Wertz, a link to the testimony would be helpful.
Well, let me oblige:
Ashcroft denies taking little interest in terrorismQUOTE
Pickard said that "in late June and through July, he met with Attorney General Ashcroft once a week," the report says. "He told us that though he initially briefed the attorney general regarding these threats, after two such briefings the attorney general told him he did not want to hear this information anymore."
Ashcroft disputed Pickard's account when he appeared before the commission, saying he met with him on more than two occasions.
"Secondly, I did never speak to him saying that I did not want to hear about terrorism," Ashcroft said.
It is not acceptable for any government official to lie. I don't see how either Pickard or Ashcroft has more motivation to lie in this case, however.
Pickard's take is that the FBI did not received the funding it requested (from Ashcroft). Ashcroft's take is that the FBI was
QUOTE
We did not know an attack was coming because for nearly a decade our government had blinded itself to its enemies," he said. "Our agents were isolated by government-imposed walls, handcuffed by government-imposed restrictions and starved for basic information technology.
Ashcroft criticized his predecessors at the Justice Department, saying a 1995 memorandum by then-Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick -- now a member of the commission -- hamstrung the FBI beyond what the law required.
Now to me, Gorelick should be before the commission, rather than on the Commission.
The US DoJ has de-classified this document:
Gorelick MemoGorelick apparently wanted to "prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation."
But back to Ashcroft,
Full Ashcroft testimonyHere is the statement:
QUOTE
My thorough review revealed no covert action program to kill Bin Laden.
But let's look at the full statement:
QUOTE
First, this Commission has debated the nature of the covert action authorities directed at Usama Bin Laden prior to 2001. In February 2001, shortly after becoming Attorney General, I reviewed these authorities.
Let me be clear: My thorough review revealed no covert action program to kill Bin Laden. There was a covert-action program to capture Bin Laden for criminal prosecution. But even this program was crippled by a snarled web of requirements, restrictions and regulations that prevented decisive action by our men and women in the field.
When they most needed clear, understandable guidance, our agents and operatives were given the language of lawyers. Even if they could have penetrated Bin Laden's training camps, they would have needed a battery of attorneys to approve the capture. With unclear guidance, our covert action team's risk of injury may have exceeded the risk to Usama Bin Laden.
On March 7, 2001, I met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. I recommended that the covert-action authorities be clarified and be expanded to allow for decisive, lethal action; we should end the failed "capture" policy. We should find and kill Bin Laden. I recall that Dr. Rice agreed and gave Director Tenet responsibility for drafting, clarifying, and expanding the new authorities.
My understanding of the Clinton stance was the bin Laden was to be captured, but if he resisted, then deadly force was authorized. There was never a standing "dead or alive" type warrant for bin Laden, no "shoot to kill" directive.
If I am wrong, please correct me.