Up until last month, the claim could just as easily have been made that
Saddam Hussein did not exist in Iraq, using the same logic that now says WMD do not exist in Iraq, did not exist in Iraq, or were never going to exist in Iraq. The best we can say on this subject is, 'unfinished search in progress, Kay final report due.' But, even Kay's interim report detailed the current finds of evidence of programs in place; Saddam&Co clearly had a wish list. During his coming trial and the very public 'this is your life' spectacle, we will all have to decide if these were the kinds of folks that should have continued to have unfettered access to the resource of a nation of 25 million people, allowed to continue to run The Republic of Fear unmolested.
Are we saying that the threat may not have been
imminent? Exactly, and exactly the argument publicly made in the 2003 SOTU:
QUOTE
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.
Not a very well hidden argument, appearing in the 2003 SOTU as it did. Was anybody listening at that point? That direct speech to the American people does not sound at all like a claim that 'the threat is imminent'--just the opposite, though, in this election year, that is how the explicit statement above had been turned on its ear.
Still, our own intelligence community is a funny thing when it comes to pre connecting the dots before anything actually happens. In that endeavor, it is regarded as both a floor wax and a dessert topping.
FOr example, sifting through it's various pre 9/11 evidence and cherry picking from it post 9/11, some claim that
we should have acted on that intelligence, before 9/11, to keep something from happening.
But, at the same time, many also claim that, in regards to the Iraq/WMD,
we should not have acted on intelligence from the precise same body.And yet, fresh from coming down after our recent maligned even after 9/11 brush with an Orange Alert in which
nothing happened, can you
imagine the pre 9/11 grief that would have fallen on the Administration if they had, before the context of 9/11, issued an Orange Alert, turned back flights, and flew CAP over civilian flights?
But, after all, the Bush administration had been
precisely warned: '...likely in the next quarter of a century...' Yet, the stated policy of the US Government before Bush took office was also 'regime change in Iraq.' It is hard to blame the 22nd Amendment for any of the above, because clearly, what was not even started in 8 years of merely
knowing what to do could not be finished in 8 months of actually doing.
The question of Saddam's future plans for WMD in Iraq is safely moot, mere fodder for internet debate. As an added bonus, it is hard to shed a tear for the architect of the 1979 purge, caught on film. It's not necessary to ignore the odd Iraqi no longer being fed feet first into the plastic shredder because the screams last longer.
Perhaps we should have let the wind emanating from East 44th street continue, unabated. "Can you keep the screaming down over there? We're trying to have a nuanced debate over here."
Perhaps we should have looked forward to the 30th anniversary symposium at some future Renaissance Weekend(I hear the crab spread is spectacular), "What Should We Do About The Middle East?" Safely caring from afar has been a real growth industry.
Perhaps we should have once again sent mad Albright to the UN to campaign for 'genocide-like' instead of 'genocide' as our kindler, gentler solution to the Paradox of Violence. After all, that was back when the world loved us.
regards,
Frediano