The idea for this topic was sparked by a comment from Trouble on another thread. A response would have likely dragged the thread off-topic, so I thought I'd start a new one to address it:




I'm not sure what he meant by the above. Will things change in Iraq when Petraeus leaves? For better or worse and why? Is Petraeus a good candidate for this position? Please explain your reasoning.

I'm leery of his ascension to CENTCOM Commander; not because he is not competent and intelligent, but because of Iraq and the surge strategy. Leaving aside the debate of whether the surge is succeeding or failing, the military is experiencing a paradigm shift in doctrine and strategic emphasis. Petraeus's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy has many sound tenets, but the further shift from a national defense institution to one that is almost entirely focused and trained for COIN and nation-building (with the ever present nation-destroying component), represents a dangerous imperial shift.

This shift is going beyond expeditionary; the effort in Iraq has produced many effective tenets such as effects based operations and network centric warfare, but I fear that politicians and senior commanders will be all too eager to attempt a perpetual series of Iraq-ish adventures, to the detriment of the US military and the United States.

This is highlighted in several DoD Directives, to give equal footing to what the DoD used to call Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), now referred to as Stability Operations. The promotion of the architect of the surge, promotes the concept that the US military can and should enter into this type of role, instead of national defense.

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense
shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat
operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including
doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities,
and planning.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf

Hm. I have to wonder, though...isn't this the proper way to go about the situation as it stands now? Seems to me that Iraq has been a steady upwards learning curve for the military and, had they used this idea and concentrated on stability five years ago, things would be better today.

Isn't this the type of thing that is needed in Afghanistan? I've read that David Kilcullen is the man behind advisement for the new COIN policy and he's pretty sharp. I've also read that Odierno is taking over for Petraeus. That being the case he will continue what Petraeus did as they are birds of a feather. I suppose I'm hoping that Petraeus could use some sway to send a little more help in Afghanistan's direction. Perhaps I'm naive and/or uninformed....

Just found an article at the council on foreign relations website. It has some informative links.

Here is an informative report on the debate within the army regarding Petreaus' COIN doctrine. The article seems very even-handed. Some of it backs exactly what DTOM said above, the other side disagrees.

The upwards falling erm... ascension of Petraus signifies the mainstream acceptance of walling off neighbourhoods and firing at them with large scale ballistics. Follow that up with under reporting about how many defected or who was killed and then move on to the next op. This is the ugly side of COIN. This is a scenario where no significant attempts are made to segregate the public from the combatants and more importantly, by uprooting the family element we force entire families to defend themselves so we can then conveniently label the resistance as underhanded and cowardly.

The attacks in Sadr city are a wonderful example of this failure-in-action. Here's how military spokesman Lt. Col. Steve Stover spun it.

QUOTE

"'The sole burden of responsibility lies on the shoulders of the militants who care nothing for the Iraqi people….' He said the militiamen purposely attack from buildings and alleyways in densely populated areas, hoping to protect themselves by hiding among civilians. 'What does that say about the enemy?… He is heartless and evil.'"

He's lucky I wasn't within earshot because I would have taken a swipe at him after hearing those rather dishonest remarks.

Moreover, Mr. Bobby Gates has indicated at a speech at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base and at West Point wherein he conveyed his disapproval at how slow the armed services were to adapt to the developing counterinsurgencies of the present and future. (Like we need more planned wars after Iraq but that is beside the point).

I've seen a transmogrification of policy that has gone from warring armies to guerrilla war and founding counter parties, to war on entire neighbourhoods with no limit or timeframe ever put into writing. This IS COIN. Obviously concepts like reconstruction never take place because the rooting out of ever-present but continually undefined enemies becomes a self sustaining endeavor. This is war on society which bears a striking resemblence to Palestine.

The only thing COIN will accomplish is the point I've repeatedly made since day one of joining this website, that should this mistake that is Iraq be allowed to continue for a long enough time the crimes and failures will be insignificant if left unchecked. Repetition is the ultimate failure. If this type of thinking is being taken seriously at the high level the threshold for violence will be undoubtedly lowered. Allegations are all the evidence that will be required when paired with the attitudes of the NPR article. That is my definition of an entity which is more diabolical than the most murderous icons of history because of the great disconnect between cause and effect. This is a sin that defies words.

