QUOTE(Lesly @ Apr 12 2007, 07:27 AM)

You need to explain how state legislatures electing/appointing Senators stop the Union from looking like a monolithic republic;
First, let me explain my terminology. I used the term "monolithic" a little too loosely-- when I said "monolithic", what I really meant was "simple", as used in F62:
QUOTE
to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.
I'll use the terms "republic" and "representative democracy" interchangeably. I'll refer to the two basic forms of a "simple" republic as a "hierarchy" and a "confederacy". In contrast to either form of "simple" republic, the Constitution constitutes a "complex" republic in the form of a balanced federation.
In a "top-down"
hierarchy, power is focused toward the higher levels of government and flows down to lower, more local levels, so that lower levels must submit to higher levels (the executive bureaucracy still takes this form, to an extent). The "pure" form a simple hierarchical republic would be a dictatorial democracy, where the People elect one dictator to lead an appointed bureaucracy until the next election. Multiple levels and branches of government with elected officials at each level is no longer a
pure hierarchy, but is still a
simple hierarchy as long as the higher (more centralized) levels have full power over the lower (more localized) levels.
In contrast to a hierarchy, a
confederacy is organized as a "bottom-up" pyramid where power flows upward from strong, autonomous lower levels of government to a weak central government, in which each higher level must submit to the decisions of the next "lower" (more local) level. The "pure" form of a simple
confederate republic would be a unicameral parliamentary system where the people elect Members of Parliament (MPs), then the MPs are responsible for all other decisions during their terms. Multiple levels and branches of government with elected officials at each level is no longer a
pure confederacy, but is still
simple as long as the higher (more centralized) levels are beholden to the lower (more localized) levels.
From 1777-1788, the
Articles of Confederation organized the U.S. as a
simple confederacy with a unicameral Congress composed of 2-7 delegates appointed by each State legislature, where each state's delegation cast one vote. Executive and judicial power flowed from legislative power, so there weren't three co-equal branches, but a simple bottom-up pyramid of power flow. By 1787, the states agreed that the confederation wasn't working out very well, partially because the Articles gave small states a disproportional vote with respect to their populations, and delegates weren't directly elected by the People. At the constitutional convention, instead of amending the Articles of Confederation as tasked, delegates ditched the Articles to constitute a new federation by combining aspects of both styles of simple republics into a complex balance between the extremes of hierarchy and confederation, through a multi-level, multi-branch republic "complicated" by a separation of powers, shared sovereignty, a system of checks and balances, and diversified accountability for government officials.
The Constitution struck a "balance" between a strong national government and strong state governments, as well as among co-equal federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Such delicate balances were to be secured by explicit "checks". The balance of shared sovereignty would keep the states relatively autonomous from one another and from the federal government, while allowing the federal government to have jurisdiction over a few issues that had caused the most trouble under the Articles. To help maintain the delicate balance of sovereignty, the framers intended state legislatures (the States) to check the legislative power of the federal government through their appointees to a bicameral Congress. Members of the House would be elected directly, proportional to population, so they would be beholden only to the interests of the People; whereas members of the Senate would be appointed to represent the interests and defend the sovereignty of State governments. From F62:
QUOTE
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; [snip]
In 1913, the 17th amendment decided that the role of state legislatures in appointing Senators had become more "injurious" than "beneficial". By abolishing the State legislatures' only check against Federal legislative encroachment on State sovereignty, the 17th brought U.S. government one step closer to a "simple" hierarchical republic the framers warned against. We're debating whether the removal of this check by the 17th was large enough or damaging enough to revive some form of the original check.
QUOTE(Lesly @ Apr 12 2007, 07:27 AM)

how a democratic process equals a monolithic republic,
A democratic process does not equal a simple republic, but removing complexity
does inherently simplify a complex republic
to some degree-- not necessarily to any alarming extreme, but perhaps enough to throw it slightly out of balance in one direction or the other. By making both houses of Congress beholden directly to the People without institutionalized accountability to the interests of State legislatures, the 17th removed the role State governments were intended to play in the passage of Federal laws, tilting the structure of government more toward a simple hierarchy than the framers (federalists and anti-federalists alike) would have ever allowed.
In my opinion, the tilt introduced by the 17th is only enough to make a slight wobble in the wheels of government, which is why it wasn't repealed long ago. The numerical equality of State representation in the Senate still acts to prevent larger states from completely dominating smaller states, but that was only one part of the Senate's original purpose:
QUOTE
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.
The other intent, which F62 describes as the "complicated check on [Federal] legislation" by State legislatures, was completely amputated in 1913 by the 17th, and we'd probably be better off in the long run if it were restored, with enough care to avoid the nasty side effects that prompted its original enactment.
QUOTE(Lesly @ Apr 12 2007, 07:27 AM)

and how state legislatures appointing Senators will keep the same from bargaining for votes and selling their state's sovereignty for almighty pork because I don’t catch your logic.
Some Senators would certainly continue to buy into the pork mindset, but if you compare pre-1913 pork to post-1913 pork, I believe you'd find a steep increase in pork post-1913. The primary reason for pork is bragging rights to curry favor with the general population in elections. When Senators are accountable to represent the interests of State governments and do not have to face re-election themselves, there tends to be less of an motivation among Senators to fight for pork, and more of an interest to keep the Federal government from encroaching on the powers granted to the State governments under the Constitution, often by
opposing pork, even (especially?) in their own states.
Without the 17th, pork would continue to be a primary focus in the House, but much of it would be trimmed out by the Senate, so Representatives could still run on passing pork through the House, without their pork actually making it into law. The framers explicitly intended the Senate's motivations to act in tension with the House's motivations to help filter out the natural tendencies of both kinds of lawmakers:
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Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. [snip] as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable [snip]
QUOTE(Lesly @ Apr 12 2007, 07:27 AM)

There is much more to the federal government’s expansion than the 17th amendment.
Agreed; but the 17th
did remove the fundamental check on Federal expansion that the framers intended the State governments to enforce through the Senate. Without Senators so willing to pass legislation encroaching on State powers, federal courts would have little means by which to uphold such federal laws and overturn state laws conflicting with them. Repealing the 17th only solves the inherent structural problems leading to federal expansion; a repeal would
not erase the damage done by nearly a century of gradual expansion still on the books, and it would not necessarily generate the groundswell of public support that would be necessary to bring government back into reasonable balance. Repealing the 17th is merely one step in the right direction, not a panacea.
QUOTE
loreng59 The real way that we can have accountability is to create an amendment like the 22nd and term limit the suckers out of office. That way the Robert Byrd's won't be around in office to torment the rest of the country for decades.
I believe a repeal of the 17th could simultaneously institute similar term limits in the process of addressing the various issues the 17th reformed. I wouldn't favor a repeal of the 17th if it failed to resolve prior problems with election of Senators by State legislatures.