Full Version: Balanced Budget Veto Amendment
Let's start out simple... here is the text of the proposed amendment:
Now most balanced budget amendment proposals would enshrine "balanced budget" as a dogma in the constitution; this just gives the president to balance the budget if congress fails to. Secondly, the most interesting aspect of this proposal is that the president has line-item veto if and only if the budget is unbalance from the previous fiscal year. Personally, I'd have to admit this idea does have some merit. Note: This was proposed by the Cato Institute--the merit of this proposal is the debate here... not their political stance. If anyone wants to debate that... please start another thread.
Does this amendment or portions thereof have any merit? Why or why not?
Would you change any part of this proposal? In what way? And why so?
More specifically, does the idea of giving the president a line-item veto if and only if the budget of the previous fiscal year is unbalanced have any merit? Why or why not?
QUOTE
Section 1. For purposes of this article, the budget of the United States for any given fiscal year shall be deemed unbalanced whenever the total amount of the debt of the United States held by the public at the close of such fiscal year is greater than the total amount of the debt of the United States held by the public at the close of the preceding fiscal year.
Section 2. If the budget of the United States is unbalanced for any given fiscal year, the President may separately approve, reduce or disapprove any monetary amounts in any legislation that appropriates or authorizes the appropriation of any money drawn from the Treasury, other than money for the legislative and judicial branches of the United States Government, and which is presented to the President during the next annual session of Congress.
Section 3. Any legislation that the President approves with changes pursuant to section 2 of this article shall become law as modified. The President shall return with objections those portions of the legislation containing reduced or disapproved monetary amounts to the House where such legislation originated, which may then, in the manner prescribed under section 7 of Article I for bills disapproved by the President, separately reconsider those reduced or disapproved monetary amounts.
Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to implement this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 5. This article shall take effect on the first day of the next annual session of Congress following its ratification.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by Congress.
Section 2. If the budget of the United States is unbalanced for any given fiscal year, the President may separately approve, reduce or disapprove any monetary amounts in any legislation that appropriates or authorizes the appropriation of any money drawn from the Treasury, other than money for the legislative and judicial branches of the United States Government, and which is presented to the President during the next annual session of Congress.
Section 3. Any legislation that the President approves with changes pursuant to section 2 of this article shall become law as modified. The President shall return with objections those portions of the legislation containing reduced or disapproved monetary amounts to the House where such legislation originated, which may then, in the manner prescribed under section 7 of Article I for bills disapproved by the President, separately reconsider those reduced or disapproved monetary amounts.
Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to implement this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 5. This article shall take effect on the first day of the next annual session of Congress following its ratification.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by Congress.
Now most balanced budget amendment proposals would enshrine "balanced budget" as a dogma in the constitution; this just gives the president to balance the budget if congress fails to. Secondly, the most interesting aspect of this proposal is that the president has line-item veto if and only if the budget is unbalance from the previous fiscal year. Personally, I'd have to admit this idea does have some merit. Note: This was proposed by the Cato Institute--the merit of this proposal is the debate here... not their political stance. If anyone wants to debate that... please start another thread.
Does this amendment or portions thereof have any merit? Why or why not?
Would you change any part of this proposal? In what way? And why so?
More specifically, does the idea of giving the president a line-item veto if and only if the budget of the previous fiscal year is unbalanced have any merit? Why or why not?
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