QUOTE(Amlord @ Jun 6 2007, 07:57 PM)

QUOTE(Vermillion @ Jun 6 2007, 01:55 PM)

NO reason?
How about the false sense of security behind a system which can easily be overcome?
How about the arms race escalation that has already begun as a result of the US research?
How about the abrogation of arms limitation treaties as a direct result of US research?
How about the reintroduction of MIRV and MRV weapons, previously on their way to the scrapyard, directly as a result of this research?
How about 60 billion dollars spent on a system that still doesn't even work at capacity 1 (C-1) levels
How about a hugely expensive system which will not protect against any of the most likely forms of attack of terrorists or rogue nations?
Your entire response is based upon your view that the current system doesn't work. That wasn't the question. The question was whether or not we should develop or continue to develop a system.
No, only the sixth response was based on the fact that the system doesn't work yet. NONE of the others do.
QUOTE
Arms race? I thought the system didn't work. Why would there be an arms race as a resultant of a system that everyone knows won't work?
No, the system doesn't currently work. The arms race exists because of the need of other nuclear powered states to overcome it if it is ever made to work. sadly, overcoming it is relatively easy: decoys, stealth and MRVs are only three easy means well within the reach of Rogue states I mentioned.
QUOTE
The one point we should zero in on is the arms race question. Although you seem to indicate that this would be a wasted effort by the enemies of the US (since the system is easily defeated anyway), an arms race IS in the interest of the US since we are more likely to win it than anyone else.
That only applies if the cost of defeating it relatively the same as the cost of developing it, it is not. Not even close.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
QUOTE(Ted)
As usual not worth talking to you. Obviously if NK had a MIRV missile, which they don’t, we could fire multiple interceptors at it to kill all RVs. DUH – do you get the concept?
yeah Right Ted,
I'M the one here wasting everybody's time and not worth responding to.

