According to this article on SpaceDaily, Iran getting nukes is inevitable. The first sentence of the article sums it up:

The article goes on to state several reasons why this will be the case.

1. Though Iran has halted work, Iran is less than two years away from achieving its goal.
2. The process of refining weapons-grade material is essentially irreversible.
3. Dubya and the Brits do not have a clear policy for Iran's nukes.
4. Though US officials have stated that Iranian nukes are unacceptable, there appears to be no clear strategy to prevent it.

Do you agree or disagree with the Iranian nuke "inevitability" thesis? If so, what should be done about it and what will the repercussions be? If not, why?

Nothing is inevitable and it is clear Iran will pay a high price in sanctions if they pursue this course.

We should also remember that Israel is not likely to sit by if Iran develops nukes and becomes aggressive. Remember what Israel did to Iraq.

Of course it is inevitable. Nobody in the world has the gumption to do anything about it. Bush does...but he has neither the resources nor the support to do anything.

The UN should handle this situation, but like in the situationas of Somalia, Rhwanda, Sebreca Massacre, and the Sudan...they are nowhere to be found.

Iran cannot become a nuclear power. The danger is unfathomable. But they will be allowed to continue and whatnot because nobody will do anything about it. Nobody cares until 3000 of their own citizens die at once. It truly is unfortunate that we allow tyrants to make nuclear weapons without repercussions. You can make all the diplomatic treaties that you want but it doesnt mean anything if you are unwilling to punish those who violate it. In our legal system...you break the law then u go to jail. It doesnt work that way in the international community...you can do whatever you want as long as it has no effect on our interest.

Do you agree or disagree with the Iranian nuke "inevitability" thesis? If so, what should be done about it and what will the repercussions be? If not, why?

Yes, it probably is inevitable, because for years the West stood by and let our "allies" in Pakistan sell their nuclear technology to whoever paid them the most. And it's worth remembering we only palled up with the Pakistanis because the Indians asked Russia for help in developing nukes, and the Indians only did that because we in the West were adamant nobody could have nuclear weapons. Except us, of course. And the Israeli's, who got their bombs from France, which technically was as illegal as the Iranians acquiring them, but nobody seemed to mind that either.

What should be done about it? Make nice with Iran now, as the EU and Britain in particular have been doing, so we have some influence that doesn't require nuclear conflagration to exert it, and so when Iran does get the bomb, they won't be hostile to the international community, because they'll be part of it, not pariahs from it. The repurcussions of this might be a more pleasant and peaceful world.

What should not be done? We shouldn't let ourselves think that the Iranians will aggressively use nuclear weapons if they have them. The Iranians have not been a violently interventionist state in their region or elsewhere, and while they have been state sponsors of terrorism from time to time, they have no innate sympathy with the Sunni Wahabist extremists that are the real problem in the WoT, being Sunnis. There is no more (or less) reason to think Iran will use their notional nukes against us than there was to think that Israel, Pakistan, or India would use them aggressively. All it means is that Iran would have to come off the drawing board for the next phase of the neocons Grand Plan for Perpetual Struggle.

Of course, if we even accidentally give the impression that the WoT is in any way a War on Islam itself, that goes out the window. Brothers stop fighting one another when it becomes clear the whole family is under attack, after all.

One of the things we should have learned from the past three years, and the two decades that led up to them, is that gearing everything in our foriegn policy decision making to one key area of concern for ourselves (1945-1990 = communicsm; 2001-date Islamic extremism) is just too much of a blunt instrument; much of the extent of the problem of Islamicism today is the indirect and unintended by-product of our exclusive focus on communism during the Cold War (tolerating dictatorships that were usefully anti-communist while suppressing democratic movements that were vaguely left-leaning, for one thing; and additionally tolerating specifically Islamic extremist states that sold us cheap oil).

The problem with Iran obtaining nuclear weapons isn't necessarily that they will use them. Their open and clear violation of the NPT (as recognized by the IAEA, and by Iran itself) will likely destroy confidence in future nonproliferation enforcement. This will have a destabilizing effect in the Middle east (and likely the world). Enforcement of the NPT is not possible without enforcers. We'll face with the challenge of adapting to Iran’s status without compromising other nonproliferation agreements.

