QUOTE
Clarke claims, for example, that in early 2001, when he told President Bush's National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice about al-Qaida, her "facial expression gave me the impression that she had never heard the term before."
From an interview on WJR in Detroit, October 4th 2000, 11 months BEFORE the 9/11 attacks:
QUOTE
RICE: Osama bin Laden, do two things, the first is you really have to get the intelligence agencies better organized to deal with the terrorist threat to the United States itself. One of the problems that we have is a kind of split responsibility, of course, between the CIA in foreign intelligence and the FBI in domestic intelligence. There needs to be better cooperation because we don't want to wake up one day and find out that Osama bin Laden has been successful on our own territory.
This blows the both the assertion that
a. Condi Rice didn't know who Al Qaeda was
and
b. that the Bush team was not concerned over terrorism.
Rice was a member of the Bush campaign, and was one of Bush's first nominees (National Security Advisor).
I agree with Aquilla (again) that Clarke's statements may not be an attempt to give facts, but merely his opinions on the situation.
But, it should be made clear that they are impressions and not facts.
When Clarke says Bush "ignored the threats" and "did nothing": are those facts, or mere opinions? Clarke leaves it at face value, and since he is such an expert in this area, we are left to assume that they are, indeed, facts.
I take issue with Wertz's assertion that "making plans" is equivalent to "Doing nothing". It might be for some who don't understand how the government (heck, ANY large organization) is run, but the statement is simply untrue, demonstrably untrue by Clarke's own words. The planning stages make up the Lion's share of any operation. Execution is the end game.
Even if we accept that Bush "did nothing" by merely planning to attack Al Qaeda, how does that leave the comment that he "ignored the problem"?
Certainly he cannot simultaneously ignore a problem and make plans to solve it, can he?
Let's stay focused on Clarke's statements: he leaves the undeniable sense that Bush was somewhat culpable for 9/11. He implies that terrorism was less of a concern for Bush than it was with Clinton, that somehow Clinton took the issue much more seriously and gave it a higher priority.
Clarke, in 2002, left me with the impression that it was CLINTON's administration that was doing less than it should have:
QUOTE
QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December (of 2000) and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...
CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.
QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?
CLARKE: There was no new plan.
QUESTION: No new strategy — I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...
CLARKE: Plan, strategy — there was no, nothing new.
So the Clinton administration really came up with nothing new, no action items that it presented to the incoming Bush team.
But what DID Bush do in the early part of his term?
Let's let Richard Clarke tell us:
QUOTE
ANGLE: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?
CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?
One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.
ANGLE: And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was ...
CLARKE: No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed — began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.
He answers the question right there. Bush WAS changing the policy towards Pakistan and the Taliban prior to 9/11. Remember, one of the big hurdles to tackling Al Qaeda was the fact that Pakistan backed it. By giving Pakistan incentive to distance itself from the Taliban (and Al Qaeda, by proxy) Bush was indeed doing something.
Clarke again:
QUOTE
CLARKE: No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.
QUESTION: Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct?
CLARKE: No, it was March.
Recall that "rollback" was a containment policy. So, Bush shifted the US policy from containment to elimination--in March 2001.
Again, I hardly think this can be characterized as "doing nothing" or "ignoring" the problem.