any UN forces or even MORE US troops seeing as to how Congress is gritting their teeth at even the smallest increase im all ears.

I also have a hard time believing that a liberal communist voted for GWB.

What you are failing to understand is the difference that I pointed out earlier. The previous operations were not designed to hold an area long enough to bring in construction experts, conduct thorough searches and maintain a visible, lasting presence in the neighborhoods. Your continuing mention of tired troops, isn't exactly a new phenomenon in combat, what is the special relevance here?


I agree, but they're getting better. Every Iraqi Battalion has a MiTT team embedded with it. Operating alongside American units, and with the assistance of the MiTT's, that equivalent ratio is shortened.


Really? That would come as a shock to the men patrolling Baghdad each day.....