While reading an article on foxnews.com, I came across this little tidbit:
Iraq: U.S Must Keep Eye on the Prize


As a side note, I offer this hefty explanation of the entire Iraq situation by the Rand Institute: US Nation-building: from germany to Iraq

Is there an international standard which the US must now meet before pulling out of Iraq. Would it be unlawful for us to leave before Iraq has a sovereign government?

The Fourth Geneva Convention has a lot to say about the responsibilities of "occupying powers" and would probably be a pretty good starting point.

How does it apply to pulling out? It has implications about the occupation, but what about the removal of the occupying power? Or is that exercise left to the reader?

Though ponderous at times, I read most of The Rand report but I was struck by what wasn't in the document. Namely, how much is all this nation-building going to actually cost?

The answer from the report was this,"A few brave souls have attempted to estimate the cost of reconstructing Iraq. We will not venture to do that here."

Say what?

The authors of the report do offer this interesting observation: "...Iraq will require substantial external funds for humanitarian assistance and budgetary support. Taxes on the oil sector are highly unlikely to be adequate to fund the reconstruction of the Iraqui economy in the immediate future." (emphasis added).

Funny how nobody mentioned that when the U.S. invaded Iraq and the Bush Administration assured the folks back home that once the oil started pumping again without Saddam in charge, the occupation and liberation of the country would pay for itself.

Thus, the American taxpayers is left with a needy client state that will be soaking us for years both economically and in the blood of slain U.S. troops. Nice going, Dubya.

And who's to say that "staying the course" is going to create that oasis of democracy Bush envisions:

The Bush administration bungled the job of establishing order after the war. But correcting its mistakes is only part of the challenge. As foreign policy scholar David Edelstein of Georgetown University explains in a paper presented recently at the University of Chicago, the United States is bucking long odds to think it can succeed at occupation.

Edelstein looked at 25 occupations that have taken place since 1815 and found only five accomplished their purposes. The vexing paradox is that "occupations succeed only if they are lengthy, but lengthy occupations elicit nationalist reactions that impede successful occupations ... To succeed, therefore, occupiers must both maintain their own interest in a long occupation and convince an occupied population to accept extended control by a foreign power."

That requirement conflicts with the notorious impatience of Americans, a trait that is not limited to critics of the war. The Pentagon predicted before the Iraq war that our troops would be there for a maximum of six months. The administration has suggested it could duplicate the transformation of Germany and Japan after World War II. But those occupations lasted several years, and few Americans are looking forward to staying that long in Iraq.

Not only that, but the conditions that helped those occupations work are absent this time. Both countries were defeated and conquered, rather than merely liberated from a tyrant. "Liberated populations are likely to desire independence, not further occupation," says Edelstein. In both cases, the occupied people perceived an external threat--the Soviet Union--that gave them a stake in the occupation. The Iraqis, lacking that worry, can focus their ire on us.

Edelstein says that failing occupations typically have three stages. In the first, "occupying powers belatedly recognize the difficulty of the occupation tasks confronting them." In the next, "despite the growing commitment of the occupying power, the challenges of the occupation only multiply instead of diminish." Sound familiar?

Finally, the occupier faces a choice: to leave with its goals unmet or, as Bush puts it, "stay the course." This show of resolve may impress voters and other nations. Unfortunately, notes Edelstein, history suggests that this option "is only likely to generate more resentment, more cost, and less success. Stay or go, the occupying power has failed."

During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, once asked whether it was better politically "to `lose' now or to `lose' after committing 100,000 men. Tentative answer: the latter." But we shouldn't sacrifice American soldiers to postpone the inevitable.

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columni...ll=chi-news-col

I don't see this statement has being any different than anything that was told. The key point is 'immediate future'. It was well known going in that it would take some time to build up the oil production capability of Iraq. So, it isn't any surprise that, until then, the funds from this won't be adequate. Of much greater interest would be what funds this will generate in the medium- to long- term future. And, in the same vein, what the expected medium to long term costs are projected to be.

I would add that not having these costs doesn't necessarily indicate a lack of planning. The infrastructure situation was largely in an 'unknown' state until post-invasion. Not knowing the state really prevented any accurate short-term plan or projection of costs with any accuracy. This should be a much more 'knowable' item now, and one which should be discussed.

As for the expected length of occupation, I think that there should be significant troop drawdowns sometime in the middle of next year. I think there will be significant, although considerably lesser, presence for at least a couple of years after that.

Edelstein states:.

I think this is key. To me, this would primarily entail growing unrest amongst the citizenry of Iraq. As long as they support our involvement, the military challenges can be met. Without their support, the challenges will multiply. I think the fact that we are only occupying, rather than inhabiting a defeated country, will give impetus to various necessary issues (such as choosing a government, taking over the infrastructure improvements, deploying a security force), rather than a hindrance. This will require, however, that we are able to move swiftly enough to prevent major frustrations from building internally. The good news is that Iraqis and the Americans should be in agreement--the sooner the US can leave, the better.

I don't think it really takes all that imagination to say that, if we're required to preserve certain civic functions such as hospitals or courts during the occupation, we would be remiss to leave before we have reason to believe that those functions will continue to be preserved. Without such an expectation of continuance, the entire 4GC could be circumvented by merely walking out whenever you couldn't be bothered living up to its requirements. I guess I just assumed that the connection would be obvious to most readers.