That said, I'm not sure how it can be done without great monetary pain, mostly to Europe and China. Oil makes up 80 percent of the exports from Iran. Europe and China have invested in pipelines and import oil from Iran (I don't think we do). They could threaten to sanction in the event of non-compliance, and pull the legs out from under those pipeline projects. The EU (and hopefully China and Russia, though I'm doubtful since they likely contributed to Iran's nuclear capability to begin with) could use those projects, and sanctions, as carrots and sticks. We could use large quantities of promised aid, plus a guarantee of non-aggression from us, if they comply and agree to inspections, termination, and scaling back of their project. I believe the EU and US thus far have been engaging in a world-scale game of good cop-bad cop, hoping to persuade Iran. Those roles have been natural. The US needs to come to the negotiating table, and the EU will (if they hope to preserve the NPT and legitimacy of the IAEA) need to start talking tough.

Inevitability is a pretty esoteric rhetorical device.

Pragmatically, there are several visible considerations that help to keep Iran on the nuke path.

1.) Israeli policies benefit, if Iran is thought to be more dangerous.
2.) Soviet, er, Russian policy is augmented by a scarier Persian Gulf.
3.) The geopolitical tactics of the United States are enhanced, by a standoff situation in southwest Asia.

The top-level players are all using the Middle East/Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia for several different but, um, inevitably related and interacting strategic purposes, all at the same time. The question of Iran's nuclear capability is an important piece on this game-board. Note that the mere question is valuable and useful.

There are several key interests who see it as desirable to have a small nuclear war, to break the ice, to remind everybody, and thus to heighten the value of nuclear weapons for those who have them. Others of course oppose this scenario.

The decision to invade Iraq can be easily read as our defacto decision on what to do about Iran's desire/willingness to play the nuke card.

One might argue that stating "inevitability is a pretty esoteric rhetorical device" is a pretty esoteric rhetorical device.

In the interest of pragmatism, do you have any evidence to support these conclusions?

Umm... how? We kinda sorta lost credibility with the whole "if you have nuclear weapons we'll invade" thing. It can more easily be read as our defacto decision on what to do when we want a strategic advantage in a region. If we had invaded N. Korea when it announced its willingness to "play the nuke card", I could see your point... that could be easily read as that type of defacto response. Iraq? Nah.

Did you read the article? Here's the quote from the source:

It goes on to give reasons why this is so:

1. redundancy
2. deeply buried labs
3. labs located in civilian areas

As for sanctions, I doubt they would be very effective. Iran has already discussed its willingness to weather them should their national security be threatened.

They couldn't weather sanctions very well if the world refused to buy their oil supply. As with Libya, the cost to them wouldn't be worth the benefit. We could also offer some form of written, tangible assurance that their security will not be threatened if they make those concessions.

Of course, we could always threaten to unleash the debauchery of the west on them from the air with 'operation porn and alcohol drop', or somesuch.

They could definitely weather sanctions by the US and possibly UK; they could probably weather sanctions imposed by the UN for a little while (though it would be very difficult). It is unlikely though that the UN would impose sanctions on Iran; it didn't do so for Pakistan or India. Iran's security is threatened by Israel as well as US military presence in three neighboring nations. A piece of paper is not nearly as convincing as a military presence. From Iran's perspective, there is no reason to believe that a treaty with the US would actually be followed.


Or we could continue to threaten Iran with "Axis of Evil" status. We could continue to make veiled and not so veiled threats. Iran knows that nukes essentially guarantee they will be taken seriously on the world stage, and they are not likely to give up when so close to producing them.

So, the US could impose sanctions or invade are the only two options I see. If the US could get the UN to follow along, then there might be real "meat" to the threat. But, I don't believe that the UN would do so mostly because quite of bit of political capital has already been spent by the US as well as the precendence set by Pakistan and India. Even if there were to be a revolution tomorrow in Iran and a pro-West democratic government were installed, then I still believe it is in Iran's best strategic interest to have nukes.

Neither Pakistan, nor India signed the NPT. Iran is a signatory. Even North Korea's initial acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability occurred before the international system declared it to be in clear violation. This is the distinction between Iran and other nuclear powers. If the UN does nothing here, it is creating a precedent for future violations. The US does sanction Iran already, for the most part, doesn't it? It's up to the others now.

This is a fair response. However, I suspect that Iran may choose to renege on the NPT, or perhaps, more realistically, interpret the NPT in such a way as to permit their ongoing "research". Iran could choose to unsign itself from the NPT: I'm not sure what the implications of that would be. Anyway, there are ways around the NPT quandary.