Was this rally a violation of the First Amendment?QUOTE(logophage @ Jan 26 2007, 12:03 AM)

1. Religion is specifically called out in both the Constitution and the First Amendment. Thus, it has a special status unlike "marches against violence" or whatnot. In fact, the pro-gun folks are very keen to point out that the 2nd Amendment makes special reference to gun ownership.
That's pretty close, but "the right of the people peaceably to assemble" is also in the First Amendment, so a "march against violence" could also make a claim of special status, and peace demonstators often do.
If Jacksonville had stifled the right to assembly as well as their right to free exercise, Jacksonville would certainly have violated the First Amendment as currently interpreted by SCOTUS. However, by funding an event primarily focused on religious worship, Jacksonville may have also violated the intent of the Constitution as interpreted by SCOTUS. There was certainly a way Jacksonville could have allowed the rally to happen without funding it that would have been not only constitutional, but constitutionally guaranteed. However, the way they decided to fund it, promote it, and conduct it raises questions under current law.
Our current perspective on establishment was definitely not shared by the framers. John Adams, who described himself as
"a churchgoing animal" is said to have given a speech against establishment on the steps of Congress, then proceeded inside the building to attend a church service held on government property;
Jefferson and Madison did the same. Our current view has been shaped by many decades of court decisions that have reinforced the idea that even the slightest hint of religion near government violates the constitution; but that interpretation has been tempered in recent rulings that the free exercise, free assembly, and equal access principles are not automatically trumped by a whiff of establishment, as was the vogue in the middle of last century.
QUOTE(logophage @ Jan 26 2007, 12:03 AM)

2. Of course, if religion were no longer tax-exempt, I'm not sure bringing a case against government funds would be as strong. Perhaps, someone (Seamus) has thoughts on this?
I don't think tax exempt status would have much of a bearing on the Jacksonville case, but it is another front in the larger church-state debate. To apply it to Jacksonville, a case might be made that because churches don't pay taxes, they don't deserve equal access to city resources. But then, churches aren't the only tax-exempt groups, so winning such a line of reasoning would also make it more difficult for Lions clubs to hold bake sales on city property. The right to assemble is not predicated on tax status, but being human and peaceful. Equal access to city services is usually based on the rights or privileges of individuals who may happen to be acting as a group; how the group itself is organized under tax code is rarely the issue. If the individuals pay taxes, it probably wouldn't matter that the group does not.
In some cases, the government
currently uses tax-exempt status as leverage to tell churches what they can and cannot express from the pulpit, but I don't think it's an issue in the Jacksonville case. There is a move among both
liberal churches and
conservative churches to
reorganize into taxpaying corporations to avoid IRS regulations that try to prevent politically active preachers like Al Sharpton, Jesse Jackson, and Pat Robertson from preaching politics to their congregations or use churches as loopholes in election laws. The "Render Unto Caesar" movement, among others, believes it is
better for churches to pay taxes than accept government regulation of religious speech, which is currently predicated on the carrot of tax-exempt status and the stick of election laws. Over the next few years, the Supreme Court is expected to hear several cases concerning whether tax exemption or election laws can continue to trump the free exercise clause. These will probably not be decided before the 2008 election season is over, but their existence has emboldened some churches to ignore the current censorship of political messages from the pulpit in anticipation of a favorable ruling. They assert that the free exercise clause trumps whatever censorship the IRS or FEC might try to prommelgate; we'll soon see whether SCOTUS agrees.
As others have pointed out, there are plenty of rulings in line with the idea that government should not be in the business of funding religion. There are also currently several exceptions to the general rule, but most are predicated on the idea that if the government would be paying for something anyway, religion can't be used as an excuse not to pay for it. In the
Gentala case, the city of Tuscon decided to charge a religious group an extra fee for using a city PA system that they didn't charge other groups. SCOTUS vacated the circuit court's decision, on the basis that the first amendment's establishment clause does not override equal access to city resources for religious groups (the
Milford case) or free exercise of religion.
Although the
Milford case dealt specifically with holding religious events on school grounds after school, it has been interpreted in several other cases to allow holding any religious event on public property following any government event, so long as the government's business has been adjourned and no privilege is given to religious groups that isn't available to any other group. Although not entirely definitive, SCOTUS has let cases stand that successfully extrapolated
Milford to a variety of other situations. The most definitive of these might have been the
Gentala case, which was essentially SCOTUS forcing a lower court to apply
Milford. For now, it would seem the SCOTUS-condoned generalization of
Milford would allow a city to hold a civic memorial service, adjourn it, and then provide a forum for leaders of community groups to engage in free expression. The main problem in the Jacksonville settlement, aside from the manner in which it was promoted, is the lack of evidence that the civic and religious elements were clearly divided, which could raise some questions about the event's constitutionality under current law. But current law is a moving target.
The most definitive Supreme Court case on government funding of religious activities is the
Hein case currently before SCOTUS. It concerns the constitutionality of Bush's faith-based initiatives. By this summer, we should know whether or not the government can discriminate against contractors on the basis of religion. SCOTUS may continue in the directions of
Gentala and
Milford to validate faith-based initiatives, or it may take the opportunity to define a limit on the extent to which tax dollars are diverted to religious groups; it could also throw out the case without a definitive ruling, as it did the
Newdow Pledge case last year, on the basis that being a taxpayer is not a sufficient injury for filing a church-state separation case. I expect SCOTUS to rule in favor of the initiatives, but I've been surprised too often to wager.
It is relatively easy to cherry-pick past court cases that support almost anything from slavery to censorship of religious expression, but law aggregates them into a virtual hierarchy where the more recent SCOTUS decisions tend to trump older SCOTUS decisions (with many exceptions, of course). There are enough SCOTUS and lower court decisions on church-state issues to be difficult to accurately navigate without specialized legal advice (and mine certainly won't qualify). However, the
Milford case and its extrapolation through
Gentala has introduced a relatively easy way to be confident of the constitutionality of public expressions of religion on government property after government business is concluded so long as equal access is preserved.
Some religious groups would rather blend religious and government meetings together, while some church-state separation hardliners would probably prefer religious people to hold their rallies in their own private buildings and stay off government property. The
Milford solution seems to offend both ends of the political spectrum, so that's probably a good indication that it's a decent compromise.