We invaded Iraq in order to prevent Saddam from using his WMD on us. When we discovered that he had no WMD, we realized our error and decided that we had actually invaded Iraq in order to establish democracy in that benighted country. So we set up a democracy and last January elections were held. Conservatives reveled in their I-told-you-so’s to skeptics. Democracy had triumphed.
Except for the fact that one election does not a democracy make. So I decide to sit down and analyze the factors that might affect successful democratization of Iraq.
I began by compiling a list of all the countries of the world. Then I threw out the 100+ countries that are little more than stumpers in twisted geography tests: you know, countries such as Burkina Faso, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and San Marino. That left me with 116 countries.
Next, I obtained the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indeces for these countries. These are pairs of numbers that estimate the degree of democratization in various countries all over the world. Such measurements have been around since the 70s, and the methodology behind them is no longer controversial. Each value runs from 1 (pure, clean democracy) to 7 (unmitigated tyranny). The two values can be averaged together to obtain a fairly good estimate of the overall “democracy-ness” of a country.
The average “democracy-ness” of all 116 countries came out to 3.50, with a sample standard deviation of about 2.07.
The next step was to come up with five simple boolean traits that characterize the body politic of a nation. These five traits, and the definitions I used for the purposes of this study, are as follows:
1. Muslim majority. Is a majority of the population Muslim?
2. Linguistic polarization: are linguistic differences intense enough to underlie a significant degree of political conflict?
3. Ethnic polarization: are ethnic differences intense enough to underlie a significant degree of political conflict?
4. Sectarian polarization: are sectarian differences intense enough to underlie a significant degree of political conflict?
5. Tribal polarization: are tribal differences intense enough to underlie a significant degree of political conflict?
I then gathered together all the countries that met condition #1. Their average “democracy-ness”value came to 5.4 plus or minus 1.18. That’s a huge difference from the world average of 3.5. This strongly suggests that Muslim countries are very undemocratic.
Next came condition #2: Linguistic polarization. It had an average of 3.6 plus or minus 2.12. That’s not a significant difference from the world average.
Then I calculated the results for condition #3: Ethnic polarization. The result, 3.55 plus or minus 1.47, isn’t significantly different from the world average.
But when I calculated the results for condition #4 (Sectarian polarization), I obtained an average of 4.33 plus or minus 1.97. That’s a significant difference, but not a huge one. Apparently sectarian differences do hinder democratization.
Lastly, condition #5 (Tribal polarization) yielded a whopping 5.41 plus or minus 1.39. That’s a serious difference. Countries with serious tribal polarization aren’t very democratic.
So now let’s apply these results to Iraq. Iraq meets all five conditions. Applying the results from the previous tests suggests that Iraq should naturally gravitate towards a value of about 5.4 or perhaps slightly lower. That’s about the same value as we find in such pillars of democracy as Egypt, Russia, Rwanda, and Tunisia.
In other words, all this talk about a free and democratic Iraq is nonsense. This little analysis of mine has plenty of flaws, to be sure, but it demonstrates just how difficult it will be to establish a democracy in such a nation.
Questions for debate:
Is it likely that our efforts in Iraq will yield a functioning democracy in that nation? What kind of result do you expect to see in 20 years: functioning democracy, a 5.5 dictatorship, or civil war? I'd like to address your question for debate in a thoughtful manner, but it begins badly with a false premise. We did not attack Iraq out of fear that Saddam would "use his WMD on us". That is not true. We attacked Saddam because he had repeatedly refused to abide by the terms of the cease fire (after the gulf war) and the UN resolutions associated with that surrender and was believed (by nearly ALL western governments) to be pursuing a program of WMD's which, it was feared, he would make available to terrorist organizations intent on a 9/11 style attack. Also, at multiple decisions points along the march to this current war, Saddam was given ample opportunity to defuse the situation by allowing free and open inspections of his country.... which he thwarted at every sense thus behaving EXACTLY like a guilty person and solidifying the belief of the US (and most of the world) that he had something to hide.
Is it likely that our efforts in Iraq will result in a functional democracy? Yes.
What will we see in 20 years? A democracy. In fact, we'll see that in 2005 and a "functional democracy" before the end of Bush's term. Sure, one election doesn't make a democracy. That was true in the USA also. But Bush will be in office until 2009 which precludes the possibility of a future spineless president from being elected until then who would rather run than stand on principle. That fact will keep this process on track.
The next place to experience democracy (in spite of the left promising that it will never happen) will be Iran. And that country is the big enchilada in this big war on terror.