I found a very long, but informative article
here, published by the Council on Foreign Relations. It was written recently, January of this year. It seems to be fairly unbiased, from the personal and related observations and collected research of Kenneth M. Pollack, director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution…A former director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and a former Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA.
Is popular Iraqi resistance to US troops a major concern in Iraq, or is the "resistance" mainly regime loyalists and terrorists? I believe that the brunt of resistance is from the regime loyalists and al-Qa'eda….perhaps the occasional Sunni tribesmen. I think the majority of Iraq wants to avoid a civil war and chaos, and see us as a necessary evil to restore order to their country. Unfortunately, there is an enormous amount of lawlessness and looting, which adds to the instability. The Iraqi population is weary of banditry. They want to be safe first and above all, then have political autonomy and get us out.
Is the concern over the "legitimacy" of the political process the primary concern for those providing security in Iraq? I hope that the primary objective right now is keeping the Iraqi population safe, and attempt to prevent continued sabotage of the infrastructure (secondary, of course, to not coming home injured or in a body bag).
It’s a difficult situation. To make matters worse, the process of recruitment and training of Iraqi policemen to share the burden isn’t going well. Training for these Iraqi policemen has been greatly abbreviated and often too cursory for purposes of expediency, and there is corruption.
QUOTE
Privately, numerous Administration and CPA officials in both Washington and Baghdad have conceded that probably only about half of the Iraqi security personnel that we keep on the books actually show up for work, with the police and the Facility Protection Service people being the worst (and they account for 80 percent of the total force).……
(later)
A lot of "bad eggs" slipped in and this has proven particularly problematic among the Iraqi police, where many of the former policemen recalled to the colors have proven to be criminals themselves. Iraqis and Americans state that too many Iraqi policemen are guilty of extortion, bribery, prolonged absences (often never showing up at all), kidnappings, rape, arson, assault, and even murder. A common story is that the police will pick up a man or woman off the street and hold them -- sometimes in the local police headquarters -- until their family pays to have them released. If the family does not pay, the hostage can be beaten or raped to encourage them to do so, and if they are unwilling or unable (and sometimes even if they do pay) the hostage may simply disappear. The problem is so bad that three different CPA officials told me that if they were out alone outside the Green Zone (admittedly a rare experience for many American officials) and they were flagged down by an Iraqi police officer, they probably would not stop because they would be too frightened of what he might do. This is not to say that there are not thousands of honest, hard-working, well-intentioned, and extremely brave Iraqi police officers, only that there are also many felons and would-be felons now charged with keeping order in Iraq's streets.
Is the coalition making reasonable progress in Iraq? The problem is, we have very little basis for comparison to make the assessment whether or not progress has been made. I went to
Danya’s first link, and read of the observations made by American families visiting their children who are soldiers over in Iraq. The observations were interesting, but not much of a basis for how the reconstruction is going. Before the occupation, Baghdad had round the clock power. Much of the rest of the country went without. Now, the power is on for 18-22 hours throughout much of the country. Ask a person in Baghdad what they think about the power situation, and they will give you a completely different opinion than someone living in an area which never had power before.
Department officials, contractors, and members of non-governmental organizations have spread out into many Iraqi villages and built schools, restored bridges, repaired hospitals, cleaned out irrigation ditches, dug sewers, ect. This is a country whose infrastructure has been neglected for well over a decade. Iraq was wartorn 15 years ago, and never recovered. They were under a tyrannical dictatorship. Add to that over a decade of sanctions in which (supposedly) more than a million people starved. Often, buildings and infrastructure were shoddily built to begin with. Improvements are crippled by looting and sabotage. Pipelines are shot or blown up. Cables are cut. Equipment is stolen when left unguarded.
Jobs are down (I’m getting that from Danya’s post, I haven’t confirmed it personally) from around 60 percent unemployment to 80, but 60 is whoppingly high. If those 20 percent were in the military (and we know, they most likely were), it wouldn’t be prudent to keep them in uniform, until they’ve undergone an extensive screening and training process (see above).
It is impossible for me to sit here at my laptop and determine whether reasonable progress is being made in Iraq. I think that under the circumstances, it probably is.
One thing of which I am very certain, is that we must continue to focus our efforts in improving the situation. Whether right or wrong, we took this on and we have to finish it reasonably well. If the Gulf Wars were fought to obtain stability in the region because we have a vested interest there (and we do), there is much at stake.
QUOTE
Saudi Arabia is frail enough as it is. Many analysts fear that even on its own, the Saudi state might not last another ten years. Add to that the tremendously destabilizing influence of civil war in Iraq next door, and no one should be sanguine about Saudi prospects. Kuwait is another major oil producer, and if chaos consumed Iraq and Saudi Arabia, it would be hard for tiny Kuwait to remain inviolate. The loss of oil production as a result of chaos or revolution in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait would cripple the international oil market with unimaginable consequences for the global economy. Beyond them, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Syria are all also economically and political fragile and all would suffer from the political, military and economic spillover of a failed state in Iraq.
Nor are these simply abstract warnings. They are being played out on the ground even today. Already the Iranians, Syrians, Turks, and Saudis have begun to stake out their turf and potential proxies in the event that Iraq falls apart. The Iranians, Saudis and Turks have all (generally) been urging their supporters to cooperate with the U.S.-led occupation, recognizing that chaos in Iraq would be the worst possible outcome for them, but behind the scenes they all appear to be making plans for the possibility that reconstruction fails and they are forced to provide for their own security. Throughout the region, officials and other elites are terrified that the United States will fail or abandon Iraq and the country will slip into Lebanon-like strife. All of them are convinced that it will create massive problems for them. Even Israeli officials are beginning to plan for the possibility of such development, although they recognize that they will be powerless to control the evils that will arise for them from such a development.
BTW..Welcome to the forum, Lone Wolf

I really REALLY appreciate hearing views from those on the inside. Thanks a million.