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The argument that the 14th Amendment provides protection based on "gender" is erroneous for two reasons. First, when the 14th Amendment was written, the concept of "gender" was wholly confined to grammar. It had no bearing whatsoever on biological sex, and even less on sexual preferences. Thus, to impute such a construction to the 14th Amendment is spurious. Second, even more damning to such an argument, is the amendment extending the right to vote to women. IF the 14th Amendment extended equal protection based on "gender", as understood to include biological sex, then the sufferage amendment would have been unnecessary, as would be the Equal Rights Amendment.
Bikerdad, you have apparently been in a coma for the last 30 odd years as the USSC has frequently interpreted the 14th as barring gender based discrimination.
From http:wps.prenhall.com
Gender Equality and the Fourteenth Amendment
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Although intended to guarantee equality for former slaves, the Fourteenth Amendment was written in terms of "any person." Early feminists unsuccessfully tried to get the Supreme Court to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as barring gender discrimination. The women's movement, led by Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, and others, labored from the Civil War until 1920 to achieve the vote for women, which came in the Nineteenth Amendment.
It was only in the 1970s that the Supreme Court became open to the view that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited gender discrimination. In Reed v. Reed (1971) it held gender classifications in the law must be "reasonable and not arbitrary," but this ruling was too broad to have great effect. A series of specific decisions has since struck down gender differences in drinking ages, in police and fire department hiring, in insurance and retirement plans, and in sports coaching in public schools. Nonetheless, gender differences persist, partly due to discrimination, partly to the conflict of family and work roles in women's careers, and partly due to the inertia of women's career choices
The intelligent thing would be for the states to get out of the business of marriage with all that sanctity stuff and issue civil unions only. If you wish to get married in church go ahead and do so.
The two concluding paragraphs from the USSC decision in Lawrence v. Texas.
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c) Bowers’ deficiencies became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States, including Texas, that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. Casey, supra, at 851–which confirmed that the Due Process Clause protects personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education–and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624–which struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals–cast Bowers’ holding into even more doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. Although the offense is but a minor misdemeanor, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged, including notation of convictions on their records and on job application forms, and registration as sex offenders under state law. Where a case’s foundations have sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater significance. In the United States, criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied on values shared with a wider civilization, the case’s reasoning and holding have been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers’ holding has not induced detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel against overturning it once there are compelling reasons to do so. Casey, supra, at 855—856. Bowers causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after it contradict its central holding. Pp. 12—17.
(d) Bowers’ rationale does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens concluded that (1) the fact a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, [B]even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process[/B]. That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled. This case does not involve minors, persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners’ right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in private conduct without government intervention. Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and private life. Pp. 17—18.
Prohibition against gay marriage does not hold up under the due process clause either. I would not label the opponents homophones, I would label them authoritarians.