What has tripped me up about this war is how the enemy has shifted from one corner to another. First it was Saddam, then Al-Quada, then the Baath party, then Iran, then Sadr, back to Iran, and finally plus or minus a few special interest groups thrown in for good measure. To an observer, this strikes me as a war against all. I'll make a prediction, Bush will do everything to disenchant the Shiites and they will trade places with the Sunnis as the enemy. Sounds stupid but then this entire war is stupid. Nir Rosen articulates the haphazardness of American policy by presenting a myopia which is weighted more in ideological fervor than reality. His article perfectly illustrates my opinion of next generation interventions - delusional and dishonest.

We've devouted entire threads on how to get out. Well guess what? There are no exit strategies. COIN operations represent a long term conflict initiative when the hearts and minds strategy has long been abandoned. If one follows the money the proposed condo development and luxery hotels in the green zone tells one all they need to know. COIN will most likely entail shifting from insurgency-guerilla type operations to a tool of the government to repressing political uprisings like the kind latin america used to enjoy. Yep you guessed it, this is more about stomping out political outcry (which might entail leaving) than any form of insurgency.

If there were any doubts that supercop imperialism was on the decline, COIN suddenly gave this mania another shot in the arm. Any ranking general who implements this as policy is a war criminal and should be treated as such.

You are correct on quite a few levels. The current COIN paradigm is akin more to the Warsaw Ghetto than the Malaysia model, which is also why we face near insurmountable odds of success. If this were an agrarian, rural insurgency, we would face much better odds. Since this is a primarily urban insurgency, our chances for success diminish the longer we stay. Our current approach to COIN is more mainstream than revolutionary; and as such we are still slow to evolve and react compared to our adversaries. Unfortunately, most of the more vocal supporters in the media and punditry, as well as on have only a 'Cliffnotes' understanding of the successful tenets of COIN.

An article in the National Journal puts it succinctly:

Victory in a conventional war goes to the big battalions. Defeating an insurgency is a more intimate affair; it requires small units that can win over, or kill, one enemy fighter at a time.

At the same time, the tribal sheiks have learned to work with, around, and through the Americans in pursuit of their own purposes. What the British statesman Lord Palmerston famously said of nations also applies to tribes -- they have no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests. Many of the sheiks now working with the United States against Al Qaeda in Iraq fought on the other side before and could change their allegiances again. They therefore remain distinctly unsteady partners not only for the United States but also for the Iraqi central government, which is dominated by Shiite clerics, political parties, and other nontribal forces.

Although tribes are by no means the only players on the Iraqi scene, American intervention, both by accident and by design, is increasing their power. The U.S. started its occupation of Iraq by dissolving or undercutting Western-style institutions such as the Iraqi army, the Baath Party, and state-owned industries, without providing alternative sources of security, leadership, or jobs. Now the U.S. is trying to end its occupation of Iraq in large part by working with, and strengthening, the tribal sheiks who stepped into the vacuum the U.S. had created.

Even with Petraeus and his COIN strategy forged at CAC and SAMS at Ft. Leavenworth, KS we are still woefully tied to the conventional structure for our military and our institutional knowledge base. We are attempting to function in an urban COIN environment using a conventional model.

I've witnessed many small success stories such as in the Doura neighborhood of East Rashid. Once a hotbed of AQI activity, our Cavalry Squadron was able to forge alliances with the local sheiks and their tribal functionaries and bring some amount of stability to that area; an important area since it contained the Doura Oil Refinery. What exacerbated issues of security however, was the Iraqi Government's insistence on meddling in security measures. They insisted on using Kurdish Peshmerga units for outer perimeter security of the refinery; who had trust issues with the Facilities Protections Service guards inside the facility; both of which had no love or loyalty to the National Police who were responsible for neighborhood security. Our Cav guys spent more time refereeing between the factions and their divided loyalties, than progressing stability and reconciliation. And this was a success story! Success has occurred at the tactical level, but we're nowhere close on the strategic level.

Compounding this type of dynamic is the issue of targeting within a COIN environment. We still abide by inter and intra turf rivalries and power plays. Both conventional forces and SOC units conduct parallel intelligence assessments and targeting for high value individuals. Unfortunately, even though liaison officers reside at the higher command headquarters, cross talk frequently doesn't happen, and one raid by a SOC Joint Assault Force can completely unravel the bonds forged between tribe and battlespace owner. And visa-versa.

I could quite literally go on all day, but suffice it so say that while I respect Petraeus as a conventional leader, I don't believe that his model will ultimately succeed, and if success does somehow occur, it will merely embolden the D0D and future administrations to embark on yet more interventionist escapades.