QUOTE(Bikerdad @ Jun 25 2007, 05:53 PM)

The fact that they can be used for other purposes means little. As a comparison, consider this: the university decides to spend an extra $5,000 a year for the next five years in order to serve kosher food, without raising the cost of the food. Everybody can eat kosher food, so this would qualify as "multi-purpose", yet it certainly seems this expenditure would constitute establishment.
If I may, let me similarly widen the net for a moment to discuss whether there's a general rule formed by related case law that can help shed more light on the footbath issue.
The kosher diet analogy is interesting because it underscores the current nature of case law on such issues. Relevant law generally sets up a value judgement that has to be made on a case-by-case basis rather than giving clear-cut decisions. Are university cafeterias
required to serve kosher food? Some are, and some are not, based on the same body of case law. However, on the issue of whether state funds are
permissible to budget for the service of kosher food in universities, the law is pretty clear-- it's usually okay, within reason. Whether or not I agree with the law, that's how it is. In general, if I were a university official whose higher-ups had determined footbaths must be installed one way or another and funding was up to me, I'd try to find a way to get private funding for it.
Most state-funded university and armed forces cafeterias or mess halls have been
required by the courts to provide nutritious selections compatible with traditional Hindu, Muslim, Vegan, and kosher diets, among others, under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Those cases tend to side with reasonable accommodation and against substantial burden. I qualified that with "most", because some are not
required to accommodate, when courts deem accommodations at other public facilities on the same or nearby state-funded premises are reasonable. In other words, this is something that can generally go either way, but usually sides with any government facility providing large numbers of people with food must consider common dietary restrictions, even when the only restriction is religious in nature. But again, that's about whether providing kosher food is
required. Providing kosher meals at a reasonably higher expense to the state remains legally
permissible, whether or not it is
required.
Here are a few sources. I'm picking those that elucidate the general decision mechanism, not necessarily those that make a clear-cut case for always siding one way or the other:
QUOTE
Eugene Volokh, Professor, UCLA School of Law: The second way the government as proprietor can affect religious beliefs is by creating programs or places that members of certain religious groups can't effectively use. The government might put up an electronic gate at a public housing complex, which keeps an Orthodox Jewish tenant from being able to easily enter and exit on the Sabbath.(174) A government-run cafeteria might not provide vegetarian, kosher, or halal dishes, which means that people of certain religions who use the building can't take advantage of the cafeteria's services.(175) A park might contain sculptures or signs that some people see as indecent or blasphemous, and those people may conclude that it would be spiritually harmful for them to be in a place that contains such material.(176) And a government-provided education program--such as the public schools themselves--might be conducted in a way that makes it impossible for people of certain religions to take advantage of it.(177)
Here, there are two burden questions: Is there a "substantial burden" here at all, given that the government isn't making it legally impossible for anyone to do anything, but only making it religiously impossible for them to take advantage of the property? And even if the answer to the first question is potentially yes, are certain government benefits--for instance, the ability to eat in a certain cafeteria--so slight that it is not a substantial burden to provide them in ways that certain religions can't use?
QUOTE
Nathan Diament. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Event Transcript May 21, 2002. Reconciling Obligations: Accommodating Religious Practice on the Job: Other things that might come up but are a little more difficult to get a handle on might be something like the requirement to eat kosher food, which could come up, obviously in situations where you have a company retreat or a company picnic and somehow the employees are expected to fully participate in that. Generally, however, kosher food is more and more ubiquitous in America. One of the things my organization does besides be involved in public policy work is we're the largest certification agency for kosher food products in the country, so when you see a little circle with a U in it on your Oreos or on your Coke or whatever it is, that's us attesting to it being kosher, and so it's fairly easy to get kosher food coast to coast. And of course there's always the fruit plate or the vegetarian menu in some fashion where you can also make do very successfully.
Those are the main issues that come up with regard to the accommodations of orthodox Jewish employees, and I think you can see why our community in particular has long been very concerned and very focused upon making sure that these protections are in place, because at the end of the day gainful employment and successful employment is really the gateway to success in the United States in being able to support your family and being a productive member of society. And we strongly believe that whether it's Orthodox Jews or people of other faiths, that no one should be forced to choose between their career and their conscience.
Finally, here's a
list of case summaries regarding religious accommodations in prison. I'm listing this because it shows how individual cases can go either way depending upon the facts of the case and the distinction between reasonable accommodation and undue burden. Prison-related case law has to be taken in context. On the one hand, the prison has a captive audience, so it is frequently required to accommodate in ways other institutions wouldn't in the free world. On the other hand, prisons are rife with spurious claims, so occasionally a summary may omit a finding based on distrust of the plaintiff's credibility; a case on the "outside" with similar facts and evidence might easily go the other way given a more credible plaintiff. In addition, there's the
Safley-O'Lone standard that allows prison regulations to impinge on constitutional rights "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests".
At any rate, right or wrong, the legal precedent closest to the facts in the footbath case would
tend to indicate that providing footbaths is
not required, but funding them with state money
could be permissible provided the $20k isn't an undue burden, and the footbaths either have a legitimate non-religious utility, or are central to the religion. A court would probably find that there's no religious mandate for expensive footbaths; but a court may or may not find that footbaths have a significan non-religious utility; in the absense of clarity, courts may either decide in such a way that effectively defers to the university officials, or they may choose to decide it themselves.
Either way, it's unlikely that a
church-state separation issue under the
establishment clause would hold up if the facts of the case already include a finding that footbaths are
not a religious
requirement to begin with. To apply chuch-state separation, one side would have to argue that Islam mandates not just footwashing, but also footbaths-- I doubt competent counsel would make that mistake in court. Otherwise, the other side would have to argue that washing feet serves no useful purpose except to Muslims-- to make that case, you'd probably have to argue that baths and showers serve no useful purpose to non-Muslims, either-- a very dubious line of reasoning, to most of us who wash our feet at least once a week whether they need it or not,

with a range of frequency deemed reasonable. Maybe someone else could find another opening for a church-state separation argument, but from what I can tell, successfully applying church-state separation in this case would seem unprecedented, and possibly establish new precedent counter to current trends, if allowed to stand by a high court.
I would argue from my political agenda, not current law, that tax or tuition funds shouldn't be spent on significantly religious or unnecessary projects except possibly where equal access to state resources is an issue, but private funds covering installation and maintenance would be preferable if the project filled a real need. Many courts tend to clarify the important legal issues, then leave a large chunk of such decisions to the bureaucrats or legislators. Others tend towards more micro-management. At the end of the day, as happens so frequently, it's impossible to know for sure how courts will rule on a case as it makes its way through the system.
edited to add...QUOTE
Lesly:Is there something disrespectful/insensitive/undue about "forcing" Muslims to use damp paper towels?
In the spirit of the question and the context of a state education or prison environment, the answer is no. If "forcing" were not in quotes, I'm far enough into legal mode to try to quibble. Argh! Okay, I'm fine now.
also edited to insert accidentally omitted words and correct some strange punctuation encoding