Here is a quote from the
dissenting opinion in the Hazelwood case about the violation of the standard set in Tinker v. Des Moines
QUOTE
In Tinker, this Court struck the balance. We held that official censorship of student expression-there the suspension of several students until they removed their armbands protesting the Vietnam war-is unconstitutional unless the speech "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . . "
Here is an except from the
majority decision of Hazelwood explaining the reason schools may limit free speech in certain publications.
QUOTE
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.
Bethel v. Fraser involved the use of sexually explicit language in front of the entire student body. It overturned a district and appeals court ruling.
Here is a fairly insightful section of the ruling.
QUOTE
In our Nation's legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our society are carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants in the debate. The Manual of Parliamentary Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that body, prohibits the use of "impertinent" speech during debate and likewise provides that "[no] person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the House." The Rules of Debate applicable in the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to order for imputing improper motives to another Senator or for referring offensively to any state. Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate?
In that same ruling is a reference to Tinker and the N.J. v. T.L.O. decision.
QUOTE
In New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), we reaffirmed that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, "the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket [Cohen's jacket said "###### the Draft"].
This site also has the text of the dissenting opinion at the same link as above.
New Jersey v. T.L.O. goes beyond what I thought a school official could do and have the information hold up in court for a criminal conviction. This one seems to me to be the most controversial.
From the
majority decision is this quotation.
QUOTE
T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search . . . Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
From the
dissenting opinion or more accurately a partially dissenting opinion, came this quotation.
QUOTE
On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the initial search conducted by Mr. Choplick—the search for evidence of the smoking violation that was completed when Mr. Choplick found the pack of cigarettes—was valid. For Mr. Choplick at that point did not have probable cause to continue to rummage through T.L.O.'s purse . . . Therefore, the fruits of this illegal search must be excluded and the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
Food for thought. Sorry for the long post.