Hint: If I'm 'not worth responding to', then do everybody here a favour and don't respond.
Firstly, thank you for your in depth analysis of the missile capacity of North Korea. sadly, you are (typically) wrong on fact. Making things up again?
"
Global Security (GlobalSecurity.org) reported that North Korea began working on the SS-N-6 as early 2003. The SS-N-6, initially designed for launch from a submarine, may have been modified by North Korea to be used by mobile vehicles on land. The SS-N-6 delivers a 1500 lb re-entry vehicle (RV) while common variants can deliver multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV)"
"China has had the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for 20 years. If China needed a multiple-RV (MRV) capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31-type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) 1 for the CSS-4"
"North Korea's first satellite Kwang Myong Song #1 went into orbit on August 31, 1998 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1948 founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The satellite was launched on a three-stage propulsion unit made of a Taepo-dong 2 (a 2-stage missile named after the town in which it was developed) and a 3rd stage solid-fuel unit. It is believed that the rocket was a MIRV (Multiple Independenty-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles) prototype intended to launch several warheads at different targets."
"China continues to modernize its ballistic missile arsenal. Although limited in number and capability when compared to their American counterparts, China's ballistic missiles are being improved in a number of key ways, making them a growing threat to the United States. The newly-developed DF-31 is capable of targeting the west coast of the United States, while its longer-range follow-on, the DF-31A, once deployed, may be able to reach much of the continental United States. Furthermore, advances in warhead design and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology (including a successful test of a MIRVed DF-21) appear intended to enable China to overcome U.S. missile defenses, allowing it to maintain a credible deterrent."
Who 'isn't worth talking to' again there Ted?
Oh but wait, there's more. Your suggestion of 'if there is a MIRV, we just fire more missiles' is hilarious, and redundant as I already deiscussed this, pity you don't make it a habit of readng before posting. MRV's deploy at the apogee and reenter at about mach 20. Ground radar then has literally a few dozen seconds to make out the decoys from the warheads and fire the 'appropriate' number of misiles. But they can't. Even your own site says the eventual intention is to have the missile itself make the determination at close range. There is no time for volleys or repeat firings. Read here:
http://www.channel4.com/science/microsites...s_starwars.htmlThe terminal phase of the warhead, where it reenters the atmosphere, can be
as little as 20 seconds.
To quote another poster here:
DUH, do you get the concept? Not to MENTION that C-1 deployment of the MDS envisages a grant total of only 10 interceptor missiles covering the continental United States.
QUOTE
Do you really think the Pentagon would spend billions and get Congress to approve same if the system could be as easily defeated ads you imply??
Of course you are right because the Pentagon has NEVER made politically motivated decisions before.
QUOTE
I posted the link to THAAD for area non ballistic defense – you obviously didn’t read it.
Yes I did, though I am still trying to figure out how it is in any way relevant to the discussion.
THAAD is essentially an improved patriot-style missile system, useless against ballistic missiles. Its planned use if perfected is against high-altitude, long range non-ballistic missiles like the SCUD. How is that relevant to anything?
QUOTE
You stick your 4 year old article and no other backup – but let me say this – I spoke with people at MIT LL who told me they were months away from having the computing power to identify decoys – that was 1988.
Since you have been unable to dispute or disprove my 4-year old article, yes thank you I will. And given that that artcile was written in 2003, onbiously your friends in 1988 (four years earlier) were completely wrong.
However, since you insist on arbitrarily dismissing this article because of it's age... well, let nobody ever say I do not aim to please:
http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/a...ssile-0033.htmlTwo weeks ago recent enough for you?
Oh and let me be clear aout something else. The three methods I laid out above are only three of the cheap and easy methods known to have a high probability of defeating the MDS: decoys, stealth and MRVs. There are more.
"
Speed: Early re-entry vehicle designs used blunt shapes which caused them to decelerate significantly during re-entry. Modern re-entry vehicles are shaped like ice cream cones to minimize aerodynamic drag. While the primary purpose of high-speed re-entry is to improve accuracy, it carries the collateral benefit of reducing the duration of exposure to terminal missile defense.
Maneuvers: It is possible to design a re-entry vehicle that will perform simple but unpredictable and intense maneuvers upon re-entry. All that is required is that the re-entry vehicle’s center of gravity and center of drag not line up along its trajectory. This can be done by using a slightly bent nose, a small fin at the rear, or an internal weight that is moved laterally during re-entry. In the 1970s the U.S. developed a maneuvering re-entry vehicle, the Mark 500, for the Trident 1 SLBM. Its tests were successful and included 200G maneuvers that would severely challenge any defense. The Mark 500 was not deployed because the Soviet missile defense system did not warrant it. Maneuvering re-entry vehicles of this type sacrifice some accuracy and payload, but for a rogue state attack these are probably not significant.
Ladder down: A nuclear warhead exploding in the upper atmosphere would create a cloud of ionized gas that would be opaque to radar for several minutes. One tactic available to the offense would be to use such a precursor explosion to mask a following re-entry vehicle. The second re-entry vehicle would become visible after passing through the cloud, but the time remaining for the defense would be significantly reduced. Possibly a second, lower, precursor could be used to ensure penetration by the third re-entry vehicle.
An advanced missile, like the Topol-M uses many of these systems at once. But even less advanced missiles could easily adopt one or two, for relatively insignificant cost.
QUOTE
How about that. We always are ahead and always will be.
Again, pity you couldn’t be bothered to read what I posted above. In fact the US is not the universal world technological leader in all military applications, that’s just bluster. Ballistic Missile systems, Torpedo systems, TOW missiles are a few of the fields Russia is leading the US in at the moment. And while you will undoubtedly say the NMD isn’t meant against Russia, let us not forget that Russia has the rather unfortunate habit of selling its technology to states like China, who then sell it to Pakistan and Iran.
And it’s not just Russia. Did you know that the most advances anti-shipping missile in the world is Chinese? The Yingji-82. Did you also know that it has sold 60 of these to Iran? That’s why the first thing the US will do if Iranian hostilities are imminent is pull its carriers OUT of the narrow confines of the Gulf.
The point is, the US certainly has the lead in many, in fact most military technologies, but don’t pretend that ‘most’ equals ‘all’.