QUOTE(amlord @ Jul 10 2003, 12:15 PM)
I believe that using a precedent from a foreign body has no legal basis.
Comparing our laws to those of Europe or Saudi Arabia or any other country carries no legal weight.
I cannot believe that a Supreme Court justice would ever reference a foreign decision when coming to a decision about the Constitutionality of any specific law.
Is he using it as a binding precedent, or merely as a way of illustrating a point using a concrete example instead of making one up? Justices have historically referred to all manner of philosophers, authors, and other non-US non-legal sources to illustrate or explain a point, and there's nothing wrong with that. Kennedy is not saying we should do X because an Irish court did X.
BTW, a link to the full text would have been appropriate. We all know that edited quotes can be and often are abused to misrepresent the intent or even the essence of an original. At least identify which decision the quotes are from.
Update: the case is Lawrence et al vs. Texas, the Supreme Court link is here, the Akamai mirror is here, and people might not have realized from the biased editing that Bowers v. Hardwick was a US case. Kennedy's point was that the earlier Bowers case was predicated on a vague reference to "western Civilization" - itself a reference to non-authoritative non-US non-legal sources - and that the reference was incorrect. If you read the actual opinion, you'll see that Kennedy continually places the US constitution and legal precedents above such "external" sources. He's doing what I often do: accepting a known false premise for the sake of argument, and showing that the conclusion is still wrong. Here's Kennedy's real argument, from the syllabus:QUOTE
Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the
Bowers Court stated that proscriptions against sodomy have ancient
roots. 478 U. S., at 192. It should be noted, however, that there is no
longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter.
...
In his
dissenting opinion in Bowers JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that (1) the
fact a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process. That
analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls here. Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is
hereby overruled.