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Minor insurgency, made as big as it is only by domestic political opposition in the US, which Iraqs are quite aware of.
The insurgency would be sputtering along at this rate no matter the domestic political climate in the US. The focus of the bad guys is to tear apart the coalition – to leave the US holding the bag alone, at which point they feel confident that domestic pressures would force an early pull out.
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…they're unable to cause enough casualties to be militarily significant, or to strike strategic objectives.
You misunderstand
strategic objectives. In this case, the attacks on international and coalition targets in Iraq – the UN HQ bombing, the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies, the Italian compound, the Spanish intel team, the Japanese diplomats, etc. – are strategic targets, designed to rip apart the coalition and degrade international support for the US. Unfortunately, at this point our guys are in the unenviable position of being tactical targets – we’re everywhere (well, only in small numbers in the southeast) - and killing a few GI’s in a drive-by or an IED attack serves only tactical objectives at the moment.
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What we should do about it is first to debureaucratize the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority, but the troops call it Can't Produce Anything) and force them to listen to the field commanders.
The CPA is not the entity supposed to
listen to the field commanders. LTG Sanchez, the commander of CJTF-7 is the senior decision-maker for military operations in country – he is the one they are talking to. In fact, he gives them an extraordinary amount of leeway in operations – no micromanagement. Sanchez has Bremer’s ear for whatever he needs to get done for the military.
Bremer and his fat bureaucracy at the CPA Baghdad are
supposed to be tuned into the CPA representatives out at the 18 governorate CPA’s. They are mostly Department of State civilians – CPA Baghdad also gets feedback from the Governorate Support Teams (GSTs – mostly military, usually Civil Affairs) and Local Governance Teams (LGTs – USAID folks and contractors). A lot of the governorate CPA’s are left hanging, dependent upon their own resources, or what they can coordinate in the way of support with very little assistance from CPA Baghdad. That’s a problem.
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The next step is to accelerate the handover to Iraqis of the policing, counter-insurgency and government.
That only works if they’re ready to take on that responsibility. Meaning, that we’ve trained and equipped them adequately for the task. So far, we’ve failed miserably – at least with the Iraqi police. That entire program needs to be revamped. Currently, a large number of Iraqi police are being trained by the Jordanians – it remains to be seen how effective that will be.
The new Iraqi Army is another element that has yet to be tested. I withhold judgment for the time being.
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There is a Karzai in Iraq somewhere. It's not up to us to find him, but we need to get a procedure in place for the Iraqis to find him ASAP.
The procedure for transition to national elections has already been laid out – after having gone through several changes. And I have no doubt that it will be tweaked more as time goes on. If we rush to elections simply in order to depart Iraq as quickly as possible for our own convenience, this will ensure the failure of the democratic transition and continued violent instability. If the US pulls out before ensuring an honest and open transition to a democratically elected government, a return to the cycle of coup and counter-coup in the formation of governing regimes is most likely; as was the case with Iraq and Syria in the ‘50s and ‘60s.