The main argument for not taking out Saddam in the early 90's was that a civil war would erupt and that another nation might take advantage of the situation, given the fact that....


http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle...sp?story=514327

Qustions for debate:

1.)Will the generals be able to provide more troops who don't drop their weapons and run at the first sound of fire?

2.)Can we trust the old generals?

3.)Does their reinstatement prove that Papa Bush's theory was correct and that Junior was wrong? (i.e.-that you need Baathists to keep the rest in line)

1) Hopefully. No one knows yet.

2) We don't know this yet either.

3) It remains to be seen.


It's probably a good idea, but it depends very much on the individuals involved. As the intelligence about pre-war Iraq ia quite poor, apparently based mainly on the testimony of exiles, I suspect that we don't know much about these people, so it certainly seems a risk. Given the current situation though, it is probably a risk worth taking.

I'm rather mixed on the whole issue. One thing is certain, they are truly a loyal bunch. We couldn't lure anyone of them to depose Saddam, that venue surely was taken at some point in recent history. At the same time, I'm sure the generals wouldn't mind retaining their position in society for themselves and their families. Such considerations usually come before ideology. And why not, we used Nazi scientists after WWII, how are Baathist generals any worse??

Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia admitted yesterday (sort of..) that his advice before the war was to bribe the Iraqi army with 3 months pay each. That way, we would have a built in, ready-made security force.

I am not sure what the problem with the current security forces is, exactly. Perhaps the "cream of the crop" are now all resistance fighters, while the sluggards are on our side...

I'm not sure how well the "bribe the Iraqi army" plan would have gone over with the American public, and it was obviously rejected by the Administration.

This plan seems similar, except it is the leadership and not the enlisted guys. Might work...might backfire. It's hard to say.

1.)Will the generals be able to provide more troops who don't drop their weapons and run at the first sound of fire?

I fear its too late for that now, though I may be wrong in my assessment. I feel that if this had been done earlier it may have been a very prudent move. Now, as the intense anti American sentiments set in, I think that resorting to the former generals who once supported the Hussein regime will be seen as a sign of desperation and/ or a lack of integrity on behalf the Americans.


2.)Can we trust the old generals?

In much the same way as you could trust the South Vietnamese generals I don't doubt. Some will be motivated through greed, others through patriotism. They will have their own agenda's and reasons, and it is impossible to know whether they are true to their word or merely using this opportunity to further their own gain.

And never mind the Iraqi's. Can you even trust your own people? It is clear that the War in Iraq has been plagued by ineptitude and incompetance since the get go, and here is an article that clearly demonstrates that even the very highest ranks of he coalition cannot be trusted.

http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040510&s=cornjones


3.)Does their reinstatement prove that Papa Bush's theory was correct and that Junior was wrong? (i.e.-that you need Baathists to keep the rest in line)

That I can't say. I do find it curious though that there is so great a difference between GW Bush and his father. Does the President not consult his father at all in these matters?

1. Will the generals be able to provide more troops who don't drop their weapons and run at the first sound of fire?
No. The hope is for the Iraqi officers to provide leadership - which has been sorely lacking. Recruiting and training an Army is a slow process - unsurprisingly, rushing it has not had the desired results.

Too true.

2. Can we trust the old generals?
Screening of all local nationals who work with us has been a huge problem. The results have been mixed. If we had planned on this from the beginning, we could have focused initially on a careful selection of former Iraqi Army senior officers, and sent them to the US to train at various service academies, where we regularly train other foreign officers. Or to Germany, and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, which was originally established to train former senior Soviet and Warsaw Pact officers to operate an Army in a democracy.

Simply conducting a rapid screening and putting them in charge in the middle of significantly increased instability is the wrong answer. To me, that appears to be more of a shift the blame exercise than a true attempt at strengthening the new Iraqi army.

3. Does their reinstatement prove that Papa Bush's theory was correct and that Junior was wrong? (i.e.-that you need Baathists to keep the rest in line)
I do not hold with the elder Bush's theory that an authoritarian regime is necessary to keep order in Iraq. However, it has been demonstrated beyond a doubt that attempting post-conflict stabilization on the cheap is a recipe for failure also. Reinstating former Iraqi army senior officers is a viable option - if it follows the selection and training process as I stated above and they are not just thrown in as a stop-gap measure.